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Abstract   
This study examines elements of tax avoidance activity, incentives to hold cash 
and determinants of corporate social responsibility (CSR) of Chinese listed firms over 
the 2006 to 2013 period. Evolution in compliance around tax avoidance and firms’ CSR 
practices is particularly important in the Chinese context. Prior research has largely 
been carried out on the tax avoidance activities of firms in the U.S. or Europe, with little 
corresponding research in the Chinese context (Cai and Liu 2009; Chan et al. 2013). 
Because capital flows into and out of China are important in assisting with economic 
growth, Chinese multinational firms trade extensively with overseas jurisdictions. This 
provides opportunities for those firms to engage in financial, regulatory, taxation and 
reporting arbitrage. Additionally, in January 2008, the Chinese State Administration of 
Taxation (SAT) introduced new tax rules relating to aggressive tax avoidance activities, 
including rules relating to the use of tax havens (Sutherland, Matthews and El-Gohari 
2012). The determinants of Chinese firms’ cash holding levels and the extent of CSR 
disclosure are of importance, given the rapid changes in governance structures and 
reporting requirements of firms in the face of rapid regulatory change and economic 
growth. Three essays are developed that separately examine each of the aforementioned 
attributes: tax haven utilization, level of cash holdings, and extent of CSR disclosures. 
The first chapter of the thesis gives an overall introduction to the three essays. 
It presents the motivation and the background of the thesis, and a summary of the main 
findings from each study.  
The first essay presented as Chapter Two, examines the association between 
CSR and tax haven utilization of Chinese listed firms. Supported by tenets of agency 
and legitimacy theory, regression results show that the extent of positive CSR activities 
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reflected by way of existence of CSR awards, increased CSR disclosure levels, and the 
existence of CSR related donations is negatively associated with tax haven utilization. 
The more extensively firms engage in activities designed to enhance their connections 
with society, including the community, shareholders, and government, the less likely 
they are to use tax haven jurisdictions. Tax haven jurisdictions provide avenues for 
Chinese multinational firms to engage in obscure and complex taxation or financial 
arrangements that may be reflected in a lack of legitimacy by those firms. In addition, 
a statistically significant positive association between strength of governance structures 
and tax haven utilization demonstrates that efficiency in governance regimes assists 
firms utilizing and engaging complex arrangements via tax haven utilization. This essay 
contributes to the existing CSR and sparse tax avoidance literature in the Chinese 
context.  
The second essay, presented as the third chapter, examines the determinants of 
Chinese firms’ cash holdings. Regression results show that tax haven utilization has a 
significant positive association with firms’ level of cash holdings. Further, a statistically 
significant positive association between the strength of governance structures and firms’ 
level of cash holdings is evident. In China, round tripping of foreign direct investment 
funds is evident, particularly in the case of large, profit-making public State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). Tax havens provide a platform to facilitate the circular transfer of 
funds into and out of China because of the secrecy granted transactions in those 
jurisdictions, including secrecy regarding the establishment and use of bank accounts. 
In fact, tax haven use assists Chinese firms to reduce their business costs, negates the 
effect of regulatory impediments relating to the use of funds and assists in expanding 
their capital markets. The potential benefits associated with the use of tax havens appear 
to exceed potential costs, leading to the observed positive association between firms’ 
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cash holdings and tax haven utilization. Chinese firms with large controlling 
shareholders and better governed firms are expected to have lower agency costs. This 
potentially reduces market frictions, such as adverse selection (where firms may invest 
excess funds in poor projects) or rent extraction (where funds are used for the benefit 
of directors or minority parties at the expense of shareholders). This essay contributes 
to the literature on firms’ incentives to hold cash in a major relations-based economy. 
Using tenets of legitimacy theory tenets, the third essay presented as chapter 
four, examines the determinants of Chinese listed firms’ CSR disclosures. Regression 
results show that the extent of CSR disclosures are negatively related to firms’ use of 
tax haven jurisdictions and positively related to the monitoring pressure applied by the 
Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection by way of an environment watch-list 
registrar, the quantum of philanthropic donations made by a firm, and receipt of 
environmental and social awards by a firm. This research is timely and important, given 
the rapid economic growth and industrialization of China and the increased importance 
placed by the Chinese government on the reporting and accountability of firms.  
Lastly, chapter five concludes the thesis and presents directions for future 
research.  
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Chapter 1 
Three essays on tax haven utilization, cash holdings and 
determinants of CSR disclosures: evidence from Chinese listed 
firms 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Chapter One discusses the objectives, motivation, and the contribution of this 
research. Collectively, three essays examine the determinants and consequences of tax 
haven utilization, firms’ level of cash holdings and determinants of CSR disclosure 
practices.  
Over the past decade, Chinese firms have had to implement CSR initiatives and 
integrate CSR into a wide range of their business practices. Support for CSR plans, 
strategies and disclosures has come about through regulatory changes, Chinese firms 
international dealings and the publication of articles regarding the benefits of 
sustainability on both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. Whilst key 
stakeholders such as consumers and shareholders may drive CSR disclosure practices 
of Western firms (such as those in the US or Australia), government influence appears 
to be the driving force behind increased CSR disclosures of Chinese firms. State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) have encouraged compliance of Chinese firms with sustainability 
practices as they promote this as being of immense benefit to the government. 
Interestingly, CSR practices of Chinese firms are inter-linked with such activities as 
education programs or assistance with welfare, community services and healthcare. The 
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social practices and involvement of Chinese companies may therefore be far-reaching 
and encompass a diverse range of community initiatives. Given the pervasive effect of 
social and environmental issues on Chinese firms, an important research question to 
consider is to examine the key determinants of Chinese firms’ disclosure practice. 
Additionally, the payment of taxes by corporations in China is considered to be the right 
thing to do for the government, thus firms’ use of tax havens, which are invariably 
associated with secrecy, obscurity and complex tax avoidance activities, raise 
significant concerns about firms’ legitimacy. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis and summary of findings 
This thesis is structured in a three-essay format. The three essays examine 
distinct but interrelated issues surrounding Chinese listed firms’ tax haven utilisation, 
cash holdings and CSR behaviour. Collectively, the thesis investigates important 
aspects of Chinese public firms’ contemporary behaviour, including their justification 
of the controversial utilisation of tax havens, cash holding behaviour and broad CSR 
activities. Overall, the thesis contains five chapters. The remainder of the thesis is 
structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 presents the first essay, which investigates the association between 
firms’ utilization of tax havens and their legitimacy-driven activities (which include 
CSR related activities and corporate governance). According to Zheng, Luo, and 
Maksimov (2015), managers’ perceptions of different forms of pressure affect firms’ 
CSR behaviour. A firm’s choice to use tax havens may be of great concern to the firms’ 
core stakeholders, such as shareholders and employees. On the other hand, firms’ CSR 
activities, such as corporate philanthropy, awards gained by involvement in various 
community commitments and CSR disclosure, on the other hand, attempt to address 
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broader stakeholders’ legitimacy concerns, and are not used as justification of firms’ 
tax havens use.  
The regression results show that the extent of positive CSR-driven activities 
reflected by way of corporate philanthropy, CSR awards, and CSR disclosures, are 
positively associated with not utilising tax havens. Further, the empirical results provide 
evidence to suggest a statistically significant positive association between strength of 
governance structures and tax haven utilization. This suggests that managers aim to 
justify their involvement in tax havens by adopting a better governance practices.  
Chapter 3 presents the second paper of the thesis. It examines the determinants 
of Chinese firms’ cash holdings. Specifically, this study investigates if ownership 
structures, the utilisation of tax havens, and the strength of corporate governance 
structures are associated with firms’ levels of cash holdings. Outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) by large Chinese enterprises has become increasingly prevalent in 
recent years (WIR 2008). Interestingly, the destinations of China’s OFDI are highly 
concentrated in three offshore financial centres and tax havens: Hong Kong, the British 
Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. Few accounting and finance studies have 
examined the association between the level of cash holdings and the utilisation of tax 
havens. In addition, agency conflicts also play a significant role in forming the cash 
holdings policy of firms. While studies based in the US and other western countries 
focus on the agent-principal conflict, the Chinese market also experiences another type 
of agency conflict, which is principal-principal conflict (Young et al. 2008). This is due, 
in part, to the highly concentrated shareholding structure of large Chinese firms. Hence, 
this study further examines the effect of ownership structures and governance structures 
in shaping the cash holding policies of Chinese firms.     
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The empirical results show that tax haven utilization is positively associated 
with firms’ levels of cash holdings. This result suggests that Chinese firms with a large 
amount of cash are more likely to utilize tax havens in order to seek potential benefits, 
such as saving costs on transactions, regulatory arbitrage and business secrecy. Further, 
results of the multiple regression show that there is a significant positive association 
between ownership concentration, the strength of governance structures and firms’ 
levels of cash holdings. This suggests that managers of firms which have large 
controlling shareholders and stronger governance structures may be constrained from 
investing excess funds in projects with poor returns. They may also be prevented from 
extracting funds for self-interest or the interests of major parties at the expense of small 
shareholders.  
Chapter 4 presents the third essay of the thesis. Based on the legitimacy 
perspective of CSR, corporations employ various strategies to obtain and maintain their 
desirability in society (Suchman 1995). A key goal of legitimacy concerns managing 
the perception of stakeholders, which involves strategic communication about social 
and environmental issues. This essay examines the extent of CSR disclosure.    
Regression results show that extent of CSR disclosure is negatively related to 
firms’ use of tax haven jurisdictions. The results also suggest that factors such as the 
monitoring pressure applied by the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection by 
way of an environment watch-list registrar, the quantum of philanthropic donations 
made by a firm, and receipt of environmental and social awards by a firm, are significant 
drivers of the extent of Chinese public firms’ CSR disclosure. This research is timely 
and important given the rapid economic growth and industrialization of China and the 
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increased importance the Chinese government is placing on the reporting and 
accountability of firms.  
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the major findings and an overall conclusion 
to the three essays. This chapter also discusses policy implications and possible 
directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
The relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and corporate governance on tax haven 
utilization: empirical evidence from Chinese firms 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is multi-dimensional in nature, with firms 
adopting CSR practices for environmental, social, cultural and financial reasons 
(Deegan and Shelly 2013). Following Moser and Martin (2012), a broad perspective of 
CSR is utilized that encapsulates all corporate actions which affect firms’ stakeholders. 
Specifically, the association between tax haven 1  utilization and the CSR 
communication practices of publicly-listed Chinese firms is examined in this study 
because CSR engagement with stakeholders affects the risk-shifting behaviour of a 
firm’s management. This may have flow-on consequences in terms of management’s 
propensity to use tax haven jurisdictions for tax avoidance practices to facilitate capital 
management objectives or to take advantage of financial and regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities.  
The motivation to undertake this study stems from several key factors. First, 
there is limited research investigating the use of tax haven jurisdictions by Chinese 
firms (Cai and Liu 2009; Chan, Lin and Mo 2010; Zeng 2010; Wu et al. 2012; Chan et 
al. 2013). The tax haven utilization of U.S. firms has been studied far more extensively. 
                                                             
1 Various governmental and academic sources define tax havens on the basis of certain key characteristics 
(e.g.Hines and Rice 1990; Wilson 2009); U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008a; GAO, 
2008b; the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2012). Tax havens are 
jurisdictions where there are nominal (or no) taxes, have laws or administrative practices that enable a 
lack of transparency relating to financial and taxation arrangements and limited access to financial 
records (Desai). A list of tax havens identified by the OECD is given in Appendix 2.A.   
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Second, aggressive use of tax haven domiciled entities is a mechanism that may 
facilitate aggressive tax avoidance. As a result, Chinese firms’ use of tax havens has 
become a recent area of focus for the State Administration of Taxation, and is now 
included in the recent Chinese General Anti-Avoidance (GAAR) tax reforms (SAT 
2014). Hence, it is important to investigate whether firms consider the use of tax havens 
contradictory to the positive, socially responsible images they are building. Further, if 
firms are found to be involved in tax haven operations, will they conform to their 
internal legitimacy demands by establishing a higher standard corporate governance 
structure? 
The regression results are based on a data sample of 704 firm-years covering 
publicly listed Chinese firms during the 2006-2013 period. They show that the extent 
of positive CSR driven activities (reflected by way of CSR related donations, CSR 
awards, and the extent of CSR disclosures), has a significant negative association with 
tax haven utilization by these firms. Further, a statistically significant positive 
association between strength of governance structures and tax haven utilization is found. 
The results are robust to alternative proxy measures of tax haven utilization and a series 
of other robustness checks. This study contributes to the existing CSR and tax 
avoidance literature by investigating the link between these variables. 
This study makes the following contributions. First, it provides unique empirical 
evidence that assesses the association between CSR communication practices and tax 
haven utilization. A negative association is evident. This finding suggests that firms 
engage in and report on CSR activities as a risk management strategy. It also suggests 
that firms use CSR related activities and reporting as a mechanism to legitimatize their 
operations and to sustain or enhance firms’ linkages with key stakeholders, in particular 
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the Chinese government (Godfrey 2005; Chalmers and Godfrey 2004). Second, this 
study extends the tax avoidance literature by demonstrating that firms in China may 
regard the aggressive use of tax havens as contrary to the Chinese government’s policy 
on tax avoidance. Therefore, firms may choose to engage in more CSR communication 
and less tax haven utilization to ensure that they are behaving responsibly based on 
societal expectations. This association is likely to be relevant to firms, as it may affect 
whether they are able to engage in other business activities that require licenses from 
the government. Overall, this study provides important evidence regarding the 
implications of CSR performance for firms’ risk management and their propensity to 
engage in aggressive tax avoidance activities vis-a-vis tax haven utilization. This study 
extends (and differs) from the work of Lenssen and Preuss (2010), Preuss (2012) and 
Col and Patel (2016) in two ways. First, it examines the relationship between the extent 
of CSR reporting and tax haven use in a major relations-based economy (China). 
Second, it examines how this relationship changed based on implementation of new tax 
rules China introduced in January 2008. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the background 
to the study, section 2.3 provides the theory and section 2.4 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 2.5 discusses the research design, including the sample and statistical 
techniques. Section 2.6 summarizes the empirical results and section 2.7 concludes the 
paper.  
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2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Tax havens  
Past research has been undertaken on tax avoidance practices in the U.S., 
Europe and Australia. However, limited research has been conducted on corporate tax 
avoidance practices of Chinese listed firms and in particular their use of tax havens. 
China is the focus of this study for a number of reasons. First, the tax avoidance 
practices of Chinese firms have gained increasing attention, particularly with regard to 
the abusive use of tax havens (Buckley et al. 2015; Sutherland, Matthews and El-Gohari 
2012). Chinese authorities have reported significant losses in tax revenue as a 
consequence of tax haven utilisation. In January 2008, new Chinese legislation was 
introduced, which included measures to limit the use of tax havens as a means to avoid 
paying tax. The OECD, and tax authorities such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
in the United States, consider the use of tax havens to be an important mechanism for 
firms to reduce their tax liabilities. Such utilisation has also been reported by the OECD 
to be the main reason why an increasing number of firms have experienced a long-run 
decline in effective tax rates. The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) has stated 
that the use of tax havens is an area in which they are focusing compliance resources. 
In recent years, the role of tax havens in assisting with the economic, financing and 
taxation objectives of firms has gained a considerable amount of notoriety (Desai, Foley 
and Hines 2006a; Desai and Dharmapala 2006).  
Tax havens are characterised by relatively low tax rates and poor information 
exchange, transparency and accountability. A relatively low corporate tax rate is the 
basic feature of tax havens. The lack of transparency and accountability also contributes 
to the existence of tax havens. As an OECD requirement, to be a transparent tax regime, 
   Page 23 of 169 
 
taxes must be imposed and collected in accordance with relevant legislation and the 
details of the tax system must be available to the tax authorities of other countries. Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006) suggest that tax haven operations facilitate tax avoidance by 
permitting firms to allocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions and also 
by reducing the burden of home country taxation of foreign income. Profits of 
multinational corporations are assigned to the jurisdiction where it is earned (Desai, 
Foley and Hines 2006b). Desai and Dharmapala (2006) believe that larger tax havens 
are used to reallocate income while smaller tax havens are used to defer tax. 
Subsidiaries incorporated in tax havens can become an important part of a multinational 
corporation’s tax plan. Tax havens usually have their own secrecy policies, including 
policies covering banking secrecy and the protection of corporate information.  
Large multinationals are more likely to use tax havens, suggesting that there are 
economies of scale in using them to avoid taxes (Rego 2003). Indeed, firms that 
incorporate subsidiaries in tax havens are often associated with tax avoidance activities 
that are often reflected in greater accounting income to taxable income (book-tax) 
differences and lower effective tax rates (Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010). Chinese firms 
tend to use Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands as offshore 
financial centres (Buckley, Sutherland, Voss, & El-Gohari, 2015; Sutherland et al., 
2012). By 2003, the Cayman Islands accounted for some 28.3 per cent of total Chinese 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI from China to the Cayman Islands then increased 
to 44 per cent (US $7.83 billion) by 2006 (Sutherland et al., 2012). By this time, the 
British Virgin Islands (BVI) and Cayman accounted for 47.5 per cent of Chinese 
outward FDI flows by 2006. Although the BVI was a less important destination for 
outward capital flows from China, that jurisdiction formed an important conduit for 
capital flowing back into China (Sutherland et al., 2012).  
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There are a number of incentives for Chinese firms to utilize offshore tax havens. 
Firstly, the utilization of tax havens enables some businesses to hide or protect their 
property from changes to, or inconsistencies in the application of China’s laws. China’s 
legal system is known for its uncertainty in making and implementing laws (Xu, Zeng 
and Zhang 2011). According to Xu, Zeng, and Zhang (2011), China’s SAT is able to 
amend the tax legislation at any time to serve its own agenda, as the SAT has the 
ultimate right to interpret tax law in China. The lack of legally protected property rights 
would encourage Chinese firms to use tax havens to commit tax avoidance or tax 
evasion (Wong and Chun 2016). 
Secondly, the use of tax havens provides firms with opportunities for 
institutional arbitrage (Boist and Meyer 2008). Chinese outbound FDI to tax havens is 
generally thought to involve assets transferred outside of the country through tax havens. 
This is with the aim of accomplishing preferential treatment of foreign capital, both 
domestically and internationally (Luo and Tung 2007).  
Finally, there is mounting evidence suggesting that tax haven operations may 
involve tax evasion, money laundering and other unlawful activities (Weichenrieder 
and Xu 2015). For example, tax haven affiliated subsidiaries have been found bribing 
government officials (Gordon 2009). According to Sharman (2010, 129), “transactions 
processed through the corporate account of such shell company become effectively 
untraceable – and thus very useful for those looking to hide criminal profits, pay or 
receive bribes, financial terrorists, or escape tax obligation.” In a similar vein, Hebous 
and Lipatov (2014) find that the demand for tax haven operations  is higher in highly 
corrupt countries. Further, Schwarz (2011) maintains that tax havens encourage money 
laundering by refusing to implement regulations and policies that would expose money 
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laundering activities. In addition, many researchers argue that the utilization of tax 
havens produces more harmful effects in developing countries than it does in developed 
countries (Schjelderup 2015). The secrecy of tax haven jurisdictions can also encourage 
crime and corruption (Sikka 2010). Collaboration amongst accounting firms, law firms, 
financial institutions and not-for-profit organizations enabled large multinational firms 
to legally transfer their profits to tax havens to avoid paying domestic and foreign tax 
(Sikka 2010; Sikka and Willmott 2010; Sikka and Hampton 2005). Some researchers, 
such as Slemrod and Wilson (2009), refer to tax havens as parasitic in nature and claim 
that the removal of some tax havens would benefit the public in general. Overall, tax 
havens have been identified as a prime cause of the progressive reduction in firms’ 
effective tax rates over the past 15 years (SAT 2014). 
2.2.2 CSR issues and development in China 
In 2010, China became the second largest economy in the world, only smaller 
than America ("Second in Line"  2010). China’s economy grew rapidly during the 
global financial crisis, performing better than many other OECD and emerging 
economies during that time (OECD 2013). However, as China consumes more energy 
and raw materials, it has become one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases and 
other pollutants. China has already become one of the largest contributors to global 
climate change, and since 2007 has been the world’s  leading emitter of sulphur dioxide 
and carbon dioxide (EPA 2008). In 2012, China accounted for 27% of global carbon 
dioxide emissions, exceeding the combined total of the USA (14%) and the EU (7%) 
(Arup 2013). 
Following China’s rapid economic reform, social issues, especially violations 
of labour rights, have also become pertinent. The logo “Made-in-China” is not only 
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associated with cheap products, but is also associated with wage arrears, dangerous 
working environments and prolonged working hours (Lin 2010). It was not until 2008 
that the government toughened the Labour Contract Laws to protect disadvantaged 
workers (Hao and Chen 2014). Recent food safety scandals also revealed some 
appalling behaviour by companies that pursued profit at the expense of human welfare. 
For example, in 2008, Sanlu Group (one of the largest dairy companies in China) 
produced baby formula with melamine contaminated milk causing thousands of 
children to be hospitalised (Yan 2012). New parents were reported to have serious 
concerns about domestic brands and indicated a preference for  imported milk if they 
could afford it (Hatton 2013). 
As increasingly serious social and environmental problems have been posed, 
China has implemented a number of regulatory and legislative changes to deal with 
them (Chan and Welford 2005). China enacted its first Environmental Protection Law 
in the late 1970s, and by the year 2000 it had enacted some 43 environmentally related 
laws (Zhang 2001). Legislative changes have recently included new laws relating to 
environmental disclosures in firms’ reporting media. For instance, CSR is explicitly 
written into recent Chinese company law (2006) such that  
“in the course of doing business, a company must comply with laws and 
administrative regulations, conform to social morality and business ethics, act in good 
faith, subject itself to the government and the public supervision, and undertake social 
responsibility” (Lin 2010, 8).  
A “Guide Opinion on the Social Responsibility Implementation for the State-
Owned Enterprises controlled by the Central Government” was released in 2008 by the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). It 
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encourages state-owned enterprises to follow sound CSR practices and report on CSR 
activities ("Current Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National 
Governments and Stock Exchanges"  2012). Further, the “Green Securities” policy 
requires listed companies to disclose more information about their environmental 
record. The “Green IPO” policy issued by the SASAC requires enterprises in energy-
intensive industries to undergo an environmental assessment by the Ministry of 
Environment Protection before initiating an IPO or obtaining refinancing from banks 
("Current Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National Governments 
and Stock Exchanges"  2012).  
In addition, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) issued the “Shanghai CSR 
Notice” and the “Shanghai Environmental Disclosure Guidelines”. Both of these are 
designed to strengthen listed companies’ accountability regarding social responsibility. 
SSE listed companies that promote CSR are offered incentives, including priority 
election into the Shanghai Corporate Governance Sector, or simplified requirements for 
examination and verification of temporary announcements. The SSE has also developed 
the concept of social contribution value per share (SCVPS) to measure a company’s 
value creation relating to CSR activities. An SSE social responsibility index based on 
SCVPS was created and started trading on 30th June 2009(Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Social Responsibility Index Information  2009). The aim of this index is to promote 
positive social and environmental behaviour and also to attract ethical investment. The 
Shanghai Environmental Disclosure Guidelines allow for the SSE to take “necessary 
punishment measures” against companies that violate of disclosure rules ("Current 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National Governments and Stock 
Exchanges"  2012, 4).  
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2.3 Theory 
CSR suggests how businesses manage the social and environmental effect of 
their activities on society (Deegan and Shelly 2013). These activities may generate 
economic benefits for both society and the firm (Moser and Martin 2012). China has 
no regulatory requirements mandating disclosure of CSR activities by listed firms. 
Firms voluntarily disclose CSR activities and a likely consequence is that the reporting 
of such activities will vary widely. There is increasing evidence that firms communicate 
their CSR activities as part of a risk-management strategy designed to enhance the 
reputation of firms and management. In fact, an increasing number of firms that value 
a good relationship with their stakeholders, include the government, regulatory bodies, 
employees, customers and the general public (Hartnett 2008). Reporting and engaging 
in CSR activities may thus protect the firm from the risk of adverse environmental, 
social, political or legal impediments and sanctions (Godfrey 2005; Minor and Morgan 
2011). Poor CSR reporting practices are likely to reflect a firm’s weak CSR orientation 
and may lead to loss of firm or management reputation, increased political or regulatory 
pressure, and fines or increased liabilities. Alternatively, CSR engagement and 
reporting may generate financial benefits for a firm. Indeed, the combined benefits of 
CSR engagement may out-weigh any associated costs. Accordingly, firms could, to 
some degree, manage their financial and reputational disposition by increasing CSR 
activities and reporting (Godfrey 2005). A firm’s attitude and actions in relation to CSR 
also encapsulates broader considerations regarding legality and ethics (Schön 2008)). 
Prior studies that examined the relationship between CSR reporting and tax 
avoidance initially suggested that socially irresponsible firms are more likely to engage 
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in aggressive tax avoidance activities (Christensen and Murphy 2004; Hartnett 2008; 
Freedman 2003). Using a sample of 408 Australian public firms, Lanis and Richardson 
(2015) provide evidence that suggests a negative association between CSR disclosure 
and aggressive tax behaviour. Considering there is a gap between firms’ voluntarily 
disclosed CSR and their actual CSR performance, Lanis and Richardson (2015) find 
that socially responsible firms are less likely to be tax aggressive. This result is 
consistent with Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2013)’s findings, which show a positive 
association between firms having excessive socially irresponsible activities and the 
likelihood of incorporating tax sheltering activities. This study examines the association 
between firms’ CSR related activities (including specific CSR reputation management 
and firms’ disclosure practices) and the utilisation of tax havens. It also extends prior 
research that has examined the association between CSR performance or reporting and 
tax avoidance. This is done by incorporating some unique explanatory factors that 
encapsulate positive CSR evaluations, philanthropy, and ultimately, firms’ strategic 
disclosure of broad CSR activities in CSR reports.  
Both prior studies and government reports have shown that firms use tax havens 
for multiple reasons. These can include tax avoidance (as firms are subject to nominal 
or no taxes in those jurisdictions), augmenting the flow of funds amongst group entities, 
reducing business costs and overcoming legal or regulatory impediments. Tax havens 
also assist firms to expand their markets and to compete effectively with their peers. 
Overall, firms use tax havens for legitimate financial or legal activities as well as to 
assist in a reduction of group tax liabilities (Womack and Drucker 2011). 
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2.4 Hypothesis Development 
2.4.1 CSR activities and tax havens 
The relationship between corporations’ social and sheltering behaviour is sophisticated 
and gives rise to voluminous debate. The sophisticated relationship is due to vastly 
diverged perceptions and expectations of the two concepts in light of different cultural, 
social, political and economic contexts. Despite the fact that the CSR industry (which 
captures data, advocates, researches and advises) continue to mature, there is still yet to 
be unanimous agreement as to what precisely falls under social responsibility. There 
will probably never be a closed boundary, as the scope of CSR constantly evolves and 
expands. Corporations’ tax paying behaviour has only been brought under the 
microscope of CSR studies in recent years (Sikka 2010; Christensen and Murphy 2004; 
Dowling 2014; Davis, Guenther, Krull, & Williams, 2016; Hoi et al., 2013). For the 
purpose of this study, the use of tax havens is not taken as a proxy of tax avoidance as 
they serve multiple purposes for businesses. It is argued that incorporating registered 
subsidiaries in tax havens facilitates overall business operation by seeking efficient cash 
flow management, taking advantage of regulatory benefits, reducing transaction costs 
and competing in a global market. In addition, this study does not obtain direct evidence 
linking the utilisation of tax havens to firms’ tax avoidance outcomes. Thus, it is not 
the intention of this study to examine the relationship between tax avoidance and 
corporations’ CSR behaviour. Nonetheless, the utilisation of tax havens is considered a 
moral hazard, and contradictory behaviour by firms who claim that they are socially 
responsible (Schjelderup 2015). In other word, this study considers the involvement of 
tax haven dealings will damage firms’ social reputation. Despite all the legitimate 
business reasons behind corporate decisions to incorporate in offshore tax havens, such 
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behaviour is undoubtedly associated with illegal activities, such as “market rigging, 
insider trading, making illicit political donations, embezzlement, fraud, and payment of 
bribes and commission kickbacks” (Christensen 2011, p.178).  The incorporation of 
subsidiaries in tax havens, therefore, gives rise to a general perception of secretive 
dealings, which is contradictory to any positive and transparent efforts to build social 
capital (such as CSR disclosures).    
Based on risk management theory (see Godfrey 2005; Col and Patel 2016), a 
consistent CSR approach predicts firms that are engaging in CSR activities will be less 
likely to rely on the use of tax havens for financial assistance. Firms with a positive 
CSR orientation may have reputational capital at stake and as such may be less inclined 
to use tax havens for taxation, financial or regulatory arbitrage opportunities. The 
reason for this is that firms which successfully engage in CSR activities are likely to 
reap the general financial benefits of doing so, and thus may be less likely to pursue 
aggressive tax avoidance practices through the use of tax havens. Additionally, firms 
engaged in tax haven use have come under increased scrutiny from taxation and other 
government agencies. In fact, as a consequence of using tax havens, many U.S. 
multinational firms have received negative media coverage (such as Apple, Google and 
Starbucks). Firms which have built a positive reputation with stakeholders through CSR 
engagement may not want to lose their good reputation by simultaneously participating 
in the complex and obscure practices typically associated with tax haven use. Tax 
havens are typified by a lack of information exchange and weak reporting of financial 
transactions, due to the weaker regulatory regimes common in such jurisdictions. Thus, 
firms that are actively engaged in CSR activities and communicate information about 
them in their annual report are not likely to be simultaneously engaging in a lack of 
information exchange and transparency by using tax havens.  
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Corporate culture theory (see Col and Patel 2016), suggests firms should be 
paying their fair share of taxes based on a “shared belief” of right behaviour. Using tax 
havens to avoid taxes and the reporting of financial transactions is an ethical issue. Thus, 
in accordance with corporate culture theory, a firm is not likely to simultaneously 
engage in effective CSR practices and tax haven use. A negative association between 
CSR disclosure practices and tax haven use is thus likely. Christensen (2016) finds that 
CSR reports have monitoring and insurance mechanism, which provides guidance to 
firms’ economic, social and environmental activities. Additionally, Christensen (2016) 
find firms that actively engage in CSR disclosure are less likely to associate with high-
profile misconduct such as bribery and harassment.  
However, it is evident that many corporations claim they are socially 
responsible while avoiding paying their fair share of tax (Dowling 2014). Sikka (2010) 
highlights the disparities between corporations’ double standards in saying and doing 
as hypocritical. In forming the hypothesis 1, this study takes organisational hypocrisy 
into consideration. However, the empirical evidence of the relationship between CSR 
related activities and the utilization of tax havens is largely untested in accounting and 
finance literature, especially in Chinese context. Consequently, this study develops the 
hypothesis based on risk management theory and corporate culture theory that firms 
extensively engaging in CSR activities are less likely to use tax haven incorporated 
subsidiaries than their counterparts. Therefore the following (directional) hypothesis is 
developed: 
H1: Chinese firms’ use of tax havens is negatively associated with the extent of 
CSR-driven activities reflected in corporate philanthropy, community achievements 
and CSR disclosure. 
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2.4.2 Governance structure and tax havens 
This study also examines the association between the strength of governance 
structures and firms’ use of tax havens. The association between governance structures 
and tax avoidance in general has been extensively researched, but few studies have 
examined the association between firms’ governance structures and tax haven use. 
Recent evidence suggests that firms’ governance structures have an important effect on 
the propensity of management to engage in tax planning (see Desai and Dharmapala 
2006; Dharmapala 2008; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Richardson, Taylor and Lanis 
2013a). There is conflicting evidence as to whether effective governance structures will 
assist firms to be more successful at tax avoidance or not. Similarly, it is an empirical 
question as to whether stronger governance structures will affect firms’ use of tax 
havens and if so, what the direction of that relationship is. 
Research undertaken by Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010) and Richardson, 
Taylor, and Lanis (2013b) found that boards of directors affect firms’ propensity to 
engage in tax avoidance through their monitoring and oversight roles, and also by 
influencing the compliance framework of the firm. It is considered that a board of 
directors with effective governance characteristics (e.g. independence, a different 
chairman and managing director, consistent meeting attendance) is less likely to engage 
in risky tax avoidance activities that may include the use of tax havens. Effectively 
governed firms are less likely to engage in complex and obscure tax arrangements and 
may be less inclined to actively engage in aggressive tax planning (Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006; Richardson, Taylor and Lanis 2013b).  
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While strong corporate governance structures are likely to reduce the incidence 
of corporate tax avoidance, effective governance structures may reflect higher levels of 
efficiency in terms of resource use and ability to compete with peers. Minnick and Noga 
(2010) find that effective governance structures are positively associated with corporate 
tax avoidance. Specifically, they find that better governed firms assist management to 
make more informed and more effective investments and to use the firms’ resources 
more efficiently - which also includes making effective tax arrangements. Effective tax 
management can increase management’s use of tax havens because tax havens assist in 
resource allocation, reducing income tax expense and creating shareholder wealth 
(Minnick and Noga 2010). Whilst the board of directors serves as an internal control 
monitoring mechanism, certain governance factors may increase firms’ strategic use of 
tax havens. For instance, independent directors may be able to draw upon their industry 
experience to increase a firm’s competitive abilities through the use of tax havens. 
Similarly, independent directors may be willing to divert resources to tax haven use to 
ensure firm competiveness, an increase in investment opportunities and enhanced firm 
performance. Minnick and Noga (2010) suggest that firms where the roles of CEO and 
chairman are carried out by the same person underperform relative to their peers. These 
firms tend to have lower levels of tax management as they are less motivated to perform 
well. Similarly, boards that have a separate CEO and chairman are motivated to use tax 
havens as a mechanism to enhance firm performance.  
In a Chinese corporate governance reform of 2002, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued a U.S. style “code of corporate governance” 
for listed companies. In addition to prescribing specific board structure requirements, 
the code grants legal powers to minority shareholders so that they have equal status 
with other shareholders (Conyon and He 2011; Rajagopalan and Zhang 2008). Under 
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the U.S. style of corporate governance structures, a well governed board with attentive 
and experienced board members can effectively oversee capital expenditure or 
scrutinize management’s spending (Harford, Mansi and Maxwell 2008). It also 
increases the transparency of the firm’s operations. Tax haven dealings can significantly 
jeopardise a strong board’s efforts and create increased information asymmetry. A 
strong internal governance structure can be reflected by factors such as BOD 
independence, directors’ outside directorship, directors’ age, meeting attendance and 
CEO and chairman duality (Taylor, Tower and Neilson 2009; Eng and Mak 2003; 
Barros, Boubaker and Hamrouni 2013; Ho and Wong 2001; Chua, Eun and Lai 2007). 
Whilst examining the efficacy of adopting the “code” is not within this study’s scope, 
companies compliant with the suggested code of conduct are expected to achieve 
efficient governance mechanisms over the long term. Firms with stronger internal 
governance may restrict or even stop the firms’ usage of tax haven incorporated 
subsidiaries.  
H2: All else being equal, strength of corporate governance structure is positively 
associated with tax haven utilization. 
2.5 Research design 
2.5.1 Sample selection and data source 
This chapter examines the tax haven utilization of the top 100 Chinese firms (by 
total assets) listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) over the period 2006–2013. 
This period was chosen because it includes the January 2008 implementation of new 
tax rules (GAAR) in China in. Two criteria were applied when selecting sample firms: 
continuous financial data must be available for the 2006–2013 period and firms must 
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have had a continuous listing on the SSE during this time. The top 100 companies were 
ranked according to total assets in 2013. This study chose the largest Chinese listed 
firms as these are more likely to use tax havens and to report on their CSR activities, 
consistent with the approach followed by Gao (2008).  
The initial sample comprised the top 200 non-financial and non-insurance firms 
listed on the SSE during the 2006-2013 period. The sample was reduced to 100 firms 
(704 firm-year observations) after excluding firms without at least four years of CSR 
reports. Consistent with Gao (2008), large Chinese firms play an exemplary role in 
Chinese CSR practice. This is not only because these companies have the resources to 
engage in CSR disclosure, but also because of the increasing societal demand for such 
information to be more transparent to the public (Gao 2008). Other data was obtained 
from Capital IQ. Overall, 704 firm-year observations were available for empirical 
testing. Financial and insurance firms were excluded because of the differences in 
reporting and regulatory practices of these firms. Finally, tax haven and CSR data was 
hand collected from the annual reports to obtain relevant data for the measurement of 
the variables, not all of which were available in electronic form in public databases. 
Under IAS 24 Related Party Transactions and IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate 
Financial Statements, it is a requirement for publicly listed Chinese firms’ annual report 
to contain a list of their subsidiaries (including the country in which they are 
incorporated). Therefore, the data relating to the use of subsidiaries incorporated in tax 
havens can be identified for the purpose of this study.  
2.5.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is represented by the occurrence of material tax haven 
operations (TH_LN) as disclosed in firms’ annual reports. Firms’ use of tax havens is 
   Page 37 of 169 
 
measured as a dummy variable (TH_Dummy), coded as 1 if the firm has at least one 
subsidiary incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven2, or 0 otherwise. The use 
of a dummy variable to measure the utilization of tax havens has been applied in 
previous research by Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Dharmapala and Hines (2009) and 
Taylor and Richardson (2012).  
2.5.3 Independent variables 
The independent variables in this study comprise CSR-driven activities and the 
strength of corporate governance. Three variables are examined to test the first 
hypothesis, which is the association between the utilisation of tax havens and CSR-
driven activities. They are corporate donations (Don_ln), awards (Awards_ln) and a 
CSR disclosure index (TotCSR). Firms’ donations (Don_ln) represent the donation 
expense recorded in their annual reports. This variable is used as an explanatory 
variable because charitable contributions are considered to be an important component 
of CSR. They are associated with a positive corporate image and possible financial 
returns (Godfrey 2005; Brammer and Millington 2006; Brammer and Millington 2008).  
Undoubtedly, philanthropic donations made by Chinese corporations are likely 
to be heavily influenced by the Chinese government. According to Lin et al. (2015), 
Chinese corporate donors accounted for two-thirds of their country’s philanthropic 
donations in 2010, whilst in America that figure was only five percent. The significant 
difference is partly due to extensive Chinese government intervention, which creates 
the demand for (and the supply of) politically oriented CSR activities (Lin et al. 2015). 
                                                             
2 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) identifies three key factors in 
considering whether a jurisdiction is a tax haven: (1) no or nominal taxes; (2) lack of effective exchange 
of information; and (3) lack of transparency. The OECD (2006) recognizes a total of 33 tax havens around 
the world. The OECD’s (2006) complete list of 33 tax havens is reported in Appendix 2.A. 
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China’s economic reforms have been transforming the nation’s government-controlled 
economic model to a market-oriented one. However, the government, at both central 
and local levels, still has absolute control over essential resources such as land use rights, 
access to financial capital and energy including electricity, gas and petrol prices (Chen 
et al. 2011). In addition, the government has discretionary power to grant businesses 
“fiscal subsidies, tax benefits, low-cost land, and waivers of enterprise liabilities” or 
impose extra fees and fines when the government needs discretionary income to 
supplement insufficient tax revenues  (Chen et al. 2011, 231). It is therefore important 
for firms to establish political connections in order to minimise such discretionary 
charges. Under such institutional settings, corporate philanthropy is adopted as a legal 
form of political rent-seeking strategy which in turn benefits firms economically (Gao 
2011).   
However, achieving political legitimacy is not the only motivation for Chinese 
firms to engage in philanthropic donations. Empirical studies have found that corporate 
donations are positively associated with corporations’ financial performance (Wang 
and Qian 2011). To this end, corporate philanthropy aligns with firms’ economic 
rationality. Donations often attract media attention, which is essential in building a 
positive public image and reputation. Hence, corporate philanthropy can be viewed as 
a strategic marketing mechanism which can effectively enable firms to address non-
business societal issues and gain social capital to sustain economic performance (Zhang, 
Rezaee and Zhu 2009).  
Chinese firms’ philanthropy behaviour cannot be solely explained as a political 
response. As the China’s transitional economy grows, the government is no longer the 
sole player in society. Consumers (or the larger community) have become a large force 
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with their own voice. To this end, corporate donation is also a pro-social behaviour 
which is driven by the public exerting pressure (Gao, Faff and Navissi 2012). For 
example, consider the philanthropic donations to disaster relief, made in response to 
China’s Wenchuan Earthquake of 2008 for example.3 Massive donations were made by 
Chinese firms to the affected areas. While the Chinese government played a significant 
role in encouraging the business sector to make contributions in aftermath of this 
catastrophic event, the general public also overwhelmingly influenced firms’ donations. 
Vanke Co., Ltd, one of the largest public property developers, initially donated 2 
million RMB donation. They were later forced to make another 100 million RMB 
donation due to overwhelming complaints from Chinese communities. The criticism 
caused a dramatic fall in the company’s share price. This market reaction provides clear 
evidence that firms’ donations are economic decisions which affect firms’ access to 
scarce societal recourses other than political alliances with the government.    
A negative association between the use of tax havens and corporate 
philanthropy is predicted for two reasons. Firstly, corporations engage in charitable 
donations in order to raise their corporate reputation and gain better public relationships 
with relevant stakeholders. Chen et al (2016) find that the publicity corporations gain 
from charitable donations attracts public and media monitoring, and eventually will 
result in decreased information asymmetry between firms and external stakeholders. 
They find that managers who are actively participating in philanthropic causes are less 
likely to engage in tunnelling activities4, which may damage their public image and 
                                                             
3 The Wenchuan Earthquake which registered at 8.0 Richter scale occurred in Wenchuan 
County, Sichuan Province, on May 12th 2008. More than 87,000 people died and many more 
were injured. It also caused enormous economic losses with an estimated total of 845.1 
trillion RMB  (CCTV.com 2008).   
4 In a contemporary Chinese market context, tunnelling refers to actions taken by parent 
companies to extract private profit from their subsidiaries (Chen et al. 2016). For example, these 
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career prospects. This study argues that associating with tax haven dealings will have 
similar consequences that raise public distrust of businesses. Thus, it is unwise for firms 
that contribute significant charitable donations to allow the negative publicity of tax 
haven dealings to compromise their efforts.  
Secondly, due to the role Chinese government plays in corporate donations, a 
negative association between donation levels and tax haven use is predicted. Corporate 
charitable giving in China has largely been driven by political interference (Li, Song, 
& Wu, 2014; Chen et al. 2016). This was most evident following the Sichuan 
earthquake, when the government explicitly requested firms to donate towards disaster 
relief (Jia & Zhang, 2011). Li et al. (2014) find that highly politically connected firms 
are also more likely to donate. Therefore, the amount of donations should reflect the 
government’s coercion or power to influence corporate philanthropic actions. Given the 
fact that the Chinese government is clearly opposed to firms avoiding taxes (Wang 2016) 
by using tax havens5, it is expected that those firms who make charitable donations as 
a result of the government’s influence are less likely to be found to have in tax haven 
dealings. 
The association between a unique reputational risk management factor, 
Awards_ln and tax haven use is further examined. According to Unerman (2008), firms 
have reputational capital at stake and are aware of the fact that their financial and 
competitive positions may be determined by how they engage with society. In order to 
develop and actively manage a strong social reputation, firms try to avoid negative 
                                                             
actions include not repaying funds borrowed from subsidiaries and transferring economic 
resources from subsidiaries in form of dividends (Chen, Jian and Xu 2009).      
5 In 2014, the SAT issued specific rules targeting companies who have transactions with related 
parties located in tax havens (PWC 2014). Specifically, the SAT issued a circular, “Gonggao 
No.16”, which denies the deductibility of royalty and intangible payments to related parties that 
are not deemed as substantially functioning (Wang 2016).   
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publicity and actively publicize their positive achievements. Awards_ln is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the total number of awards disclosed in a firm’s annual report. 
Consistent with Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde (2016), in response to public pressure, 
firms would be less inclined to engage in aggressive tax planning if they seek to 
maintain their reputational capital in society. Therefore, firms that actively manage a 
positive social image would be less likely to use tax havens to engage in aggressive tax 
planning. Total CSR disclosure (TotCSR) is measured as an index based on the Global 
Reporting Index (GRI) version 3.0 that comprises a maximum of 70 social and 
environmental items. TotCSR is the natural logarithm of the CSR score. Essentially, 
CSR disclosure can be seen as a manager’s attempt to reduce information asymmetry 
between the firm and the general public, with the aim of maintaining their licence to 
operate in society and enhance performance (Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer 2013).   
The corporate governance score (Gindex) consists of five variables: the 
proportion of the board that are independent directors; the proportion of the board with 
outside directorships; the board of directors’ average age; board meeting attendance 
and duality of the CEO and chairmanship. Consistent with Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew (2010), firms’ top executives are likely to influence firms’ decisions to 
incorporate subsidiaries in tax havens. Both poorly-governed and well-governed firms 
have incentives to utilize offshore tax havens; however, well-governed firms are more 
inclined to incorporate subsidiaries in tax havens. Tax havens offer a number of 
perceived benefits that would appeal to management. These benefits could potentially 
include improved credit ratings, a reduced cost of debt, and increased market 
capitalization (Graham and Tucker 2006; McGill and Outslay 2004; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006). Well-governed firms are motivated to engage in complex tax 
planning and are often rewarded instead of penalized by the market, because tax haven 
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is consistent with shareholder wealth creation (Wilson 2009). These governance items 
are individually assessed as dichotomous variables, scored as ‘1’ if they are above the 
median value of each variable or ‘0’ otherwise, and as a corporate governance index 
(Gindex), calculated as the sum of the five governance items scaled by 5.    
2.5.4 Control variables 
The control variables for this study are denoted by the book to market ratio 
(BVMV), firm size (SIZE), return on assets (ROA), foreign revenue (FORE), net 
property, plant and equipment (TANG), intangible assets (INTG), research and 
development (RD), politically connected directors (POL), big-4 auditors (BIG4), audit 
fees (AUDFEE), government ownership (GOV), industry sector (INDSEC) effects and 
year (YEAR) effects. BVMV is included in the model to control for differences in firm 
growth. According to Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006b), firms with higher growth are 
more likely to establish tax haven operations to achieve economies of scale. Similarly, 
Chen et al. (2010) find that firms with high growth or investment opportunities are 
likely to pursue a more complex operational and/or tax environment in order to 
efficiently control the flow of funds and reduce the cost of capital (Kim and Li 2014). 
BVMV is measured as the book value of equity over the market value of equity.  
SIZE is also included as a control variable in the regression model, following 
Chen et al. (2010)’s findings that smaller sized firms in China are less likely to 
incorporate subsidiaries in tax havens. Similarly, Rego (2003) claims that larger firms 
are more capable of utilizing complex tax strategies (including incorporating in tax 
havens) to achieve economies of scale in order to reduce corporate taxes. Further, 
reflecting the potential non-tax incentives of tax haven utilization, larger firms are likely 
to achieve economies of scale in their ability to borrow or raise capital at lower costs 
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and are better able to sustain earnings than smaller firms (Klassen et al. 2004). SIZE is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is included in regression models 
to control for operating performance and firm profitability. As most of the tax havens 
offer very low or zero tax rates, firms are attracted to utilizing subsidiaries incorporated 
in tax havens to strategically manage their tax payments by moving profits from high 
taxing jurisdictions to lower taxing ones (Taylor and Richardson 2012). Kim and Li 
(2014) also find that more profitable firms can rely on their availability of resources to 
establish tax haven registered entities, particularly offshore financial centres. ROA is 
measured as pre-tax profit scaled by total assets. FORE is controlled for in the 
regression models because firms with foreign operations, especially those that have 
significant foreign income, would be more likely to utilize tax havens to strategically 
manage their financial position (Wilson 2009). Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006b) also 
find that firms with extensive foreign operations are more likely to establish foreign 
subsidiaries in tax havens. FORE is measured as the natural logarithm of total foreign 
revenue. The total net value of property, plant and equipment (TANG) is included as a 
control variable to control for capital intensity (Bradshaw, Liao and Ma 2012). TANG 
is measured as net property, plant and equipment over total assets. 
Prior research has demonstrated that firms use intangibles and research and 
development to avoid tax (Clausing 2009; Sikka and Willmott 2010). Therefore, both 
intangible assets (INTG) and research and development (RD) are incorporated into the 
model as control variables. INTG is measured as total intangible assets scaled over total 
assets and RD is measured as total R&D expenditure scaled over total assets. POL is 
included in the regression model to control for the political power and connections of 
members of the board of directors. POL may affect management’s decision to 
incorporate entities in tax haven. It may affect the risk or strategic orientation of 
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management, in relation to how aggressively they could use tax havens to manage the 
firm’s tax burden. As Kim and Zhang (2016) identified, politically connected board 
members bring valuable political resources to firms. This may empower these firms to 
engage in riskier investments and potentially aggressive tax planning activities. There 
is compelling evidence to suggest firms that are highly politically connected are less 
financially transparent (Houston et al. 2014; Leuz and Oberholzergee 2006). Using tax 
havens enhances firms’ financial secrecy (Kudrle 2009). POL is measured as the total 
number of politically connected BOD members scaled over the total number of BOD. 
A politically connected director is either a member of the Chinese Communist Party or 
member of the People’s National Congress. Employment of Big 4 accounting firms 
(Big4) is included in the regression model to control for the likely involvement of elite 
accounting firms in incorporating of subsidiaries in tax havens for their clients. It is 
commonly accepted that the big four accounting firms provide higher quality audits as 
they have the required resources and processes with which to conduct an audit (Taylor 
and Richardson 2012).  
Also included are two variables to control for audit effects in the regression. 
First, Big-4 audit firms are also accused of orchestrating complex tax planning 
strategies which often involve establishing tax haven operations (Sikka and Hampton 
2005; Sikka and Willmott 2010). This is also evident in the results as 21.5 percent of 
the Big 4 accounting firms are associated with 43.5 percent of the number of tax havens. 
Therefore, Big 4 employment is incorporated as a control variable. Big4 is measured as 
a dichotomous variable, coded as ‘1’ if the firm’s annual report is audited by one of the 
Big 4 accounting firms, or ‘0’ otherwise. Similarly, audit fee is also included as a 
control variable to control for the audit firm’s financial dependence of the on the client. 
AUDFEE is measured as the natural logarithm of total audit fees. 
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Furthermore, government ownership is also included as a control variable as the 
sample includes state-owned enterprises (SOE). Due to their allegiance to controlling 
shareholders (the government), whencompared to non-SOEs, SOEs may be less likely 
to use tax havens to avoid paying tax to the Chinese government (Bradshaw, Liao and 
Ma 2012; Chen, Firth and Xu 2009; Wu, Rui and Wu 2013). Government ownership is 
measured as a dichotomous variable, coded as ‘1’ if the firm is an SOE (the government 
controls more than 50% of the equity in the firm), or ‘0’ otherwise.  
Finally, the effects of industry and year are fixed. IND dummy variables, 
defined by the two-digit Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes, are 
included as control variables in the regression model as tax haven use can fluctuate 
across different industry sectors (Rego 2003). Eight IND dummies are included in the 
study: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, healthcare, industrials, 
materials, telecommunication services and utilities (with consumer discretionary being 
the omitted sector in the regression model). No sign predictions are made for the IND 
dummies. YEAR dummy variables are also included in the regression model to control 
for differences in tax haven activities that could possibly exist over the 2006–2014 
sample years.  
2.5.5 Regression model 
The regression model used to examine the tax haven utilization is represented 
as follows: 6 
                                                             
6 Note that after taking into account the binary nature of TH_Dummy, logit regression analysis is 
employed to empirically test the hypotheses. TH_LN is a continuous variable, so the hypotheses are 
tested by using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. Furthermore, to obtain robust standard 
errors, the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of standard errors is used for the regression models 
(Wooldridge 2010). Also all continuous variables are winsorized (reset) at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
to mitigate the effect of outliers significantly influencing the empirical results. 
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TH_LNit = α0it + β1Don_lnit + β2Awards_lnit + β3TotCSRit + β4Gindexit + 
β5BVMVit + β6SIZEit + β7ROAit + β8FOREit + β9TANGit + β10INTGit + β11 FORE it + 
β12RD it + β13POL it + β14BIG4 it + β15AUDFEE it + β16-23YEAR it + β24-31INDSECit + εit
           (1) 
where: i is firms 1–100; t is financial years 2006–2013; TH_LN is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the total number of tax haven subsidiaries for each firm in year 
t; Don_ln = the natural logarithm of the total donation expense incurred by the firm; 
Awards_ln = the natural logarithm of the total number of awards disclosed in the 
company’s annual report; TotCSR = the natural logarithm of the number of 
environmental and social items, based on GRI 3.0 disclosures in firm i’s CSR report in 
year t; Gindex = the corporate governance score, comprising five governance items 
scaled by 5; BVMV = the book value of equity over the market value of equity; SIZE 
= the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = pre-tax profit over total assets; FORE = 
the natural logarithm of total foreign revenue; TANG = net property, plant and 
equipment scaled by total assets; INTG = the total intangible assets scaled by total assets; 
RD = the total R&D scaled by total assets; POL = the total number of politically 
connected BOD scaled by the total number of BOD; BIG4 = a dichotomous variable, 
coded as ‘1’ if the firm’s annual report is audited by one of the Big 4 accounting firms, 
or ‘0’ otherwise; AUDFEE = the natural logarithm of total audit fees; YEAR = a 
dummy variable, coded as ‘1’ if the year falls within the specific year category, or ‘0’ 
otherwise; IND = a dummy variable, coded as ‘1’ if the firm is represented in the 
particular two-digit GICS industry category, or 0 otherwise; and ε is the error term. 
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2.6 Empirical results 
2.6.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.1 (Panel A) provides the sample industry distribution based on the GICS. The 
sample includes a greater proportion of firms in industrials (40 percent), materials (21 
percent), and consumer discretionary (12 percent) sectors compared to the other 
industry categories. Moreover, Table 2.1 (Panel A) reports descriptive statistics of TH-
Dummy by industry classification (GICS). The incidence of at least one subsidiary firm 
incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven is more prevalent in the consumer 
discretionary (28.83 percent), industrials (27.93 percent) and materials (19.82 percent) 
sectors. 
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Table 2. 1 Summary Statistics  
 
Panel A: Industry Distribution 
Industry Name 
Total 
number of 
observations 
Percentage 
(%) of 
observations 
TH_Dummy 
(No. of firm 
years) 
TH_Dummy 
Relative 
Frequency 
(%) 
Ranking 
Consumer 
Discretionary 96 12 32 28.83 1 
Consumer Staples 56 7 6 5.41 6 
Energy 64 8 12 10.81 4 
Healthcare 40 5 0 0 7 
Industrials 320 40 31 27.93 2 
Materials 168 21 22 19.82 3 
Telecommunication 
Services 8 1 8 7.21 5 
Utilities 48 6 0 0 7 
Total 800 100 111 100% N/A 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Med 0.75 Max 
TH_LN 704 0.13 0.32 0 0 0 0 1.79 
Don_ln 704 0.51 1.74 -4.61 -0.22 0 1.54 6.41 
Awards_ln 704 1.2 1.14 0 0 1.39 2.2 4.84 
TotCSR 704 2.04 1.09 0.69 0.69 2.25 2.89 3.95 
Gindex 704 0.65 0.2 0 0.6 0.6 0.8 1 
BVMV 704 2.58 2 0 1.19 1.94 3.35 10.29 
SIZE 704 9.98 1.31 8 9 10 11 14 
ROA 704 0.07 0.06 -0.17 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.66 
FORE 704 4.22 4.27 0 0 4.98 7.52 24 
Tang 704 0.55 0.35 0 0.25 0.52 0.82 1.49 
INTG 704 0.05 0.06 0 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.31 
RD 704 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.06 
POL 704 0.24 0.22 0 0.08 0.2 0.33 1 
BIG4 704 0.27 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 
AUDFEE 704 7.38 1.17 5.63 6.62 7.09 7.77 11.85 
GOV 704 0.78 0.42 0 1 1 1 1 
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Table 2.1 (Panel B) reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable 
(TH_LN), independent variables (Don_ln , Awards_ln, TotCSR, and Gindex) and 
control variables (BVMV, SIZE, ROA, FORE, TANG, INTG, RD, POL, BIG4, 
AUDFEE and GOV). The dependent variable (TH_LN) has a mean of 0.13. For the 
independent variables, Don_ln, Awards_ln, TotCSR, and Gindex have means of 0.51, 
1.2, 2.04 and 0.65, respectively. The descriptive statistics of alternative measures for 
the dependent variable are provided in Panel C. The dependent variable TH_Dummy 
has a mean of 0.146, indicating that approximately 14.6 percent of the firms in the 
sample incorporated at least one subsidiary in a tax haven. The mean, median and range 
of the control variables are also reported in Table 2.1 (Panel B). 
2.6.2 Correlation results 
The Pearson correlation results are reported in Table 2.2. Significant 
correlations are found between TH_LN and TH_Dummy and the independent variables 
Don_ln, Awards_ln, TotCSR, and Gindex (p < 0.10 or better) and the control variables 
BVMV, SIZE, ROA, FORE, INTG, RD, POL, BIG4, and AUDFEE (p < 0.10 or better). 
Table 2.2 also shows that only moderate levels of collinearity exist between the majority 
of explanatory variables.7  Finally, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are calculated when 
estimating the regression models to test for signs of multi-collinearity between the 
explanatory variables. The untabulated results confirm that none of the explanatory 
variables’ VIFs exceed four. Thus multi-collinearity does not present a problem for the 
study (Hair et al. 2006).  
                                                             
7 As per Hair et al. (2006), if the correlation coefficient for a pair of explanatory variables lies 
between ±0.25 and ±0.75, then there is a moderate level of collinearity between the two 
variables. 
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Table 2.2: Pearson Correlation  
  TH_LN TH-Dummy Don_ln  Awards_ln TotCSR Gindex BVMV SIZE ROA FORE Tang INTG RD POL BIG4 AUDFEE GOV 
TH_LN 1                                 
TH_Dummy 0.9601* 1                               
Don_ln  0.0495 0.061 1                             
Awards_ln 0.073** 0.0821*  0.172*** 1                           
TotCSR 0.093*** 0.0902* 0.240*** 0.775*** 1                         
Gindex 0.059* 0.0348 -0.119*** -0.109*** -0.217*** 1                       
BVMV -0.099*** -0.0800* 0.054 -0.150*** -0.134*** -0.038 1                     
SIZE 0.254*** 0.2384* 0.403*** 0.369*** 0.521*** -0.194*** -0.227*** 1                   
ROA -0.094*** -0.0824*  0.151*** -0.142*** -0.129*** 0.05 0.317*** -0.089** 1                 
FORE 0.264*** 0.2860* 0.165*** 0.118*** 0.236*** 0.01 0.036 0.221*** -0.011 1               
Tang -0.004 -0.046 0.114*** 0.017 0.106*** -0.039 -0.046 0.229*** 0.041 -0.148*** 1             
INTG -0.067* -0.0742* 0.019 0.099*** 0.070** -0.011 -0.065* -0.049 0.131*** -0.112*** -0.053 1           
RD 0.066* 0.0792*  0.024 0.262*** 0.291*** 0.001 -0.03 0.081** -0.045 0.264*** -0.145*** 0.076** 1         
POL 0.116*** 0.0792*  0.132*** 0.055 0.140*** -0.113*** -0.107*** 0.438*** 0 0.051 0.166*** -0.01 -0.084** 1       
BIG4 0.160*** 0.1434*  0.245*** 0.117*** 0.191*** -0.172*** -0.088**  0.449*** -0.022 0.243*** 0.122*** 0.133*** -0.034 0.284*** 1     
AUDFEE 0.173*** 0.1638* 0.418*** 0.265*** 0.439*** -0.193*** -0.136*** 0.756*** -0.031 0.287*** 0.097*** 0.031 0.002 0.443*** 0.637*** 1   
GOV -0.005 -0.0138 -0.082** -0.004 0.105*** -0.203*** -0.046 0.199*** 0.049 0.077** 0.178*** 0.137*** -0.027 0.291*** 0.224*** 0.148*** 1 
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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2.6.3 Regression results 
The regression results are presented in Table 2.3 (with standardized coefficient 
estimates; t-statistics are in parentheses). Table 2.3 shows that the regression coefficient 
for Don_ln has a significant negative association with tax haven utilization (p < 0.01), 
thus H1 is supported. The more charitable donations firms make, the less likely they 
are to use tax havens. The regression coefficient for Awards_ln is negative and 
significantly associated with tax haven utilization (p < 0.1), thus providing support for 
H1. The regression coefficient for TotCSR is negative and significantly associated with 
tax haven utilization (p < 0.05 or better), so H1 is supported. Firms that intend to 
provide more extensive CSR disclosures are less likely to use tax havens. The 
regression coefficient for Gindex is positive and significantly associated with tax haven 
utilization (p < 0.05 or better), so H2 is supported. Firms that are well-governed are 
more likely to use tax havens. Finally, regarding the control variables, the regression 
coefficients for SIZE and FORE are positive and significantly associated with tax haven 
utilization (p < 0.01 or better). TANG is negative and significantly associated with tax 
haven utilization (p < 0.10 or better). 
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Table 2.3: Regression results 
      
 TH_LN 
   Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a 
Don_ln  -0.0219***                   
  (-2.81)                   
Awards ln   -0.0209*                  
   (-1.65)                  
TotCSR    -0.0403**                 
    (-2.53)                 
Gindex     0.1356**  
     (2.39)    
BVMV  -0.0046 -0.0048 -0.0041 -0.0050    
  (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.52) (-0.64)    
SIZE  0.0495*** 0.0384** 0.0486*** 0.0422*** 
  (3.13) (2.35) (3.07) (2.72)    
ROA  -0.1940 -0.2675 -0.2968 -0.2963    
  (-1.00) (-1.37) (-1.54) (-1.54)    
FORE  0.0159*** 0.0011*** 0.0165*** 0.0147*** 
  (5.11) (2.73) (5.25) (4.66)    
Tang  -0.0852** -0.1057*** -0.0756* -0.0984**  
  (-2.21) (-2.71) (-1.94) (-2.53)    
INTG  -0.2178 -0.3734* -0.2222 -0.2468    
  (-1.11) (-1.89) (-1.13) (-1.25)    
RD  0.1293 1.5925 0.3347 0.1279    
  (0.13) (1.61) (0.33) (0.13)    
POL  0.0477 0.0767 0.0591 0.0589    
  (0.80) (1.27) (0.99) (0.99)    
BIG4  0.0229 0.0315 0.0212 0.0318    
  (0.69) (0.93) (0.64) (0.95)    
AUDFEE  -0.0108 0.0025 -0.0121 -0.0154    
  (-0.59) (0.14) (-0.67) (-0.85)    
GOV  -0.0437 -0.0110 -0.0243 -0.0108    
  (-1.49) (-0.38) (-0.84) (-0.36)    
Intercept  -0.1342 -0.0813 -0.1064 -0.1335    
  (-1.06) (-0.67) (-0.86) (-1.03)    
YEAR FE  YES YES YES YES 
IND FE  YES YES YES YES 
N  704 704 704 704    
adj. R-sq  0.233 0.207 0.232 0.231    
Variable definitions: TH_LN refers to the natural log of the total number of tax haven 
subsidiaries from the entire sample. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  
aStandardized coefficient estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. 
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2.6.4. Robustness check – alternative tax haven utilization measure 
A robustness check of the main regression results (see Table 2.4) is performed 
based on an alternative measure of tax haven utilization (TH_Dummy). Specifically, 
TH_Dummy is measured as a dummy variable, coded as 1 if there is at least one 
subsidiary incorporated in a tax haven. Consistent with the main regression results 
presented in Table 2.3, statistically significant regression coefficients are shown for 
Don_ln, TotCSR and Gindex (p < 0.05 or better). However, Awards_ln is negatively 
but not significantly associated with TH_Dummy. These findings provide additional 
support for H1 and H2. Finally, for the control variables, Table 2.4 shows that the SIZE, 
ROA, FORE, TANG and INTG regression coefficients are positively and significantly 
associated with TH_Dummy (p < 0.10 or better) in some of the regression models. 
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Table 2.4: Logit Regression Results - alternative measure 
 
  TH_Dummy   
  Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a 
Don_ln -0.2614***    
 (-2.84)    
Awards_ln  -0.1959   
  (-1.31)   
TotCSR   -0.6036***  
   (-2.86)  
Gindex    1.6696** 
    (2.32) 
BVMV 0.0393 0.0337 0.0574 0.0480 
 (0.39) (0.34) (0.55) (0.48) 
SIZE 0.4636** 0.3903* 0.4713** 0.3740* 
 (2.20) (1.83) (2.23) (1.82) 
ROA -4.9008 -4.3730 -6.7192** -6.8354** 
 (-1.64) (-1.60) (-2.24) (-2.34) 
FORE 0.1769*** 1.8456*** 0.1894*** 0.1631*** 
 (4.37) (3.51) (4.57) (4.03) 
Tang -1.3081** -1.1223** -1.1430** -1.3741** 
 (-2.33) (-2.05) (-2.00) (-2.39) 
INTG -8.2100** -7.9524** -7.5343* -8.6415** 
 (-2.09) (-2.12) (-1.94) (-2.22) 
RD 11.3835 22.5236** 12.3721 11.1176 
 (1.02) (2.15) (1.11) (1.03) 
POL -0.2260 0.4163 0.0917 -0.0644 
 (-0.26) (0.50) (0.11) (-0.07) 
BIG4 0.2705 0.0680 0.1978 0.3360 
 (0.57) (0.15) (0.42) (0.70) 
AUDFEE -0.0979 0.0308 -0.1260 -0.1675 
 (-0.38) (0.12) (-0.48) (-0.65) 
GOV -0.6946** -0.2596 -0.4116 -0.3138 
 (-2.00) (-0.78) (-1.22) (-0.92) 
Intercept -4.0996** -4.2375*** -3.6899** -3.8948** 
 (-2.50) (-2.87) (-2.27) (-2.29) 
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES 
N 616 616 616 616 
adj. R-sq 0.234 0.213 0.235 0.229 
Variable definitions: TH_Dummy = a tax haven dummy variable, coded as 1 if the firm has at 
least one tax haven subsidiary, or 0 otherwise.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The p-values are one-tailed for directional hypotheses and 
two-tailed otherwise. aStandardized coefficient estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. 
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2.6.5 Robustness check - Firm fixed effects 
As previously mentioned, inferences about the association between tax havens 
and the independent variables (Don_ln, Awards_ln, TotCSR and Gindex) are based on 
a pooled sample and time-series regression analysis, where multiple annual 
observations for the same firm are used. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and the within-firm clustering (Petersen 2009) in the main regression 
models helps to alleviate this concern. However, the robustness of the regression results 
is considered by estimating a firm fixed-effects regression model version of Eq. (1), in 
which every firm and every year in the sample is assigned a dummy variable (similar 
to Wooldridge 2010). The regression results in table 2.5 indicate that the regression 
coefficients for TH_ln are statistically significant (p < 0.05 or better) for all independent 
variables. Hence, these regression results show that the main results are not necessarily 
driven by any omitted time-invariant firm characteristics (Wooldridge 2010). 
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Table 2.5: Fixed effects 
  TH_LN 
 Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a 
Don_ln  -0.0219***                   
 (-2.81)                   
Awards_ln  -0.0209*                  
  (-1.65)                  
TotCSR   -0.0403**                 
   (-2.53)                 
Gindex    0.1356**  
    (2.39)    
BVMV -0.0046 -0.0048 -0.0041 -0.0050    
 (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.52) (-0.64)    
SIZE 0.0495*** 0.0384** 0.0486*** 0.0422*** 
 (3.13) (2.35) (3.07) (2.72)    
ROA -0.1940 -0.2675 -0.2968 -0.2963    
 (-1.00) (-1.37) (-1.54) (-1.54)    
FORE 0.0159*** 0.0011*** 0.0165*** 0.0147*** 
 (5.11) (2.73) (5.25) (4.66)    
Tang -0.0852** -0.1057*** -0.0756* -0.0984**  
 (-2.21) (-2.71) (-1.94) (-2.53)    
INTG -0.2178 -0.3734* -0.2222 -0.2468    
 (-1.11) (-1.89) (-1.13) (-1.25)    
RD 0.1293 1.5925 0.3347 0.1279    
 (0.13) (1.61) (0.33) (0.13)    
POL 0.0477 0.0767 0.0591 0.0589    
 (0.80) (1.27) (0.99) (0.99)    
BIG4 0.0229 0.0315 0.0212 0.0318    
 (0.69) (0.93) (0.64) (0.95)    
AUDFEE -0.0108 0.0025 -0.0121 -0.0154    
 (-0.59) (0.14) (-0.67) (-0.85)    
GOV -0.0437 -0.0110 -0.0243 -0.0108    
 (-1.49) (-0.38) (-0.84) (-0.36)    
Intercept -0.1415 -0.0719 -0.0814 -0.1493    
 (-1.08) (-0.57) (-0.65) (-1.11)    
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
N 704 704 704 704    
adj. R-sq 0.224 0.197 0.222 0.221    
Variable definitions: TH_Dummy = a tax haven dummy variable, coded as 1 if the firm 
has at least one subsidiary incorporated in tax haven, or 0 otherwise.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The p-values are 
one-tailed for directional hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise. aStandardized 
coefficient estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. 
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2.6.6 Blundell-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) regression analysis 
As another endogeneity check of the baseline regression results reported in 
Table 2.3, this study employs the Blundell-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) 
regression analysis to more accurately control for potential time-invariance correlated 
with omitted variables in this study (Wintoki, Linck and Netter 2012; Kubick and Masli 
2016; Tian and Lau 2001). To estimate the system GMM, the lagged dependent variable 
and the TH_LN are treated as endogenous variables. The results of the Blundell-Bond 
GMM regression analysis are reported in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 shows that the regression coefficient for dependent variables 
[Don_log, Awards_ln, TotCSR and (Gindex)] are negatively (positively) and 
significantly associated with TH_LN across all regression model specifications (p < 
0.05 and better). Hence, this particular set of results provides additional support for the 
hypothesis. The results also find that some of the regression coefficients for the control 
variables are significantly associated with TH_LN in the regression models such as 
SIZE, ROA, FORE, TANG, BIG4, AUDFEE, and GOV (p < 0.10 or better with 
predicted signs). In addition, further post-estimation tests are conducted to test the 
inference. Untabulated results find that measures of autocorrelations (1) and (2) confirm 
the existence of first order autocorrelations, but not the second order. Finally, the 
‘Sargan test’ confirms the exogeneity and validity of the instruments used. 
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Coefficient estimates with t-statistics reported in brackets. *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
  
Table 2.6: Blundell-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) regression analysis 
TH_LN 
 Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a 
L.TH_LN 0.9637*** 0.9604*** 1.0377*** 0.9747*** 
 (183.05) (47.66) (341.33) (206.65)    
Don_log -0.0076*** - - -                
 (-2.86) - - -               
Awards_ln - -0.0426** - - 
 - (-2.04) - - 
TotCSR - - -0.0164*** -               
 - - (-7.08) -             
Gindex - - - 0.0358**  
 - - - (2.21)    
BVMV 0.0010 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0002    
 (0.96) (-0.19) (1.12) (0.24)    
SIZE 0.0047* 0.0126* 0.0035** 0.0026    
 (1.82) (1.71) (2.23) (1.47)    
ROA -0.0371** -0.1134* -0.0750*** -0.0544**  
 (-2.30) (-1.74) (-3.29) (-2.18)    
FORE 0.0012** 0.0011 0.0006 0.0008    
 (2.50) (0.84) (1.64) (1.57)    
TANG 0.0203** 0.0183 0.0185*** 0.0033    
 (2.46) (0.89) (3.88) (0.51)    
INTG -0.0195 -0.0021 -0.0085 0.0076    
 (-0.83) (-0.04) (-0.39) (0.37)    
RD 0.1215 0.0069 -0.1517 -0.1243    
 (0.73) (0.01) (-1.61) (-1.04)    
POL -0.0047 0.0054 -0.0053 0.0038    
 (-0.55) (0.27) (-0.74) (0.44)    
BIG4 -0.0016 0.0106 -0.0077* -0.0026    
 (-0.27) (0.88) (-1.86) (-0.64)    
AUDFEE 0.0043 -0.0036 0.0048** 0.0013    
 (1.40) (-0.54) (2.47) (0.47)    
GOV -0.0187*** -0.0164 -0.0093 -0.0073    
 (-2.94) (-1.20) (-1.52) (-1.15)    
Intercept -0.0521 -0.0026 -0.0293* -0.0535**  
 (-1.61) (-0.06) (-1.94) (-2.16)    
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Ind Dummies YES YES YES YES 
N 630 630 630 630  
R1 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
R2 0.409 0.279 0.281 0.692 
Sargan Test 0.441 0.501 0.189 0.524 
   Page 59 of 169 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This study examines the association between the extent of CSR-driven activities, 
strength of governance structures and tax haven utilization of Chinese listed firms. 
Based on a sample of 704 publicly listed Chinese firm-years data covering the 2006–
2013 period, regression results show that the extent of CSR disclosures has a significant 
negative association with tax haven utilization by these firms. The results are robust to 
alternative proxy measures of tax haven utilization, CSR disclosures and a series of 
robustness checks. This study contributes to the existing CSR and tax avoidance 
literature by investigating the link between these variables. It provides unique empirical 
evidence that assesses the association between the extent of CSR disclosure and tax 
haven utilization. A negative association is evident. This finding suggests that firms 
engaging in and reporting on CSR activities, providing donations, or receiving CSR 
related awards do so for legitimacy reasons. This supports the conjecture that CSR 
disclosure practices and reporting are used to sustain or enhance a firm’s reputation 
capital (Godfrey et al. 2009). Further, this study extends the literature by examining the 
association between CSR performance and tax haven utilization, and by arguing that 
CSR disclosure practices constitute a set of risk management strategies. These 
strategies affect firm financial performance and the motivation of management to 
engage in aggressive strategies via use of tax havens. This association is likely to be 
relevant to numerous stakeholders, particularly the Chinese government. Further, a 
positive association between the strength of governance structures and tax haven use is 
evident. This suggests that firms with effective governance structures are able to 
compete and use resources more efficiently via the use of tax havens. Ultimately, this 
may enhance firm performance. Overall, this study provides important evidence 
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regarding the implications of CSR communication practices for firms’ tax avoidance 
strategies. 
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Appendix 2.A: List of OECD (2006) cited tax havens 
 
The OECD’s (2006) 33 tax havens are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bermuda, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar, 
Grenada, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Montserrat, Nauru, 
Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Panama, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos Islands and Vanuatu. 
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Appendix 2.B: Variable Definitions and Measurement 
A. Dependent variables 
 
Variable name  Variable measurement 
TH_LN  A continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of the total number 
of tax haven subsidiaries from the entire sample. 
TH_Dummy  1 if a firm used a tax haven, otherwise 0. 
B. Independent variables 
 
Don_ln  A continuous variable measured as the natural logarithm of the total donation 
expenses incurred by the firm. 
Awards_ln  A continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of the total number 
of  awards disclosed in the company’s annual report 
TotCSR  A continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of the total GRI 
3.0 (0-70) items observed from each company’s CSR report. 
Gindex  A continuous variable, measured as a corporate governance score (0-5) 
scaled by 5. The corporate governance score consists of five dichotomous 
variables: 
 independent directors: coded as 1 if the percentage of independent 
directors exceeds the median (which is 0.3333), or 0 otherwise;  
 board of directors’ age: coded as 1 if the average age of the directors is 
lower than the median (which is 52), or 0 otherwise; 
 individuals on the board of directors (BOD) with outside directorship: 
coded as 1 if the percentage of directors holding outside directorship 
exceeded the median (which is 0.1538), or 0 otherwise;  
 board meeting attendance: coded as 1 if the percentage of directors 
attending all meetings exceeds the median (which is 0.8181), or 0 
otherwise; 
 duality of CEO and chairmanship: coded as 1 if the CEO of the company 
did not hold chairmanship, or 0 otherwise. 
C. Control variables 
 
BVMV  A continuous variable, measured as the book value of equity over the market 
value of equity (i.e. market capitalization). 
SIZE  A continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets 
ROA  A continuous variable, measured as profit over total assets. 
FORE  A continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of total foreign 
revenue. 
Tang  A continuous variable, measured as the total value of net property, plant and 
equipment over assets. 
 
INTG  A continuous variable, measured as total intangible assets over total assets. 
RD  A continuous variable, measured as total R&D over total assets. 
 
POL  A continuous variable, measured as the total number of politically connected 
BOD members over the total number of BOD members. 
BIG4  A dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if the firm’s annual report was audited 
by one of the big 4 accounting firms, or 0 otherwise. 
AUDFEE  A continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of total audit fees. 
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Appendix 2.C: CSR indices according to GRI 3.0 
EN1 Materials used by weight or volume. 
EN2 Percentage of materials used that are recycled input materials.  
EN3 Direct energy consumption by primary energy source.  
EN4 Indirect energy consumption by primary source. 
EN5 Energy saved due to conservation and efficiency improvements. 
EN6 Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or renewable energy based products and services, and reductions in 
energy requirements as a result of these initiatives. 
EN7 Initiatives to reduce indirect energy consumption and reductions achieved. 
EN8 Total water withdrawal by source.    
EN9 Water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of water. 
EN10 Percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused.  
EN11 Location and size of land owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent to, protected areas and areas of high 
biodiversity value outside protected areas.                                                      
EN12 Description of significant impacts of activities, products, and services on biodiversity in protected areas and 
areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas. 
EN13 Habitats protected or restored.  
EN14 Strategies, current actions, and future plans for managing impacts on biodiversity. 
EN15 Number of IUCN Red List species and national conservation list species with habitats in areas affected by 
operations, by level of extinction risk.  
EN16 Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight.  
EN17 Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight.  
EN18 Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reductions achieved. 
EN19 Emissions of ozone-depleting substances by weight. 
EN20 NOx, SOx, and other significant air emissions by type and weight.                        
EN21 Total water discharge by quality and destination.  
EN22 Total weight of waste by type and disposal method. 
EN23 Total number and volume of significant spills. 
EN24 Weight of transported, imported, exported, or treated waste deemed hazardous under the terms of the Basel 
Convention Annex I, II, III, and VIII, and percentage of transported waste shipped internationally.  
EN25 Identity, size, protected status, and biodiversity value of water bodies and related habitats significantly 
affected by the reporting organization's discharges of water and runoff. 
EN26 Initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products and services, and extent of impact mitigation. 
EN27 Percentage of products sold and their packaging materials that are reclaimed by category.  
EN28 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations. 
EN29 Significant environmental impacts of transporting products and other goods and materials used for the 
organization's operations, and transporting members of the workforce.  
EN30 Total environmental protection expenditures and investments by type. 
LA1 Total workforce by employment type, employment contract, and region.  
LA2 Total number and rate of employee turnover by age group, gender, and region.  
LA3 Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to temporary or part-time employees, by 
major operations.  
LA4 Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
LA5 Minimum notice period(s) regarding significant operational changes, including whether it is specified in 
collective agreements.  
LA6 Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint management-worker health and safety committees 
that help monitor and advise on occupational health and safety programs.  
LA7 Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and absenteeism, and number of work-related fatalities by 
region. 
LA8 Education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-control programs in place to assist workforce 
members, their families, or community members regarding serious diseases. 
LA9 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade unions. 
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LA10 Average hours of training per year per employee by employee category.  
LA11 Programs for skills management and lifelong learning that support the continued employability of 
employees and assist them in managing career endings.  
LA12 Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career development reviews. 
LA13 Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of employees per category according to gender, age 
group, minority group membership, and other indicators of diversity. 
LA14 Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee category.  
HR1 Percentage and total number of significant investment agreements that include human rights clauses or that 
have undergone human rights screening.  
HR2 Percentage of significant suppliers and contractors that have undergone screening on human rights and 
actions taken.  
HR3 Total hours of employee training on policies and procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are 
relevant to operations, including the percentage of employees trained.  
HR4 Total number of incidents of discrimination and actions taken. 
HR5 Operations identified in which the right to exercise freedom of association and collective bargaining may 
be at significant risk, and actions taken to support these rights.  
HR6 Operations identified as having significant risk for incidents of child labour, and measures taken to 
contribute to the elimination of child labour.  
HR7 Operations identified as having significant risk for incidents of forced or compulsory labour, and measures 
to contribute to the elimination of forced or compulsory labour.  
HR8 Percentage of security personnel trained in the organization's policies or procedures concerning aspects of 
       安保人 在运营相关的人权政策 序方 接 培 的
 
HR9 Total number of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous people and actions taken. 
SO1 Nature, scope, and effectiveness of any programs and practices that assess and manage the impacts of 
        
 
SO2 Percentage and total number of business units analysed for risks related to corruption.  
SO3 Percentage of employees trained in organization's anti-corruption policies and procedures. 
SO4 Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption. 
SO5 Public policy positions and participation in public policy development and lobbying.  
SO6 Total value of financial and in-kind contributions to political parties, politicians, and related institutions by 
country. 
SO7 Total number of legal actions for anti-competitive behaviour, anti-trust, and monopoly practices and their 
outcomes.  
SO8 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with 
laws and regulations.  
PR1 Life cycle stages in which health and safety impacts of products and services are assessed for improvement, 
and percentage of significant products and services categories subject to such procedures. 
PR2 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary codes concerning health and 
safety impacts of products and services during their life cycle, by type of outcomes.  
PR3 Type of product and service information required by procedures, and percentage of significant products and 
services subject to such information requirements.  
PR4 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary codes concerning product and 
service information and labelling, by type of outcomes.  
PR5 Practices related to customer satisfaction, including results of surveys measuring customer satisfaction.  
PR6 Programs for adherence to laws, standards, and voluntary codes related to marketing communications, 
including advertising, promotion, and sponsorship.  
PR7 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary codes concerning marketing 
communications, including advertising, promotion, and sponsorship by type of outcomes.  
PR8 Total number of substantiated complaints regarding breaches of customer privacy and losses of customer 
data. 
PR9 Monetary value of significant fines for non-compliance with laws and regulations concerning the provision 
and use of products and services.  
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Chapter 3 
The Effect of Tax Haven Utilization, Ownership Structure and Strength 
of Governance Structure on Corporate Cash Holdings: Evidence from 
Chinese Firms 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Prior research shows that corporate investment strategies and the level of agency 
conflicts are important determinants of corporate cash holding decisions (Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith and Servaes 2003; Bates, Kahle and Stulz 2009; Lin et al. 2016; Lins, Servaes and 
Tufano 2010; Kusnadi, Yang and Zhou 2015; Megginson, Ullah and Wei 2014; Gao, Harford 
and Li 2013). While studies conducted in the Chinese context have examined the effect of cash 
flows on firms’ over-investment and under-investment (Chen, Sun and Xu 2016; Huang et al. 
2011), little research has examined the association between firms’ ownership and governance 
structures, investments in offshore tax havens, and their level of cash holdings. Further, cash 
flows can be viewed as the lifeblood of a business’ survival (Guariglia and Yang 2016). As a 
result, the choice of how to deploy cash flows is deeply embedded in the conflicts between 
businesses’ core stakeholders, such as managers and shareholders (Harford 2008). As noted by 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), agency problems play a key role in determining the level 
of corporate cash holdings. Whilst the general notion of agency problems in developed 
countries lies in relations between agents and principals (Jensen 1986; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith 
and Servaes 2003), agency relations may differ in developing and emerging economies where 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) play a dominant role. As ownership is concentrated in a small 
number of shareholders, which is often the case in emerging economies, the level of principal-
principal conflicts increases (Li and Qian 2013; Young et al. 2008). The main objective of this 
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chapter is to examine the role of tax havens, ownership structures, and strength of governance 
structures in the determination of corporate cash holding levels in China.   
Prior research shows that tax havens8 assist firms to reduce their income tax payable 
(Levin 2012; Gravelle 2009; Bucovetsky 2014; Oxfam 2016).9  Additionally, tax havens are 
often accused of providing a platform for round-tripping and regulatory arbitrage (Haberly and 
Wójcik 2015). This is particularly evident in the case of China. Firstly, China’s foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is dominated by large, profit-making public SOEs (Kolstad and Wiig 2012) 
which represent politically-enforced monopolies (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008).10 Secondly, 
China’s FDI is highly concentrated in a small number of offshore financial centres. For 
example, in 2006, three offshore financial centres (namely Hong Kong, the British Virgin 
Islands and the Cayman Islands) hosted approximately 80 percent of China’s total outbound 
direct investment (ODI) of USD 69.5 billion (OECD 2008). However, it is purported that a 
large amount of China’s ODI took a round trip and returned to China in the form of FDI. This 
phenomenon provides an incentive to examine the association between Chinese firms that have 
reported tax haven operations and their cash holding levels.  
Studies have shown that Chinese firms derive a string of benefits from the utilization 
of tax havens (Dyreng and Lindsey. 2009). These benefits include a reduction in business costs, 
                                                             
8 The OECD (2006, 2013) has developed a list of 33 tax havens. The full list can be found in Appendix 
2A. 
9 A recent Oxfam report shows that the top-50 U.S. firms paid an effective tax rate (ETR) of 26.5%, 
accumulated around $1.4 trillion in offshore funds and disclosed the utilization of 1,608 subsidiaries 
domiciled in offshore tax havens (Oxfam 2016). 
10 The most popular FDI statistics are provided by the Ministry of the People’s Republic of China 
(MOFCOM). However, the statistics from MOFCOM do not consider the final destinations of the 
cash flows, or the amount of the reverse cash flows. Therefore, the volume and destination of Chinese 
ODI remains unclear (Garcia-Herrero, Xia and Casanova 2015). This chapter aims to examine the 
cash holding behaviour of some of China’s largest listed firms. These firms are incapable of 
conducting ODI and FDI activities without the presence of subsidiaries registered overseas. The 
limitations of MOFCOM statistics do not affect our firm-level statistical analysis. Further, capital 
flows to and from tax havens identified on the OECD list are considerably larger than capital flows to 
and from jurisdictions not on the OECD list.     
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secrecy in financing arrangements and an expanded set of markets (Klassen, Lang and Wolfson 
1993; Dyreng and Lindsey. 2009; Womack and Drucker 2011; Levin 2012; Grubert 2003). Use 
of tax havens clearly leads to significant savings in transaction costs. China imposes stringent 
controls on domestic companies’ capital flows (Garcia-Herrero, Xia and Casanova 2015; 
Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). However, as an incentive to encourage foreign investment, the 
Chinese government allows a much greater freedom of capital exchange for foreign-invested 
enterprises  (FIEs). In addition, investments in tax havens are treated with confidentiality, 
which allows firms to conceal core business information from almost all government 
authorities (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). Many Chinese multinational companies utilise tax 
havens, but they appear to utilise them less than multinational firms in the U.S.    
On the other hand, the utilization of tax havens by Chinese firms can also involve 
substantial costs relating to lack of transparency, agency costs, tax penalties and fines, and 
reputational costs (Scholes and Wolfson 1992; Dhaliwal, Lee and Pincus 2009). The use of tax 
havens by Chinese firms raises an important research question concerning how these potential 
benefits and costs affect firms’ level of cash holdings.  
This study is motivated to analyse the association between companies’ tax haven 
utilization and their cash holding behaviour. It is a well-known fact that tax havens are 
frequently used to significantly reduce income tax expenses (Womack and Drucker 2011; 
Levin 2012; Gravelle 2009, 2015). However, whilst there is considerable research on the use 
of tax havens by U.S. multinational firms, there is a lack of empirical research regarding 
Chinese firms’ utilization of tax havens. According to the U.S. research and advocacy group 
Global Financial Integrity, China was subject to a US$3.79 trillion illegal capital outflow 
between 2000 and 2011 (Kar and Freltas 2012). Of the US$2.83 trillion that illicitly flowed out 
of China from 2005-2011, a total of US$595.8 billion ended up in tax havens in the form of 
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cash deposits and financial assets (such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds and derivatives) (Kar 
and Freltas 2012). 
This study develops two competing arguments to explain the potential effect of tax 
haven utilization on firms’ cash holdings. The first argument is that the utilization of tax havens 
could lead to a higher level of cash holdings. For instance, tax haven utilization can generate 
significant tax savings (Gravelle 2015), potentially resulting in an increased level of cash. 
Further, tax havens may significantly reduce firms’ business expenses, resulting in higher 
future cash flows, particularly for those firms that have successfully utilized tax havens over 
the long term. Kim and Li (2014) suggest that tax haven operations could assist a firm to expand 
its investment opportunities by allowing firms to shift funds, in a tax effective manner, to 
markets outside of the parent company’s country of domicile. Additionally, accumulated 
earnings and cash flows may not be subject to regulatory or legislative barriers, thereby 
increasing firms’ level of cash holdings. Globally, it is evident that large corporations with 
subsidiaries incorporated in tax havens have accumulated a large amount of earnings. 
According to McIntyre, Phillips, and Baxandall (2015), whilst most of the United States’ 
Fortune 500 companies disclosed offshore operations in 2014, some have more cash parked in 
tax havens than others. For instance, 6 percent of these companies are responsible for 65 
percent (US$1.4 trillion) of offshore cash.   
The second argument is that tax haven utilization may result in a lower level of cash 
holdings. For example, tax haven use may increase the costs of business by creating obscure 
and complex financing arrangements that lead to investor and government uncertainty.  These 
costs could increase a firm’s level of systematic risk. An adverse selection problem, reduced 
liquidity and a lower level of cash holdings through higher transaction costs (i.e. a higher cost 
of capital) may occur (Amihud and Mendelson 1986). Agency related problems may also 
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increase a firm’s exposure to rent extraction by management as they exploit information 
asymmetry issues throughout the firm, potentially leading to inefficient investments and poor 
management of firms’ cash holdings (Chen et al. 2011). Costs of tax haven utilization could 
also include tax penalties, fines (Scholes and Wolfson 1992) and reputational costs (Hanlon 
and Slemrod 2009). These could negatively affect a firm’s expected future cash flows, resulting 
in lower levels of cash (Dhaliwal, Lee and Pincus 2009). These contrasting effects suggest that 
tax haven utilization could possibly be associated with either a lower or a higher level of cash. 
On balance, it is expected that tax haven utilization is likely to increase firms’ cash holdings 
by reducing income tax expenses and overall business costs.   
Employing a sample of 778 publicly-listed Chinese firm-years covering the 2006–2013 
period, regression results show that tax haven utilization has a significant positive association 
with firms’ cash holdings. Further, a statistically significant positive association between the 
strength of a firm’s corporate governance structure and its cash holdings is evident. The results 
are robust to alternative proxy measures of cash holdings and additional tests. The potential 
cost savings associated with use of tax havens appears to exceed the potential costs, leading to 
the observed positive association between these variables. On average, a one-standard 
deviation increase in tax haven utilization leads to firms’ cash holdings increasing by around 5 
percent. A one-standard deviation increase in shareholdings of the top five shareholders leads 
to firms’ cash holdings increasing by around 9 percent. A one-standard deviation increase in 
the strength of corporate governance leads to firms’ cash holdings increasing by around 10 
percent.  
This chapter makes the following contributions. First, it extends the accounting and 
finance literature by providing robust empirical evidence of a significant positive association 
between Chinese firms’ tax haven utilization and cash holdings. The findings are also 
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economically significant. Hence, tax haven utilization plays an important role in the 
development of Chinese firms’ liquidity positions. Second, this study is one of the first to 
specifically investigate the financial consequences of firms’ tax haven utilization. Further, the 
majority of studies that focus on the determinants of cash holdings have been conducted in high 
investor protection countries such as the U.S. (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes 2003; Opler 
et al. 1999; Bates, Kahle and Stulz 2009) and european countries (Hall et al. 2015; Ferreira and 
Vilela 2004). Far fewer studies have been undertaken in China. The investigation into the 
strength of governance structures suggests high shareholder concentration and strong corporate 
governance structures are positively associated with a higher level of cash holdings. These 
findings should therefore be of interest to a number of capital market participants, including 
shareholders, financial analysts, regulatory bodies and tax authorities.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 considers the extant 
literature, which forms the theoretical background of this chapter. Section 3.3 develops the 
hypothesis. The research design employed is described in section 3.4, followed by a report of 
the empirical findings in section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Determinants of Cash Holdings 
3.2.1 Tax Havens and Cash Holdings 
Three key motives have been advanced to account for firms’ levels of cash holdings. 
According to the ‘transaction motive’, a firm’s optimal level of cash is derived from the net 
effect of the marginal costs and marginal benefits of holding cash (Opler et al. 1999). The 
‘precautionary motive’ for holding cash posits that firms hold cash as a buffer to deal with 
adverse shocks, such as an increase in the cost of external financing (Han and Qiu 2007). The 
‘pecking order motive’ purports that there is a hierarchy of financing choices pursued by 
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companies. Because of market frictions such as information asymmetry and agency costs, the 
cost of external financing could be higher than the equivalent costs of internal financing (Chen, 
Sun and Xu 2016), leading firms to use internally generated cash before they obtain externally 
derived funds.  
The effect of utilising tax havens on firms’ cash holdings can be explained by all three 
motives for holding cash. Firstly, based on the ‘transactional motive’, tax havens are likely to 
assist firms to sustain or increase their cash holdings. The marginal benefits of tax haven use 
relating to financial flexibility, reduced regulatory impositions, lower business costs and lower 
tax expenses are likely to exceed the marginal costs. Secondly, based on the precautionary 
motive, tax haven use by Chinese listed firms may also increase their level of cash holdings. 
Despite the government’s financial support to firms “going abroad”, overseas expansion poses 
significant investment risks (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). 11  This may result in firms 
retaining a high level of cash. Finally, based on the ‘pecking order motive’, tax haven use may 
lead to increased cash holdings because internal generation of cash (either through profits or 
tax and other savings) could be preferred over more costly external funding. Furthermore, tax 
haven use enables Chinese firms to deposit excess cash overseas and re-invest it when needed 
(Kolstad and Wiig 2012).   
                                                             
11 “Going abroad” is a policy endorsed by the central government, officially initiated in 2000. Luo, Xue, 
and Han (2010) document a number of promotional policies under the “going abroad” strategy which 
include: 1) tax incentives, which align with its international peers thus allowing Chinese firms operating 
overseas to be subject to single income tax principle; and 2) interest incentives, which allow firms to 
borrow RMB and foreign currency at no more than the benchmark interest rate set by the central bank, 
People’s Bank of China. 
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3.2.2 Strength of Corporate Governance Structures, Ownership Structure and Cash 
Holdings 
The strength of governance structures is also considered to be an important determinant 
of Chinese firms’ levels of cash holdings. Specifically, this study examines the association 
between a firm’s level of cash holdings and its ownership structure. A critical determinant of a 
firm’s internal governance and control is its ownership structure (Gul, Kim and Qiu 2010; Fan 
and Wong 2002; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell 2008). Concentrated ownership creates conflict 
between controlling shareholders and outside investors. Prior research shows that controlling 
shareholders are capable of exercising entrenchment power to prioritise managerial self-
interests (Gul, Kim and Qiu 2010; Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). Compared to their Western 
counterparts, large Chinese listed firms have different shareholder structures. Even after the 
2005 share market reform, the Chinese state continues to be the majority shareholder of large 
listed companies. This reform required Chinese listed companies to convert their previous non-
tradable shares into tradable shares. One of the objectives of this reform was to align monitoring 
efforts with increases in share price. According to Chen et al. (2012), the reform appeared to 
be effective in affecting firms’ cash management. Using a data set of 1293 firm-years, Chen et 
al. (2012) find the average ratio of corporate cash holdings to non-cash assets dropped from 
23.5 percent to 20.8 percent.12 However, this reform has had little effect on the composition of 
ownership structures. Megginson, Ullah, and Wei (2014) suggests that the state continues to 
exercise control via retained ownership. As captured in the study, 78 percent of the firms 
observed in the sample are SOEs. Unlike large western firms, in large Chinese firms the 
shareholders are not private individuals or families; instead, they are state controlled 
organisations. This key characteristic ensures that the managers, who are often appointed by 
                                                             
12 Our sample size is smaller than the Chen et al. (2012) study, yet shows a similar ratio of 19.6 percent. 
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the government (Li, Long and Song 2015), are there to ensure the party and the state’s interests 
are prioritised above everything else.13 Inevitably, these firms are responsible for assisting with 
some political tasks, such as reducing unemployment and increasing social welfare. For 
instance, the Chinese government often allocates donation tasks to businesses in order to 
provide funding for natural disaster relief (Tan and Tang 2014; Li, Song and Wu 2014). Under 
Megginson, Ullah, and Wei (2014)’s soft-budget perspective, SOEs hold less cash due to easy 
access to debt funding through state-owned banks. However, this notion neglects the cash 
requirements for SOE’s non-investing activities. Bank borrowing is considered to be 
conditional liquidity which requires the borrower to provide collateral and continue to meet 
covenants (Lins, Servaes and Tufano 2010). In contrast, cash provides unconditional liquidity 
which can be used either to achieve political aims or to serve other managerial entrenchment 
purposes (Chen et al. 2012).   
Compared to SOEs, large shareholders in privately owned firms have different motives 
for holding cash. They are less pressured by the government’s political agenda. So the question 
is, do private firms with sound governance characteristics hold similar levels of cash to SOEs. 
There are a number of reasons for non-SOEs to hold more cash. Firstly, from a transaction cost 
perspective, the state-owned banks in China apply a much higher level of scrutiny over non-
SOEs,14 motivating non-SOEs to hold more cash. Secondly, the corporate ownership structure 
in China is highly concentrated in both SOEs and non-SOEs (Gul, Kim and Qiu 2010). This 
                                                             
13Dharwadkar, George, and Brandes (2000) suggest the agency issues in emerging countries’ post-
privatised SOEs are more related to the fact that managers in SOEs prioritise the state’s objectives rather 
than achieving enterprise efficiency. Specifically following Cho (1999), Dharwadkar, George, and 
Brandes (2000) point out that in addition to the traditional agency-principal problems, post-privatised 
SOEs have principle-principle issues which suggests that large state owners take advantage of minority 
private shareholders. 
14 Several studies suggest Chinese state-owned banks apply a different approach when lending to non-
SOEs (Megginson, Ullah and Wei 2014; Brandt 2005). For example, non-SOEs are expected to provide 
more collateral than SOEs (Brandt 2005). Consequently, non-SOEs retain more free cash flow under 
this tight budget constraint (Megginson, Ullah and Wei 2014). 
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characteristic, together with weak investor protection, created an environment that allows the 
large shareholders or controlling shareholders to promote private interests at the expense of 
other shareholders (Dharwadkar, George and Brandes 2000; Gul, Kim and Qiu 2010; Johnson 
et al. 2000; Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan 2002). Using a sample of 11,000 firms from 45 
countries, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) find that companies from countries where 
investor protection is low hold more cash. Highly concentrated shareholdings in non-SOEs, 
which are more likely held by controlling families, are inclined to result in the retention of 
company savings in the form of cash, rather than distributing cash dividends to shareholders 
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes 2003). In regard to the influence of corporate governance 
in privately owned firms, well governed firms are expected to have lower agency costs, 
potentially reducing the chances of investing excess cash in less profitable projects (Gao, 
Harford and Li 2013).  
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
3.3.1 Tax haven utilization and cash holdings 
There are two competing arguments about the potential effect of tax haven utilization 
on firms’ level of cash holdings. The first argument is that the utilization of tax havens may 
result in a higher level of cash holdings. For example, tax haven utilization can help a firm to 
increase their level of cash through significant tax savings (Gravelle 2015). Moreover, if 
outside investors perceive that future cash flows will be higher for firms that have been 
successful in long-term tax haven utilization. This may also lead to higher levels of cash. This 
is because the firm is likely to access capital at a lower rate of return based on the higher 
expected current and expected future earnings (Dhaliwal, Lee and Pincus 2009; Kim and Li 
2014). It is also possible that the weak legal or regulatory framework existing in tax havens, 
this could help a firm to increase its investment opportunities (Kim and Li 2014). The net effect 
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is that its earnings and cash flows can be sustained without being subject to regulatory or 
legislative barriers, thereby reducing overall business costs, and potentially resulting in higher 
cash holdings.  
The second argument is that, tax haven utilization may give rise to a lower level of cash 
holdings. For instance, tax haven utilization encompasses increased financial, legal and 
organizational complexity, and reduced information transparency, generating uncertainty for 
investors which could increase a firm’s level of systematic risk. This, in turn, may reduce firms’ 
cash holdings because of the higher business costs associated with tax haven use (Amihud and 
Mendelson 1986). Agency related problems may also increase a firm’s exposure to risk and 
reduced investment efficiency leading to a lower level of cash holdings (Chen, Sun and Xu 
2016). The costs of tax haven utilization could also include tax penalties, fines and reputational 
costs which could negatively influence a firm’s expected future cash flows and current level of 
cash holdings (Dhaliwal, Lee and Pincus 2009). These contrasting effects indicate that tax 
haven utilization could be associated with a higher or a lower level of cash holdings. On balance, 
however, we expect that tax haven utilization is likely to have a favourable effect on cash flows. 
The following (directional) hypothesis is developed: 
H1: Tax haven utilization is positively associated with a firm’s cash holdings. 
3.3.2 Strength of corporate governance structures and cash holdings 
With regard to internal corporate governance determinants, both ownership structure 
and board characteristics can affect the level of corporate cash holdings. Central to these two 
determinants is the co-existence of agent-principal and principal-principal conflicts. According 
to Jensen (1986) free cash flow perspective, when agent-principal conflicts are prevalent, 
managers are motivated to hold excess cash in order to maximize personal interests. In order 
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to mitigate agent-principal conflicts, two options can be exercised by Chinese firms. One option 
to mitigate agent-principal problems is to appoint controlling shareholders as agents, or at least, 
appoint agents who can represent the controlling shareholders. This ultimately gives rise to 
principal-principal conflicts where large controlling shareholders have overarching power to 
monitor every aspect of the business. Two possible consequences arise. One is that, the direct 
monitoring mechanism endorsed by high ownership concentration could suppress 
opportunistic managerial behaviour and strengthen internal control (Dharwadkar, George and 
Brandes 2000; Chen et al. 2012). The other one is that principal-principal conflicts can create 
information asymmetry which potentially provides controlling shareholders with opportunities 
to expropriate private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders (Li and Qian 2013). These 
potential outcomes of high ownership concentration may both lead to a higher level of 
corporate cash holdings, but for distinct purposes. Firstly, managers affiliated with controlling 
shareholders may be motivated to make rational and informed decisions about how to dissipate 
internal funds, due to close monitoring by dominant controllers (Young et al. 2008). To this 
end, funds could be prioritized for investment and transaction purposes as informed by the 
transaction, precautionary and pecking order motives. Secondly, managers’ cash deployment 
decisions will be loosely coupled with the transaction and precautionary motives when 
information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is high. 
As suggested by Jensen (1986) free cash flow theory, managers motivated by self-interest will 
hold excess cash in order to gain discretionary power over investment decisions.   
Based on the above analysis, this study develops the following directional hypothesis: 
H2: Shareholder concentration is positively associated with a firm’s cash holdings. 
The other option to mitigate agent-principal problems is to adopt the Anglo-American 
style of corporate governance structures. In 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
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(CSRC) issued a U.S. style “code of corporate governance” for listed companies. In addition 
to prescribing specific board structure requirements, the code grants legal powers to outside 
shareholders so that they have equal status with other shareholders (Conyon and He 2011; 
Rajagopalan and Zhang 2008). Under the U.S. style of corporate governance structures, a well 
governed board with attentive and experienced board members can effectively oversee capital 
expenditure or scrutinize management’s spending (Harford, Mansi and Maxwell 2008). The 
structure of the board of directors (BOD) can be reflected by factors such as BOD independence, 
directors’ outside directorship, directors’ age, meeting attendance and CEO and chairman 
duality (Taylor, Tower and Neilson 2009; Eng and Mak 2003; Barros, Boubaker and Hamrouni 
2013; Ho and Wong 2001; Chua, Eun and Lai 2007). Whilst examining the efficacy of adopting 
the “code” is not within this study’s scope, companies compliant with the suggested code of 
conduct are expected to have efficient internal control mechanisms over the long term. Harford, 
Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) suggest that firms which protect shareholder rights get rewarded 
with more cash as they gain trust from shareholders. On the basis of the aforementioned 
discussion, the following directional hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: Strength of corporate governance structures is positively associated with a firm’s cash 
holdings. 
3.4 Research Design 
3.4.1 Sample  
This study examines the cash holdings of the top 100 firms (by total assets) listed on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange over the financial reporting periods 2006–2013. The following 
criteria were applied when selecting the sampled firms: (1) financial data must be available for 
every year in the 2006–2013 period; and (2) firms must have had a continuous listing on either 
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the Shanghai stock exchanges over the 2006–2013 period. The top 100 companies were ranked 
according to the level of total assets in the 2013 financial period. The largest Chinese listed 
firms are chosen as these are more likely to use tax havens, have issues relating to agency 
considerations, and have cash holdings reflected by SOE influence.  
The initial sample comprised the top 200 Shanghai Stock Exchange listed non- financial 
and insurance firms from the 2006-2013 periods. The sample was reduced to 100 firms (778 
firm-year observations) after excluding firms without the data required to calculate the 
independent and control variables. Overall, 778 firm-year observations were available for 
empirical testing. Financial and insurance firms are excluded because of the differences in 
reporting and regulatory practices of these firms. Finally, tax haven data was hand collected 
from the annual reports to obtain relevant data for the measurement of the variables, not all of 
which are available in electronic form in public databases. Other data was obtained from 
Capital IQ. It is a disclosure requirement for publicly-listed Chinese firms to provide a list of 
their subsidiaries (including the country in which they are incorporated) in their annual reports 
under IAS 124 Related Party Transactions and IAS 127 Consolidated and Separate Financial 
Statements. Hence, the data in relation to tax haven subsidiaries can be collected. 
3.4.2. Dependent variable: Cash holdings 
The dependent variable is represented by firms’ level of cash holdings. In line with 
prior literature, firms’ level of cash holdings is measured using two models. Similar to Bates, 
Kahle, and Stulz (2009), the primary ratio is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets (Cash_TA). Two alternative measurements of cash holdings are also used. The 
alternative ratios are the ratio of cash and cash equivalents plus marketable securities to total 
assets (CashSTI_TA) and the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets minus cash and 
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cash equivalents (Cash_NA). Each of the three measures is employed as a separate dependent 
variable across three separate regression models.  
3.4.3 Independent Variables 
The first independent variable used in this study is represented by the occurrence of 
material tax haven operations (TH_LN) as disclosed in firms’ annual reports. TH_LN is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of subsidiaries incorporated in an OECD 
(2006) listed tax haven.15 Following Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Dharmapala and Hines 
(2009) and Taylor and Richardson (2012), a dummy variable measuring the existence of tax 
havens (TH_D) is also included as an alternative measurement for tax haven operations.  
Two internal governance control mechanism measures are used to gauge the potential 
impact of agency related conflicts on firms’ level of cash holdings costs. These are ownership 
concentration and board characteristics. It is argued that concentrated ownership reduces agent-
principal conflicts but amplifies principal-principal conflicts for two reasons in the Chinese 
context. First, concentrated ownership saves coordination costs and reduces information 
asymmetry (Dharwadkar, George and Brandes 2000). Second, considering China’s weak 
investor protection laws, large controlling shareholders are capable of exercising entrenchment 
power to prioritise self-interests at the expense of outside investors (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 
2008; Gul, Kim and Qiu 2010). Where such ownership structures exist, managers tend to hoard 
cash to please the holders of large, controlling shareholdings. Following Wu, Xu, and Yuan 
                                                             
15 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) identify three key factors in 
considering whether a jurisdiction is a tax haven: (1) no or nominal taxes; (2) lack of effective exchange 
of information; and (3) lack of transparency. The OECD (2006) recognizes a total of 33 tax havens 
around the world. The OECD’s (2006) complete list of 33 tax havens is reported in Appendix 3.A. 
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(2009), the ownership concentration is measured by referencing a modified Herfindahl 
concentration index (H_SH) of the largest five shareholders (SH5) using the formula:  
H_SH=Ln SH5/(1-SH5)  
The index, SH5/(1-SH5), gives a measure of top five shareholders’ shareholdings in 
relation to the rest of shareholders’ shareholdings. The logarithm is applied to this measurement 
to enable an approximate normal distribution. SH5 is the percentage of the largest five 
shareholders’ shareholdings. SH5 is also used as an alternative measurement for ownership 
concentration.  
A governance index (Gindex) consisting of five board of director characteristics is used 
as a measure of the strength of governance of a firm. Similar to Ahmed and Duellman (2007), 
Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2016) and Taylor, Richardson, and Taplin (2015), the five 
governance items are i) the proportion of independent directors on the board, ii) the proportion 
of the BOD with outside directorships , iii) board directors’ average age, iv) board meeting 
attendance, and v) duality of CEO and chairmanship. The Gindex is calculated by the total of 
the five observations scaled by 5. The development of the Gindex is justified by reference to 
extant literature. The 2002 corporate governance reform specifically required that there must 
be at least two independent directors from June 2003 onwards Rajagopalan and Zhang (2008). 
The purpose of introducing this rule is to safeguard the interests of shareholders (Chen and 
Firth 2006). In addition, the index also includes the percentage of board members holding 
additional outside directorships and the BOD age as proxies for the experience of board 
members. Following Fama and Jensen (1983), additional outside directorship contributes to 
the level of monitoring expertise. In addition, older individuals are more likely to be 
conservative and traditional (Huang, Rose-Green and Lee 2012; Sundaram and Yermac 2007). 
Based on Chen and Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007)  and Chen et al. (2006), the percentage of 
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meetings attended is included as a proxy for board members’ activeness. Lastly, the separation 
of the roles of chairman and CEO is included in the Gindex. The concern of having the same 
person holding the two top positions is that the person may have too much power with which 
is enough to undermine any attempt at monitoring (Firth, Fung and Rui 2007; Lin et al. 2016). 
Overall, construction of the governance index is based on objective evidence including 
development of governance requirements in recent Chinese regulatory reforms. 
These five governance items are also individually assessed in the models. Where the 
original variable is a continuous variable, the median value of the variable is used, values above 
the median are coded one, and values below the median are coded 0. The mean and median 
values of the board characteristics are presented in Table 3.1. 
3.4.4 Control variables 
Consistent with prior cash holdings research (Azar, Kagy and Schmalz 2016; 
Megginson, Ullah and Wei 2014), the regression models control several firm-level and industry 
level variables. The control variables for this study are denoted by firm size (SIZE), leverage 
(LEV), Tobin’s Q (Q), cash flows from operations (CFO), net working capital (NWC), net 
property plant and equipment (NPPE), dividends (DIV), government ownership (SOE), 
research and development (R&D), foreign subsidiaries (Fsub) industry sector (INDSEC) 
effects and year (YEAR) effects.  
Larger firms are more likely to have a greater capacity to obtain resources, including 
cash. This makes larger firms less financially distressed than smaller firms and hence less likely 
to stockpile cash (Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). Further, larger firms are likely to achieve 
economies of scale, hence they are less motivated to hold cash to cover transaction costs (Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz 2009). SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage 
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(LEV) is included in the regression model to control for differences in firms’ capital structures. 
Firms that have excess cash tend to reduce leverage (Gao, Harford and Li 2013; Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz 2009). LEV is measured as short term and long term liabilities scaled over total assets. 
Following Duchin (2010) and Agha (2013), Tobin’s Q (Q) is measured to control growth 
opportunities. Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and the difference 
between book value of total assets and book value of equity in year t, scaled by the book value 
of total assets in year t.  
Cash from operations (CFO) is used to control for cash flow volatility from operating 
activities (Megginson, Ullah and Wei 2014). CFO is calculated as cash from operation 
activities scaled by total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is included in the model to control 
for differences in operating performance (Opler et al. 1999; Gao, Harford and Li 2013; Ferreira 
and Vilela 2004). NWC is measured as working capital less cash and cash equivalents scaled 
by total assets. NPPE is included in the model to control for asset tangibility (Yun 2009; Agha 
2013). It is measured as total net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. 
Dividends are included in the model to control for differences in distribution of retained 
earnings as dividends across firms (Ozkan and Ozkan 2004; Kusnadi, Yang and Zhou 2015; 
Harford, Mansi and Maxwell 2008; Ferreira and Vilela 2004; Wu, Rui and Wu 2012). 
According to Morck, Yeung, and Zhao (2008), large Chinese firms are more inclined to retain 
excessive earnings for empire-building rather than distributing earnings back to shareholders. 
Similarly, Guney, Ozkan, and Ozkan (2007) argue that better shareholder protection is often 
related with lower levels of cash holdings. Hence, firms that pay dividends are likely to 
associate with lower managerial cash holding needs. DIV is measured as a dichotomous 
variable, coded as 1 if the firm pays a dividend in a particular year.  
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Furthermore, government ownership is also included as a control variable as the 
sampled firms includes a large number of state-owned enterprises (SOE). Management of 
SOEs may adopt more conservative investment practices which may in turn influence firms’ 
cash holdings (Bradshaw, Liao and Ma 2012). SOE is measured as a dichotomous variable, 
coded as 1 if the firm is an SOE (the government controls more than 50 percent of the equity 
of the firm), or 0 otherwise. Following Foley et al. (2007) and Gao, Harford, and Li (2013), 
R&D is included as a control for two main reasons. First, technological innovation has 
consistently been a primary focus of government economic policy in guiding domestic firms 
as well as inward FDI (Davies 2013). Second, better governed firms with excess cash are likely 
to increase investment in intangible assets in order to improve competitiveness and profitability 
(Harford, Mansi and Maxwell 2008; Opler et al. 1999; Gao, Harford and Li 2013; Morck, 
Yeung and Zhao 2008; Dhaliwal, Lee and Pincus 2009). R&D is measured as R&D expenditure 
scaled by total assets. Considering that the level of cash holdings is closely associated with the 
firms’ overseas expansion (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008; Megginson, Ullah and Wei 2014), 
the existence of foreign subsidiaries is included as a control variable. Similar to Foley (2007), 
Fsub is coded as 1 if firm i has a foreign subsidiary and 0 otherwise.  
Finally, industry and year dummy variables are included in the models. IND dummy 
variables, defined by the two-digit Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes, are 
included as control variables in the regression model as firms’ level of cash holdings can 
fluctuate across different industry sectors (Rego 2003). Eight INDSEC dummy variables 
included in this study: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, healthcare, 
industrials, materials, telecommunication services and utilities (with consumer discretionary 
being the omitted sector in the regression model). No sign predictions are made for the 
INDSEC dummies. YEAR dummy variables are also included in the regression model to 
control for differences in tax haven activities that could possibly exist over the 2006–2013 
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sample years (with 2006 being the omitted year in the regression model). No sign predictions 
are made for the INDSEC or YEAR dummies. 
3.4.5 Regression model 
The multivariate regression model for examining the association between tax haven 
utilization, ownership and governance structure and level of cash holdings is estimated as 
follows: 
Cash_TA it = α0it + β1 TH_ln it + β2 H_SH it + β3 Gindex it + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6Qit 
+ β7CFOit + β8NWCit + β9NPPEit + β10DIVit + β11SOEit + β12R&Dit + β13Fsubit + β14-
21INDSECit + β22-29YEARit + εit,                (1)                                                           
  where: i = firms 1–778; t = financial years 2006–2013; Cash_TA = firms’ level of cash 
holdings measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; TH_ln = the natural 
logarithm of the number of subsidiaries incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven; 
H_SH = the natural logarithm of the proportion the top five shareholders’ shareholdings to the 
remaining shareholdings; Gindex = the firm-level corporate governance score which consists 
of 5 internal governance items scaled by 5; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV 
= short term and long term liabilities scaled over total assets; Q = the sum of the market value 
of equity and the difference between book value of total assets and book value of equity; CFO 
= calculated as cash from operating activities scaled by total assets; NWC is measured as 
working capital less cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets; NPPE  = The total net 
property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; DIV = a dichotomous variable, coded as 
‘1’ if a firm i pays dividends in year t, and ‘0’ otherwise; SOE = a dichotomous variable, coded 
as ‘1’ if the government controls more than 50 percent of the firm’s equity, and ‘0’ otherwise; 
R&D = R&D expenditure scaled by total assets; Fsub = a dichotomous variable, coded as ‘1’ 
if a subsidiary is registered in a non-tax haven foreign country, and ‘0’ otherwise. INDSEC = 
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a dummy variable, coded as ‘1’ if the firm is represented by a specific SIC industry, and ‘0’ 
otherwise; YEAR = a dummy variable, coded as ‘1’ if the year falls within the specific year 
category, and ‘0’ otherwise; and ε = the error term.  
Chen et al. (2012) find that the average cash holdings of Chinese public firms reduced 
significantly after the split share structure reform of 2005. However, privately owned 
companies and firms with weaker governance structures reduced cash holdings when compared 
to SOEs and with stronger governance structures. Their findings imply that the ownership type 
could interact with governance characteristics to influence firms’ cash holding decisions. 
Accordingly, a further test is conducted to test if the role of governance characteristics has 
different influences on SOE and non-SOE cash holding decisions, and if they are different, 
which type of firm is more likely to hold more cash. The base OLS regression model in Eq. (1) 
is extended as follows: 
Cash_TA it = α0it + β1 Gindex it + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4Qit + β5CFOit + β6NWCit + 
β7NPPEit + β8DIVit + β9SOE1it + β10R&Dit + β11Fsubit + β12-19INDSECit + β20-27YEARit + εit, 
               (2)                 
Cash_TA it = α0it + β1 Gindex it + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4Qit + β5CFOit + β6NWCit + 
β7NPPEit + β8DIVit + β9SOE0it + β10R&Dit + β11Fsubit + β12-19INDSECit + β20-27YEARit + εit, 
               (3)                                                                                                       
 where: SOE1 = the government controls more than 50% of the firm’s equity and SOE0 = 
private owned firms.   
Table 3.5 reports the regression coefficient for corporate governance characteristics to 
the three measurements of the dependent variables, Cash_TA (as model 1), CashSTI_TA (as 
model 2) and Cash_NA (as model 3). The regression coefficient is also tested after partitioning 
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the whole sample into two groups, SOE and non-SOE, across the three models. The coefficient 
estimates for the control variables are not tabulated. The regression results suggest that whilst 
strong corporate governance is significantly associated with the level of cash holdings in the 
whole sample, it enhances the association in the SOE group and plays no significant role in the 
non-SOE group. The coefficient estimates of Gindex in the three models are 0.0766 (t-statistic 
= 4.42), 0.0722 (t-statistic = 4.15) and 0.1044 (t-statistic =3.99) respectively for SOE firms. 
All models are significant at better than the 1% level and have higher values than the coefficient 
estimates of Gindex for the whole sample. The coefficient estimates are negative between 
Gindex and cash holding levels, however, all three models appear to be insignificant. The 
results support Chen et al. (2012) findings that corporate governance characteristics influence 
SOEs and private-owned firms’ cash holding decisions differently. SOEs with stronger 
governance are likely to have higher levels of cash savings than SOEs with weaker governance. 
The strength of corporate governance plays no significant role in non-SOE firms’ cash savings 
policies.        
Finally, Appendix 3.A summarizes the variable definitions and measurement details for 
all of the variables employed in this study. 
3.5 Empirical findings 
3.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 (Panel A) provides the industry distribution of the sample based on the GICS 
classification. The sample includes a greater proportion of firms in industrials (40 percent), 
materials (21 percent), and consumer discretionary (12 percent) sectors compared to the other 
industry categories. Moreover, Table 3.1 (Panel A) reports descriptive statistics of Cash_TA, 
CashSTI_TA and Cash_NA by industry classification (GICS). The results find higher 
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Cash_NA ratios in the consumer staples (34.78 percent), healthcare (31.91 percent), consumer 
discretionary (23.37 percent) and industrial (20.09 percent) sectors compared to other sectors. 
On the contrary, utilities and telecommunication services have extraordinarily low levels of 
Cash_NA ratio at 3.21 percent and 4.63 percent.   
Table 3.1 (Panel B) reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, 
independent variables and control variables. The dependent variable Cash_TA has a mean of 
0.15. For the purpose of interpreting meaningful statistics, the alternative measurements for tax 
haven utilization (TH_D) and top 5 shareholders’ shareholdings (SH5) are reported. TH_D, 
SH5 and Gindex have means of 0.144, 0.605 and 0.667 respectively, indicating that 14.4 
percent of the sampled companies have incorporated at least one subsidiary in a tax haven. The 
top 5 shareholders own a mean of 60.5 percent. The mean of Gindex is 66.7 percent. The mean, 
median and range of the control variables are also reported in Table 3.1 (Panel B). 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Industry Distribution 
Industry Name 
Total 
number of 
observation
s 
Percentage 
of 
observatio
n 
Cash_T
A 
CashSTI_T
A 
Cash_N
A 
Rankin
g 
Consumer Discretionary 96 12% 17.75% 18.24% 23.37% 3 
Consumer Staples 54 7% 23.11% 23.47% 34.78% 1 
Energy 64 8% 11.60% 12.00% 14.29% 6 
Healthcare 40 5% 22.40% 22.60% 31.91% 2 
Industrials 313 40% 15.82% 16.49% 20.09% 4 
Materials 168 21% 12.84% 13.06% 16.29% 5 
Telecommunication 
Services 8 1% 4.39% 4.39% 4.63% 7 
Utilities 48 6% 3.07% 3.22% 3.21% 8 
Total 791 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Standard deviation 25 Percentile Median 75 Percentile 
Cash_TA 735 0.15 0.113 0.065 0.125 0.203 
TH_ln 735 0.144 0.352 0 0 0 
H_SH 735 0.605 0.16 0.516 0.609 0.698 
Gindex 735 0.667 0.198 0.6 0.6 0.8 
SIZE 735 9.952 1.261 9.153 9.662 10.537 
LEV 735 0.265 0.173 0.126 0.255 0.375 
Q 735 1.982 2.167 0.948 1.275 2.107 
CFO 735 0.068 0.071 0.022 0.062 0.11 
NWC 735 -0.108 0.162 -0.201 -0.107 -0.013 
NPPE 735 0.413 0.261 0.175 0.381 0.646 
DIV 735 0.984 0.127 1 1 1 
SOE 735 0.777 0.417 1 1 1 
R&D 735 0.005 0.01 0 0 0.004 
Fsub 735 0.495 0.5 0 0 1 
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3.5.2 Correlation results 
The Pearson correlation results are reported in Table 3.2. Significant 
correlations are found between control variables Cash_TA, CashSTI_TA and Cash_NA 
and the independent variables H_SH and Gindex and the control variables SIZE, LEV, 
Q, CFO, NWC, NPPE, SOE and R&D. Table 3.2 also shows that only moderate levels 
of collinearity exist between the majority of explanatory variables.  Finally, the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) are calculated when estimating regression models to test for 
signs of multi-collinearity between the explanatory variables. The un-tabulated results 
confirm that none of the VIFs exceed four for any of the explanatory variables; thus 
multi-collinearity does not present a problem for this study (Hair et al. 2006).16  
                                                             
16 As per Hair et al. (2006), if a value of the correlation coefficient for a pair of explanatory 
variables lies between ±0.25 and ±0.75, then there is a moderate level of collinearity between 
the two variables. 
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Table 3.2: Pearson correlation   
    
              
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Cash_TA 1                
CashSTI_TA 0.990*** 1               
 0.000                
Cash_NA 0.934*** 0.923*** 1              
 0.000 0.000               
TH_ln 0.047 0.050 0.054 1             
 0.186 0.161 0.132              
H_SH -0.080** -0.084** -0.063* -0.008 1              
 0.030 0.022 0.086 0.823             
Gindex 0.120*** 0.117*** 0.113***  0.129*** 0.118*** 1            
 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001            
SIZE -0.180*** -0.172*** -0.171*** 0.204*** 0.519*** -0.003 1          
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.928           
LEV -0.413*** -0.420*** -0.452*** -0.065* -0.151*** -0.152*** 0.002 1         
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.955          
Q 0.093*** 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.051 0.022 0.014 0.087** -0.098*** 1        
 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.154 0.559 0.694 0.015 0.006         
CFO 0.085** 0.080** 0.158*** 0.009 0.172*** 0.050 0.055 -0.295*** 0.072**  1       
 0.017 0.026 0.000 0.800 0.000 0.158 0.124 0.000 0.043        
NWC 0.072** 0.083** 0.107*** -0.068* 0.003 0.048 -0.144*** -0.322*** 0.089** -0.166*** 1      
 0.044 0.019 0.003 0.057 0.940 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000       
NPPE -0.499*** -0.517*** -0.481*** -0.051 0.216*** -0.061* 0.155*** 0.404*** -0.050 0.272*** -0.505*** 1     
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.165 0.000 0.000      
DIV 0.039 0.021 0.027 0.039 -0.032 -0.181*** 0.262*** 0.029 0.055 0.061* 0.007 0.000 1      
 0.269 0.552 0.446 0.271 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.408 0.124 0.088 0.846 0.991     
SOE -0.062* -0.065* -0.044 -0.005 0.372*** 0.004 0.165*** -0.073** 0.009 0.042 -0.087** 0.150*** -0.037 1   
 0.081 0.069 0.218 0.877 0.000 0.905 0.000 0.039 0.794 0.238 0.014 0.000 0.295    
R&D 0.228*** 0.251*** 0.129*** 0.077** -0.028 0.061* 0.028 -0.199*** 0.089**  -0.032 0.037 -0.170*** -0.014 0.010 1  
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.440 0.085 0.428 0.000 0.013 0.376 0.297 0.000 0.703 0.773   
Fsub 0.031 0.043 0.032 0.279*** 0.127*** 0.318*** 0.113*** -0.143*** 0.049 0.037 0.128*** -0.081** -0.138*** -0.111*** 0.175*** 1 
  0.382 0.224 0.362 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.169 0.302 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.002 0.000   
*, **, *** correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively
   Page 91 of 169 
 
3.5.3 Base Regression Results 
The regression results for tax haven utilization, internal governance structure 
variables and cash holdings are presented in Table 3.3. Table 3.3 shows that the 
regression coefficient for TH_ln has significant positive association with firms’ cash 
holdings across three models (coefficients of 0.019, 0.019 and 0.04 for Cash_TA, 
CashSTI_TA and Cash_NA respectively), thus H1 is supported. Each of the four 
models employs a different measure of cash holdings. Firms that utilize tax havens more 
intensively tend to have a higher level of cash holdings. This supports the contention 
that efficiency in tax planning and strategic use of tax haven incorporated subsidiaries 
can assist the firm in managing its overall investments, may assist in achieving tax 
savings and may improve the flow of funds amongst group members. The estimated 
coefficients of TH_LN in models 1, 4 and 7 suggest a 5 percent, 5 percent and 7 percent 
increase in Cash_TA, Cash_STI_TA and Cash_NA respectively for firms utilizing tax 
havens.17 The estimated coefficients of H_SH in models 2, 5 and 8 suggest a 9 percent, 
8 percent and 6 percent increase in the three cash measurements for firms with high 
concentrated shareholdings. Lastly, the estimated coefficients of Gindex suggest a 10 
percent, 9 percent and 9 percent increase in the three cash holding measurements for 
firms with quality BOD governance characteristics. Further, many of the control 
variables are significantly associated with firms’ cash holdings including SIZE, LEV, 
NWC, and NPPE. Each of these control variables has a significant association with 
firms’ level of cash holdings. Q and CFO have a significant positive association with 
                                                             
17 Calculated as the SD of the independent variable times the regression coefficient of the 
independent variable divided by the SD of dependent variable. 
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all all three cash measurements. While R&D has a significant positive association with 
CASH_TA and CashSTI_TA, its correlation with Cash_NA is not significant. 
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Table 3.3: Determinants of cash holdings   
 
OLS  
  Cash_TA CashSTI_TA Cash_NA 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
TH_ln 0.0185 - - 0.0188 - - 0.0432 - - 
 (1.88)* - - (1.93)* - - (2.26)** - - 
H_SH - 0.012 - - 0.0113 - - 0.0141 - 
 - (2.37)** - - (2.23)** - - (1.75)* - 
Gindex - - 0.0584 - - 0.0531 - - 0.0842 
 - - (4.01)*** - - (3.62)*** - - (3.60)*** 
SIZE -0.0096 -0.0142 -0.009 -0.0098 -0.0143 -0.0093 -0.0159 -0.0214 -0.0144 
 (-3.78)*** (-4.52)*** (-3.67)*** (-3.86)*** (-4.53)*** (-3.73)*** (-3.76)*** (-3.88)*** (-3.54)*** 
LEV -0.1621 -0.1534 -0.1539 -0.1585 -0.1485 -0.1509 -0.3519 -0.3418 -0.3391 
 (-5.11)*** (-4.50)*** (-4.90)*** (-5.09)*** (-4.44)*** (-4.89)*** (-7.80)*** (-7.57)*** (-7.64)*** 
Q 0.0044 0.0041 0.0048 0.0044 0.004 0.0047 0.0095 0.0088 0.01 
 (2.01)** (1.86)* (2.21)**  (1.95)* (1.78)* (2.11)**  (2.53)** (2.39)** (2.73)*** 
CFO 0.2242 0.2234 0.2207 0.2356 0.235 0.2322 0.5486 0.5588 0.542 
 (3.50)*** (3.34)*** (3.50)*** (3.69)*** (3.53)*** (3.69)*** (4.89)*** (4.76)*** (4.91)*** 
NWC -0.2024 -0.2162 -0.2035 -0.1993 -0.2127 -0.2007 -0.2912 -0.3097 -0.2955 
 (-7.25)*** (-7.37)*** (-7.41)*** (-7.15)*** (-7.28)*** (-7.31)*** (-6.32)*** (-6.31)*** (-6.40)*** 
NPPE -0.2289 -0.237 -0.2296 -0.2373 -0.2454 -0.2382 -0.393 -0.4071 -0.3963 
 (-12.64)*** (-12.47)*** (-12.83)*** (-13.27)*** (-13.02)*** (-13.48)*** (-12.60)*** (-12.00)*** (-12.82)*** 
DIV -0.006 -0.0076 0.0028 -0.0054 -0.0081 0.0028 -0.0296 -0.0236 -0.0149 
 (-0.19) (-0.22) -0.09 (-0.17) (-0.23) -0.09 (-0.55) (-0.43) (-0.28)    
SOE 0.0056 0.0007 0.0054 0.0042 -0.0003 0.0041 0.0192 0.0143 0.019 
 -0.74 -0.09 -0.72 -0.56 (-0.04) -0.54 -1.42 -1.01 -1.43 
R&D 1.5256 1.6258 1.5727 1.7718 1.8493 1.8148 0.4554 0.4838 0.526 
 (2.38)** (2.45)** (2.49)**  (2.78)*** (2.81)*** (2.88)*** -0.87 -0.89 -1.01 
Fsub -0.0022 0.0019 -0.0062 -0.0011 0.003 -0.0045 -0.0042 0.0049 -0.008 
 (-0.31) -0.25 (-0.87)    (-0.16) -0.4 (-0.63)    (-0.36) -0.38 (-0.65)    
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDSEC FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Constant 0.2986 0.3444 0.2489 0.3041 0.3495 0.2584 0.4625 0.5117 0.3864 
 (7.00)*** (6.96)*** (5.74)*** (7.06)*** (6.98)*** (5.92)*** (6.35)*** (6.28)*** (5.31)*** 
N 778 732 778 778 732 778 778 732 778 
adj. R-sq 0.441 0.442 0.449 0.452 0.452 0.458 0.45 0.451 0.454 
Coefficient estimates with t-statistics reported in brackets. *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% levels of 
significance, respectively.  
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3.5.4 Blundell-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) regression analysis 
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), Agha (2013) and Agha (2016), this study 
employs Blundell-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) regression to address the 
potential problem of endogeneity. OLS assumes 1) there are no linear relationships 
among the independent variables (TH_ln, H_SH and Gindex) and 2) the error term is 
uncorrelated with each independent variable (Roberts and White – endogeneity in 
empirical corporate finance). Table 3.3 shows regression models are robust to 
alternative measurements of dependent variables, however, potential endogeneity 
issues arise from possible correlation between the utilization of tax havens (Th_ln) and 
internal governance characteristics (H_SH and Gindex) are not resolved.18 In addition, 
unobserved and omitted variables also pose potential endogeneity issues. To estimate 
the system GMM, the lagged dependent variable and the CASH_TA are treated as 
endogenous variables. The results of Blundell-Bond GMM regression analysis are 
reported in Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4 shows that the regression coefficient for independent variables 
TH_LN, and H_SH and Gindex across all regression model specifications (p < 0.05 and 
better). Hence, it provides additional robustness support to the hypotheses. Further, 
some regression coefficients for the control variables are found to be significantly 
associated with CASH_TA in the regression models such as SIZE, LEV, Q, CFO, NWC, 
NPPE, and R&D (p < 0.10 or better). In addition, several post-estimation tests are 
conducted for inference. The un-tabulated results find that measures of autocorrelations 
(1) and (2) confirm the existence of first order autocorrelations, but not the second order. 
                                                             
18 Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Dharmapala, (2008), and Richardson et al (2013) find that 
firms’ governance characteristics have influence on the propensity of management to engage 
in aggressive tax planning. 
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We also find that the Hansen test confirm the exogeneity and validity of the instruments 
used. 
Table 3.4: Blundell-Bond general methods of moments (GMM)  
 Cash_TA 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
L.cash_ass_w 0.0874*** 0.2840*** 0.2594*** 
 ( 3.68) ( 10.65) ( 9.94) 
TH_ln 0.0298*** - - 
 ( 2.83) - - 
H_SH - 0.0280*** - 
 - ( 2.75) - 
Gindex - - 0.0441**  
 - - ( 2.00) 
SIZE -0.0066* -0.0173*** -0.0059**  
 (-1.74) (-4.35) (-2.13)    
LEV -0.1195*** -0.0683*** -0.0825*** 
 (-4.97) (-3.71) (-4.34)    
Q 0.0029*** 0.0015** 0.0025*** 
 ( 4.24) ( 2.37) ( 3.95) 
CFO 0.3028*** 0.2828*** 0.2769*** 
 ( 7.24) ( 7.90) ( 6.57) 
NWC -0.1473*** -0.1463*** -0.1562*** 
 (-5.52) (-5.95) (-7.53)    
NPPE -0.2164*** -0.2119*** -0.1690*** 
 (-9.61) (-11.13) (-8.90)    
DIV ( 0.01) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) 
 (-1.56) (-0.54) (-0.64)    
SOE -0.0001 -0.0066 0.0146*   
 (-0.01) (-0.59) ( 1.82) 
R&D 0.7874*** 0.7888*** 0.9109*** 
 ( 2.97) ( 3.92) ( 4.15) 
Fsub -0.0053 0.0049 0.0027 
 (-0.93) ( 1.22) ( 0.64) 
_cons 0.2789*** 0.3337*** 0.1852*** 
 ( 6.92) ( 7.49) ( 5.33) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSEC YES YES YES 
N 679 653 679 
AR1 0.009 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.393 0.837 0.867 
Hansen  0.119 0.072 0.078 
Coefficient estimates with t-statistics reported in brackets. *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
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Table 3.5  
  Whole sample SOE Non-SOE 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Gindex 0.0584 0.0531 0.0842 0.0766 0.0722 0.1044 -0.0238 -0.0307 -0.0597 
 (4.01)*** (3.62)*** (3.60)*** (4.42)*** (4.15)*** (3.99)*** (-0.82) (-1.03) (-1.23) 
 
Control 
variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
N 778 778 778 605 605 605 173 173 173 
adj. R-sq 0.449 0.458 0.454 0.472 0.481 0.499 0.373 0.37 0.337 
3.6 Conclusions 
Employing a sample comprised of 778 publicly-listed Chinese firm-years data 
covering the 2006–2013 period, the regression results show that tax haven utilization 
has a significant positive association with firms’ cash holdings. Further, a statistically 
significant positive association is found between the ownership structure and strength 
of governance structure and firms’ level of cash holdings. The results are robust to 
alternative proxy measures of cash holdings, and additional tests. It appears that the 
potential costs savings associated with the utilization of tax havens exceed the potential 
costs leading to the observed positive association. The positive association between 
firms’ ownership structure and their level of cash holdings is likely to be driven by the 
high level of state ownership of sample firms. Similarly, strength of governance 
structure appears to act as a form of risk management mechanism which enhances firms’ 
level of cash holdings. Further work on Chinese firms’ level of cash holdings could 
focus on the effect of related party transactions on cash holdings. 
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Appendix 3.A: Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variable:           
Cash Holdings Models:    
Model 1: Cash_TA = Total cash and cash equivalents to total assets 
Model 2: CashSTI_TA = Total cash and cash equivalent plus short term investment to total 
assets 
Model 3: Cash_NA = Total cash and cash equivalents to net assets, where net assets are 
measured as total assets minus cash and cash equivalents 
 
Independent variable:            
TH_ln = The natural logarithm of the total number of tax havens subsidiaries 
identified. 
TH_D = 1 if a firm adopt tax Haven, otherwise 0. 
SH5 = The percentage of shareholdings by the largest five shareholders 
H_SH = Ln( 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆51− 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5) 
Gindex = A continuous variable, measured as a corporate governance score (0-
5) scaled by 5. The corporate governance score consists five 
dichotomous variables which are independent directors(coded as 1 if 
above the median of 33.33% of the board size, 0 otherwise); board 
directors’ age (coded as 1 if above the median of 52 year-old, 
otherwise 0); outside directorship (coded as 1 if above the median of 
15.38% of BOD has outside directorship, 0 otherwise), board meeting 
attendance (coded as 1 if the BOD attended more than the median of 
81% of the meeting, 0 otherwise) and duality (coded as 1 if the CEO 
and the chairman are not the same person, 0 otherwise) 
 
 
Control Variables:              
SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV = Total long-term and short-term debts scaled to total assets 
Q = The sum of the market value of equity and the difference between 
book value of total assets and book value of equity in year t, scaled by 
the book value of total assets in year t 
CFO = Cash from Operation scaled by total assets 
NWC = The total net working capital less cash and equivalents 
NPPE = The total net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets 
DIV = 1 if a firm i pays dividend in year t, otherwise 0 
SOE = 1 if the government controls more 50% of the equity, otherwise 0 
R&D = R&D expenditure scaled by total assets 
Fsub = 1 if the firm  has a subsidiary registered outside China in a non-
tax-haven country, otherwise 0 
All continuous variables are winsorized (reset) at the 1st and 99th percentiles.    
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Chapter 4 
Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
Practices: An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Listed Firms 
4.1 Introduction 
During the post-Mao economic reform period (post late-1970s), Chinese 
leaders abandoned the state-planned economy and commenced with the 
development of a modern socialist market based economy. This was also the 
beginning of a period when profit maximization was the sole purpose of Chinese 
enterprises (Wang and Juslin 2009). As China shifted its focus towards 
development of a socialist market based economy, economic performance was the 
primary means by which the Communist Party attained legitimacy with society 
(Lamrad 2012). Prior research highlighted that this economic reform neglected the 
development of business ethics and professional morality (Harvey 1999; Shafer, 
Fukukawa and Lee 2006; Wang and Juslin 2009). Harvey (1999) suggests that the 
long-established Confucian values of trustworthiness and diligence have been 
replaced by the phenomenon of ‘money-worship’ as a result of market based 
economic reform. 
This chapter is motivated for several reasons. First, China is a major 
contributor to greenhouse gas emissions from 2007 (EPA 2008), hence, there is 
growing concerns over businesses’ environmental performance. Second, there are 
frequent media releases that highlight severe environmental and social issues 
ranging from labour relations and wages to smog over some of the largest Chinese 
cities. Third, the relations-based regime that typifies China offers considerable 
scope to examine associations between social and environmental disclosures and 
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firms’ risk management and directors’ characteristics. Indeed, the establishment 
of relationships or connections with business partners is considered necessary in 
order to acquire resources, to obtain approvals or obtain bureaucratic privilege, to 
facilitate the achievement of business outcomes or to reduce risks that these 
outcomes will not be achieved which includes environmental and social targets 
(Hwang et al. 2009). Fourth, significant new regulations and legislation governing 
social and environmental disclosures were introduced in 2010 and firms, which 
traditionally focused on profit-maximization, now have to consider the nature and 
consequences of their CSR activities. Prior research on understanding the 
determinants of CSR disclosures in the Chinese context are fragmented and this 
study offers an ideal opportunity to provide a far more in-depth and rigorous study 
of those determinants.  
China had become the second largest economy in the world after America 
in 2010 ("Second in Line"  2010). In particular, China’s economy grew rapidly 
during the global financial crisis, and performed better than other OECD and many 
other emerging economies during that crisis (OECD 2013). However, as China 
increasingly consumes more energy and raw materials, it has become one of the 
largest emitters of greenhouse gases and other pollutants. In fact, China has already 
become one of the largest contributors to global climate change, and is the leading 
sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide emitter globally since 2007 (EPA 2008). China 
accounted for 27% of the global carbon dioxide emission, being the largest 
greenhouse emitter that exceeds the combination of USA (14%) and EU (7%)’s 
total emissions in 2012 (Arup 2013). 
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Furthermore, social issues, especially violations of labour rights, have also 
become pertinent following China’s rapid economic reform. The logo “Made-in-
China” is not only associated with cheap products, but is also associated with wage 
arrears, dangerous working environments and prolonged working hours (Lin 2010). 
It is not until 2008 that the government toughened the Labour Contract Laws to 
protect disadvantaged workers (Hao and Chen 2014). Recent food safety scandals 
also revealed some appalling behaviour by companies that have pursued profit at 
the expense of human welfare. For example, one of the largest dairy companies in 
China (Sanlu Group) was found producing baby formula with melamine 
contaminated milk in 2008 (Yan 2012). This event caused thousands of children 
to be hospitalised (Yan 2012). New parents were reported to have serious concerns 
about domestic brands and prefer imported milk if they can afford them (Hatton 
2013). 
As social and environmental problems have posed increasingly serious 
issues, China has implemented a number of regulatory and legislative changes to 
deal with these issues (Chan and Welford 2005). China enacted its first 
Environmental Protection Law in the late 1970s, and by the year 2000, it had 
enacted some 43 environmental related laws (Zhang 2001). Legislative changes 
have recently included new laws relating to environmental disclosures in firms’ 
reporting media. For instance, CSR is explicitly written in recent Chinese 
Company Law (2006) such that  
“in the course of doing business, a company must comply with laws and 
administrative regulations, conform to social morality and business ethics, act in 
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good faith, subject itself to the government and the public supervision, and 
undertake social responsibility” (Lin 2010, 8).  
A “Guide Opinion on the Social Responsibility Implementation for the 
State-Owned Enterprises controlled by the Central Government” released in 2008 
by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), encourages state-owned enterprises to follow sound CSR practices and 
report on CSR activities ("Current Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
Efforts by National Governments and Stock Exchanges"  2012). Further, the 
“Green Securities” policy, requires listed companies to disclose more information 
about their environmental record  and the “Green IPO” policy issued by SASAC, 
requires enterprises in energy-intensive industries to undergo an environmental 
assessment by the Ministry of Environment Protection before initiating an IPO or 
obtaining refinancing from banks ("Current Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure Efforts by National Governments and Stock Exchanges"  2012).  
In addition, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) issued the “Shanghai CSR 
Notice” and the “Shanghai Environmental Disclosure Guidelines” designed to 
strengthen listed companies’ accountability regarding social responsibility. 
Shanghai listed companies that promote CSR are offered incentives including 
priority election into the Shanghai Corporate Governance Sector, or simplified 
requirements for examination and verification of temporary announcements. The 
SSE has also developed the concept of social contribution value per share (SCVPS) 
to measure a company’s value creation relating to CSR activities. An SSE Social 
Responsibility index based on SCVPS was also created and started trading on 30th 
June 2009(Shanghai Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Index Information  
   Page 102 of 169 
 
2009). The aim of this index is to promote social and environmental behaviour and 
also to attract ethical investment. The Shanghai Environmental Disclosure 
Guidelines allow for the SSE to take “necessary punishment measures” against 
companies for violation of disclosure rules ("Current Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National Governments and Stock Exchanges"  
2012, 4).  
Based on a sample of 704 publicly-listed Chinese firm-years data covering 
the 2006–2013 period, the regression results show that the extent of CSR 
disclosure is significantly negatively associated with firms’ use of tax haven 
incorporated subsidiaries, and significantly positively associated with a 
government controlled CSR watch-list, firms level of philanthropic donations, 
firms receipt of environmental awards and political connected board of directors. 
Results are robust to additional analyses and endogeneity checks.  
This chapter contributes to the CSR literature in several ways. This study 
provides unique empirical evidence that assesses the association between CSR 
communication practices and elements of firms’ propensity to engage in social or 
environmental legitimacy by way of donations, awards, watch-lists, tax 
aggressiveness and political connections. In particular, Chinese firms may make 
claims about being socially and environmentally responsible, but at the same time 
may use tax haven jurisdictions extensively to reduce the payment of corporate 
taxes. Firms that use tax havens may insulate themselves from engaging in, and 
disclosing essential CSR information to stakeholders. Similarly, firm have 
incentives to disclose more CSR information in order to revamp their reputation 
after being placed on an environmental watch-list by the government. Chinese 
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firms may also legitimize operations through philanthropic activities such as 
making donations and flag these activities through CSR disclosures. Thus, 
legitimacy theory offers important insights into the motivation of Chinese firms’ 
CSR disclosures practices.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the 
theoretical framework for CSR disclosure in the Chinese context. Section 4.3 
provides the theory and Section 4.4 develops the hypotheses. Section 4.5 discusses 
the research design and summarizes the empirical results. Finally, Section 4.6 
concludes the paper.  
4.2 Theoretical framework for CSR disclosure 
The motives for engaging in CSR activities and communication are 
complex. This is primarily due to the fact that there is a weak regime in place to 
regulate CSR disclosure in emerging economies (Gray 2010; Lanis and 
Richardson 2012). Consequently, firms’ un-audited CSR disclosures are largely 
used to minimise risks relating to reputation, and the social and political milieu 
(Bebbington, Larrinaga and Moneva 2008; Gao 2008). In response to the 
complicated nature of CSR disclosure, empirical research has developed a wide 
range of theoretical constructs in order to explain this phenomenon (Unerman 2008; 
Bebbington, Larrinaga and Moneva 2008; Lanis and Richardson 2012). For 
instance, according to agency theory, CSR engagement is criticised as an attempt 
by managers to advance their own career and social agendas, at the costs of 
shareholders (Friedman 1970). Similarly derived from agency theory, de Villiers 
and van Staden (2010) document that CSR disclosure, specifically environmental 
disclosures, are in fact made in the interests of shareholders’ and managers who 
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are responsible to provide legitimate information designed to ameliorate agency 
related problems. 
Political economy theories such as stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory are also used to explain why corporations voluntarily disclose their CSR 
information. According to stakeholder theory, managers are motivated to disclose 
information designed to target powerful stakeholders (Deegan and Shelly 2013). 
Similarly, legitimacy theory suggests managers are motivated to supply 
information in order to secure resources that are deemed to be vital to the survival 
of the firm (Deegan and Shelly 2013). According to Reverte (2008), these two 
theories should not be seen as competing theories, but rather that they offer 
complementing insights in the understanding of firms’ decision in disclosing CSR 
related information. This study applies legitimacy theory as the theoretical 
framework to explain firms’ CSR communication patterns.     
  Legitimacy theory is defined as a “generalised perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 
1995, 574). The main tenet of legitimacy is the existence of a social contract 
(Shocker and Sethi 1973; Archel et al. 2009; Deegan, Rankin and Tobin 2002) 
with which organizations aim to comply with in order to continue using social 
resources (Dowling 2013; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) and to retain their licence to 
operate (Deegan, Rankin and Tobin 2002). The importance of this theory is that it 
focuses on the legitimacy gap which is derived when organizations’ actions do not 
conform to societal expectations (Archel et al. 2009). Consequently, one of the 
major assumptions of legitimacy theory is that, whenever there is a perceived 
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legitimacy gap which may affect the supply of critical resources to the organization, 
managers will pursue strategies to ensure the continued supply of those resources 
(Deegan, Rankin and Tobin 2002). 
Legitimacy theory has been widely adopted in corporate social 
responsibility reporting research in the context of developed countries (Patten 
2002; O’Donovan 2002; Deegan, Rankin and Tobin 2002). This chapter employs 
legitimacy theory as the theoretical framework to explain differences in the extent 
of CSR disclosures and the potential determinants of those disclosures. Significant 
legitimacy issues relating to social and environmental activities are prevalent in 
China. Based on legitimacy theory, it is expected that Chinese listed companies 
will engage in reporting social and environmental information in their annual 
reports or stand-alone CSR reports. This is partly due to the increasing number of 
social and environmental regulations implemented by the Chinese government and 
stock exchanges. Recently, China has been experiencing numerous societal and 
environmental problems. Some government reports indicate that the number of 
labour dispute cases filed climbed from 90,000 cases in 1998 to 500,000 in 2008 
(Lin 2010). Workers’ dissatisfaction mainly comes from low wages and poor 
working conditions which contribute to the country’s recent labour shortage 
problem (Knight, Deng and Li 2011). The unfair wealth distribution has also 
contributed to economic inequality, which was once regarded as incompatible with 
a socialist system (Lin 2010). Researchers have criticized that the government’s 
negligence in handling social issues and the exclusive focus on economic 
development are the main causes of social crises (Hao and Chen 2014). In addition, 
environmental degradation and pollution has become extreme in some parts of 
China. The Chinese government is openly concerned about these problems and has 
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admitted that the country is poorly prepared to tackle the impact of pollution 
(Cahan 2013).  
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
In this section, it is argued that legitimacy and institutional incentives drive 
the extent of CSR disclosures by Chinese largest firms. These incentives can be 
reflected in corporate behaviour such as avoiding being perceived as unethical tax 
avoider and defending poor environmental or social performance. Firms may 
choose to disclose their CSR activities in order to gain or sustain community 
legitimacy. For instance, firms may engage in philanthropic donations and seek to 
pay their fair share of taxes as activities designed to legitimize themselves with the 
community or government. Political connections of firms’ board members may 
also influence firms’ propensity to engage in CSR related activities and to disclose 
information relating to those activities. Several factors are considered to be 
important drivers of Chinese firms CSR disclosure practices. These factors are 
firms’ use of tax haven incorporated subsidiaries, whether the firm has been 
explicitly placed on an environmental watch-list by the government, the amount 
of philanthropic donations made by a firm, and political connections of firms’ 
board members. 
4.3.1 CSR and tax havens  
Prior research has shown that corporate tax strategies are linked with the 
nature and disclosure of CSR practices (Christensen and Murphy 2004; Sikka 2010; 
Lanis and Richardson 2012; Hoi, Wu and Zhang 2013; Fisher 2014; Davis et al. 
2016). Aggressive tax avoidance behaviour such as transfer pricing, income 
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shifting and incorporation of subsidiaries in tax haven jurisdictions are considered 
by the community to be fundamentally socially irresponsible and harmful to 
society as well as to the government (Christensen and Murphy 2004; Fisher 2014).  
The association between the extent of firms’ CSR disclosures and their 
propensity to use tax havens is examined to assess whether this assertion holds in 
the Chinese context. There are some empirical studies that have examined the 
association between CSR reporting and aggressive tax strategies (measured via 
effective tax rates or book-tax differences) (see e.g. Davis et al. 2016; Lanis and 
Richardson 2012). However, little work has examined the association between 
CSR reporting and tax haven use explicitly. Sikka (2010) accuses companies of 
being hypocritical when communicating that they are socially ethical while at the 
same time engaging in tax avoidance activities. Specifically, Sikka (2010) points 
out that it is important to have public scrutiny and debate on corporate hypocrisy 
and to keep pressuring firms to align their internal culture with their external 
claims. Recently, there has been increasing research that has demonstrated a link 
between tax avoidance in general and firms’ CSR practices. Jenkins and Newell 
(2013) argue that firms must make three key commitments in order to endorse a 
socially responsible tax strategy comprising use of arm’s length transfer pricing, 
avoiding or limiting incorporation of tax haven subsidiaries for tax avoidance 
purposes and avoiding constructing artificial financial arrangement for tax 
avoidance purposes. Conversely, firms that depict themselves as socially 
responsible should not rely on tax havens to pursue aggressive tax benefits.  
Based on risk management theory (Godfrey 2005; Col and Patel 2016), the 
use of tax havens for tax and arbitrage (e.g. financial, regulatory) opportunities 
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may jeopardise the positive image CSR oriented firms aim to achieve. This is 
manifested in anecdotal evidence where some of the world’s largest corporations 
were criticised widely as a consequence of unethically reducing tax obligations by 
exploiting tax benefits through different geographical jurisdictions (Sikka and 
Willmott 2010). Therefore, CSR legitimacy by way of increased CSR disclosure 
and tax haven utilisation may signal conflicting information to the market 
concerning firms’ real intentions regarding CSR legitimacy. Whilst increased CSR 
disclosure reflects active communication by managers designed to minimise the 
extent of information asymmetry, the ongoing and committed use of tax havens 
signal firms’ intentions to engage in secretive practices typified by the lack of 
information exchange.  
Based on the weight of evidence from prior research, it is expected that 
firms that use tax havens more extensively are less likely to extensively disclose 
CSR activities than their counterparts. Therefore, the following (directional) 
hypothesis is developed: 
H1: All else being equal, the extent of CSR disclosure is negatively associated with 
tax haven use of Chinese firms. 
4.3.2 CSR disclosure and adverse environmental publicity  
Prior CSR literature and legitimacy theory has found extensive evidence to 
suggest that legitimacy related incentives significantly drive accounting related 
voluntary disclosure. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) argue that, at a time when 
there was a lack of definition and reporting requirements relating to derivative 
financial instruments in accounting standards, managers voluntarily disclosed such 
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information primarily due to societal legitimacy and institutional pressures which 
could have posed a threat to firms’ reputation. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) also 
argue that financial reputation can be preserved and enhanced by having highly 
experienced staff, quality auditors combined with compliance with regulatory 
standards as well as industry sectors’ best practice guidelines.  
Firms has changed their attitude towards CSR disclosure from one of 
generally being forced by their broader stakeholders to disclose to one where firms 
proactively seek benefits from CSR disclosure by managing the general public’s 
perceptions of firms’ image ((Bebbington, Larrinaga and Moneva 2008; Deegan, 
Rankin and Tobin 2002; O’Donovan 2002; Patten 2002). This trend is also evident 
in Chinese context. Lu, Abeysekera, and Cortese (2015) examine 100 listed 
companies in China and find the quality of CSR reporting significantly affect 
corporations’ social reputation and that this relation has increased over time.  
Legitimacy theory predicts that management will act on positive CSR 
strategies when their firms are exposed to adverse exposure (O’Donovan 2002). 
Specifically, firms with poor social and environmental performance would be 
more likely to provide more positive information in order to offset their 
shortcomings (Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer 2013). This is evident in the Chinese context. 
Du (2015) finds that some firms spending generously on advertising campaigns 
deliberately deceive consumers when they were found guilty of supplying toxic 
products to the Chinese market. Du (2015) also suggests that weak law 
enforcement is to blame, as the system is powerless to penalise firms that violate 
social or environmental laws.  
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Informed by legitimacy theory and empirical findings, Chinese listed firms 
that have been exposed to certain negative publicity in relation to their 
environmental and social conduct have incentive to release more CSR related 
information such as charitable contributions in order to divert public’s attention 
from that bad news. Such information will evidently drive CSR disclosure 
coverage. An environmental watch list published by the Chinese Ministry of 
Environment Protection (MEP) lists China’s biggest polluters who have violated 
environmental laws.19 This name-and-shame mechanism can be damaging to firms’ 
reputation, which may motivate these firms to disclose more CSR related 
information in annual and other reports. Therefore the following (directional) 
hypothesis is developed: 
H2: All else being equal, the extent of CSR disclosure is positively 
associated with firms being recorded in the MEP’s watch-list.      
4.3.3 CSR and BOD’s Political Connection 
Rowe, Guthrie, and Paton (2009) argue that it is necessary to consider firms’ 
“guanxi business relationship” when studying the Chinese business environment. 
Guanxi refers to a type of relationship that at a certain point can become the 
facilitator of transactions via trust, communication and commitment (Ramasamy, 
Goh and Yeung 2006). Guanxi also incorporates gift giving and exchange of 
favour during the process of gaining specific privileges beyond societal norms as 
well as laws (Ramasamy, Goh and Yeung 2006). The nature of guanxi is such that 
it could potentially lead to a lack of transparency and monitoring by firm 
                                                             
19 The watch list is available for years 2004, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 for the 
period this study covers. 
   Page 111 of 169 
 
management and the board of directors. In such situations, guanxi is capable of 
nurturing irresponsible, illegal behaviour as well as corruption (Harvey 1999). Lau 
and Young (2013), on the other hand, suggest that guanxi originates from 
Confucian family values that may assist in the development of rules and policies. 
Furthermore, the past three decades of economic reform have changed the 
country’s cultural orientation such that there is sufficient evidence that the current 
behaviour of businesses is less ethical and less socially and environmental 
responsible (Shafer, Fukukawa and Lee 2006). 
Political connection is a subset of guanxi in that it is used to gain an 
advantage from government agencies for business purposes. Fisman and Wang 
(2015) reveal that many coal mining companies with powerful political 
connections often provide ownership stakes to local officials as an incentive to 
promote profit over safety. Having gained such political favour, companies are 
more likely to conceal unsafe activities and information on pollution. In the 
Chinese context, BODs’ personal political identity and connections assist firms’ 
to gain financially from their political connections. For instance, Tu, Lin, and Liu 
(2013) provide evidence that political connections are more important in China 
where higher levels of corruption and law enforcement are experienced as 
compared to that in developed countries. Fan, Rui, and Zhao (2008) report that 
firms with politically connected CEOs underperform relative to those without 
connections while note that Communist Party membership helps private 
entrepreneurs to obtain loans from state financial institutions. Francis, Hasan, and 
Sun (2009) find that firms in China with greater political connections are 
characterized by higher offering prices in the IPO market. Taken together, prior 
research provides evidence of the importance of political connections in 
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determining business decisions and behaviour. It is therefore not unreasonable to 
assert that political connections shaped identity will significantly influence CSR 
disclosure patterns.  
Further, legitimacy theory purports that managers will take various actions 
to ensure that their operations are perceived to be legitimate (Dowling and Pfeffer 
1975). The majority of academic supported legitimacy strategies such as educating 
the public, changing perceptions of the relevant public, and deflecting attention, 
rely heavily on communication with the relevant parties (Lindblom 1994). 
However, when political connection is misused to cover up irresponsible 
behaviour, less information will generally be available to the public. Piotroski, 
Wong, and Zhang (2015) believe political affiliated individuals are motived and 
capable of supressing bad news and this factor overshadows factors that promote 
transparency. Therefore, the following (directional) hypothesis is developed: 
H3:  All else being equal, there is a negative association between 
existence of political connection of firms’ board members and the extent of CSR 
disclosure of Chinese firms. 
4.4 Research design 
4.4.1 Sample selection and data source 
This study examines the extent of CSR disclosures over the period 2006–
2013, by some of the largest firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). 
This period was chosen because it transcends the introduction to the 
implementation of new Chinese CSR rules since 2010. Two criteria are applied in 
selecting the sampled firms: consecutive financial data must be available for the 
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2006–2013 periods, and firms must have had a continuous listing on the SSE over 
the 2006–2013 period. The top 100 companies are ranked according to the level of 
total assets in 2013. Following Gao (2008), the largest Chinese listed firms are 
considered to be more likely to disclose their CSR activities.  
The initial sample comprised the top 200 non-financial firms listed on the 
SSE listed over the 2006-2013 period. The sample was reduced to 100 firms (704 
firm-year observations) after applying the above selection criteria. Consistent with 
Y. Gao (2008), the larger Chinese companies play an exemplary role in Chinese 
CSR practice. This is not only because these companies have the resources to 
engage in CSR disclosure, but also because of the increasing societal demand for 
such information to be more transparent to the public (Gao 2008). Other data was 
obtained from Capital IQ. Overall, 704 firm-year observations were available for 
empirical testing. Financial and insurance firms are excluded because of the 
differences in reporting and regulatory practices of these firms. Finally, CSR and 
tax haven data was hand collected from the annual reports in order to obtain 
relevant data for the measurement of the variables, not all of which are available 
in electronic form in public databases. Other data was obtained from Capital IQ. 
Under the IAS 124 Related Party Transactions and IAS 127 Consolidated and 
Separate Financial Statements, it is a disclosure requirement for the annual reports 
of publicly-listed Chinese firms to include a list of their subsidiaries (including the 
country in which they are incorporated). Therefore the data relating to the use of 
tax havens can be identified from annual reports, which is then used to construct 
the tax haven measures. 
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4.4.2 Base OLS Regression Model and Variables 
The regression model used to examine the determinants of the extent of 
CSR disclosure is expressed as follows: 
CSRit = α0it + β1THit + β2WATCHit + β3DONit + β4Awardsit + β5POLit + 
β6AFit + β7BIG4it + β8CGit + β9 GOV_D it + β10BVMVit + β11SIZEit + β12ROAit + 
β13FIit + β14TANGit + β15INTANGit + β16RDit + β17-24INDit + β25-32YEARi + εit
    (1) 
where: i is firms 1–100; t is financial years 2006–2013; CSR = the natural 
logarithm of the number of environmental and social items, based on GRI 3.0, that 
are disclosed in firm i’s CSR report in year t;  TH = a dichotomous variable, coded 
as ‘1’ if firm i has at least one subsidiary resident in one of the tax haven countries 
in year t, or ‘0’ otherwise; WATCH = a dichotomous variable, coded as ‘1’ if firm 
i is identified as a significant polluter according to the MEP in year t, or ‘0’ 
otherwise; DON = the natural logarithm of the total donation expense incurred by 
firm i in year t; AWARDS = the natural logarithm of the total number of awards 
disclosed in firm i’s annual report in year t; POL = the total number of politically 
connected BOD scaled by the total number of BOD members in firm i in year t; 
AUDFEE = the natural logarithm of total audit fees in firm i in year t; BIG4 = a 
dichotomous variable, coded as ‘1’ if firm i’s  annual report is audited by one of 
the Big 4 accounting firms in year t, or ‘0’ otherwise; CG = corporate governance 
score comprising five governance items scaled by 5; GOV_D = a dichotomous 
variable, coded as ‘1’ if firm i is a state owned enterprise, or ‘0’ otherwise; BVMV 
= the book value of equity over market value of equity; SIZE = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; ROA = pre-tax profit over total assets; FI= the natural 
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logarithm of total foreign revenue; NPPE = net property, plant and equipment 
scaled by total assets; INTG = total intangible assets scaled by total assets; RD = 
total R&D expenses scaled by total assets; YEAR = a dummy variable, coded as 
‘1’ if the year falls within the specific year category, or ‘0’ otherwise; IND = a 
dummy variable, coded as ‘1’ if the firm is represented in the particular two-digit 
GICS industry category, or ‘0’ otherwise; and ε is the error term. 
In attempting to assess the extent and determinants of CSR reporting by 
the top 100 firms from the SSE, this chapter uses the extent of CSR disclosure as 
the dependent variable. It uses independent variables, comprising firm’s utilization 
of tax havens (TH), firms’ environmental performance (WATCH), firms’ level of 
philanthropic donations (DON), firms’ intention to seek societal agreement 
(AWARDS), and board of directors’ political connections (POL). It also uses 
control variables comprising level of auditing fees (AUDFEE), size of audit firm 
(Big4), strength of corporate governance structure (CG), government ownership 
(GOV), firms’ market capitalization (BVMV), firm size (SIZE), profitability 
(ROA), foreign revenue income (FI), net asset value (NPPE), firms’ investment in 
R&D (RD), industry sector and year fixed-effects. A summary of the variables’ 
definitions and measurement are presented in Appendix 4.A. 
The rationale for assessing the relationship between the extent of CSR 
disclosures and independent variables is as follows. There has been wide 
discussion in regard to whether corporations’ tax payment behaviour is a CSR 
issue (Davis et al. 2016). However, empirical evidence of the association between 
Chinese firms’ tax avoidance and CSR has been both limited and mixed (Lanis 
and Richardson 2012; Jenkins and Newell 2013). There is even less research 
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investigating the association between CSR disclosures and use of tax haven 
jurisdictions (e.g. Cai and Liu 2009; Chan, Lin and Mo 2010; Zeng 2010). Based 
on U.S. evidence, Davis et al. (2016) find that CSR disclosures is associated with 
tax avoidance and high spending on tax lobbying.  
4.4.3 Dependent variable: measurement of the extent of CSR disclosures 
This study adopts the social and environmental dimensions of the Global 
Reporting Initiative index (GRI G3) to measure the extent of Chinese listed firms’ 
CSR disclosures. This study adopts the GRI guidelines because they are 
recognized for their international adoption and influence (Noronha et al. 2013; Du 
2015). According to information on the GRI website, reporting type G4 appears to 
be the latest version of GRI index. However, the majority of the latest GRI reports 
uploaded to the GRI website by Chinese companies still follow reporting type G3. 
In addition the GRI also states that the G3 reporting style will continue to be 
recognised until the end of 2015. Therefore, GRI G3 is determined to be of greater 
relevance to the research period of this study. The disclosure index consists of a 
total of 70 items (see Appendix 2.C) that cover what are generally the two major 
dimensions of concern for companies, namely the social dimension (40 items) and 
the environmental dimension (30 items).  
The original GRI G3 index also includes an economic dimension. As this 
study will use a number of financially-related items as independent variables, the 
economic dimension will not be included in the GRI index in this study. Further, 
the social dimension is divided by the GRI into four key performance aspects, 
namely labour practices (14 items), human rights (9 items), society (8 items), and 
product responsibility (9 items). The dependent variable is (CSR) measured as an 
   Page 117 of 169 
 
index based on Global Reporting Index (GRI) version 3.0 that comprises a 
maximum of 70 social and environmental items. CSR is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the aggregated CSR score. CSR disclosure can be seen as managers’ 
attempts to reduce information asymmetry between the firm and the general public 
(Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer 2013).   
4.4.4 Independent variables  
This study examines five independent variables which are all related to 
firms’ identity awareness and reputation management. These independent 
variables are represented by the existence of subsidiaries registered in tax havens 
(TH), being identified as a significant polluter by the MEP (WATCH), 20  the 
amount of donation (DON), the number of awards disclosed in companies’ CSR 
reports (AWARDS) and BOD’s political connection (POL). Each of these 
variables was hand collected from firms’ annual reports and CSR reports. The 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires firms’ annual reports 
to disclose details of all subsidiaries and directors. TH is a dummy variable, coded 
as ‘1’ if the firm has at least one subsidiary registered in one of the OECD (2006) 
listed tax havens. The use of a dummy variable to measure the existence of tax 
havens has been applied in previous research by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006b), 
Dharmapala and Hines (2009) and Taylor and Richardson (2012). WATCH is a 
dummy variable, coded as ‘1’ if the firm is identified on the environmental watch 
list published by MEP.  
                                                             
20 The Watch list is released by the MEP 
(http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgt/201501/t20150107_293958.htm). Firms are 
individually identified for data collection. 
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Legitimacy theory predicts that poor environmental performers generally 
disseminate more positive social and environmental information to offset their 
shortcomings (Cho and Patten 2013). Firms’ donation (DON) represents the 
donation expense recorded in their annual reports. This variable is included as an 
explanatory variable because charitable contributions are considered to be an 
important driver of CSR disclosure and are associated with a positive corporate 
image and possible financial returns (Godfrey 2005; Brammer and Millington 
2006; Brammer and Millington 2008). DON is measured as the natural logarithm 
of the total donation expense incurred by the firm. AWARDS is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the total number of awards disclosed in a firm’s annual report. 
According to Unerman (2008), firms have reputational capital at stake and are 
cognizant of the fact that their financial and competitive position may be 
determined by how they engage with society. In order to actively manage and 
develop a socially strong reputation, firms would try to avoid negative publicity, 
whilst actively publicising their positive achievements. POL is measured as the 
proportion of the number of politically connected members on the board of 
directors. These measures of political connection are consistent with that used in 
prior literature (see e.g.Faccio 2006; Li, Long and Song 2015). A board member 
who is a member of the National People’s Congress Party is considered to be a 
politically connected person (Chen et al. 2011; Li, Long and Song 2015). The 
National People's Congress (NPC) is the highest body of state power in China; 
appointments of government officials are approved by the NPC. In addition, board 
members who hold current or past positions in the government are also identified 
as having political connections. 
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4.4.5 Control variables 
To control the other effects on the level of CSR disclosures by Chinese 
listed companies, several control variables are included in the models. Firstly, two 
variables that control for audit effects are included in the regression. Auditor 
quality, will be used to assess the relationship between audit characteristics and 
the extent of CSR disclosures. Secondly, the employment of Big-4 audit firms is 
included as these firms are more experienced in providing higher quality 
monitoring and assurance (Uyar 2017; Francis, Hasan and Sun 2009; Xiao and 
Yuan 2007). The big four are found to be responsible for providing integrity 
assurance for their clients’ CSR reports (Uyar 2017). However, they are also the 
masterminds behind complex tax planning strategies which often involve 
establishing tax haven operations (Sikka and Hampton 2005; Sikka and Willmott 
2010).  
Corporate governance (CG) is also included as a control variable. A 
substantial amount of research has suggested that the strength of corporate 
governance structures is positively related to firms’ performance (Tian and Lau 
2001) and transparency in terms of mandatory and discretionary reporting (Taylor, 
Tower and Neilson 2009; Eng and Mak 2003; Barros, Boubaker and Hamrouni 
2013; Ho and Wong 2001; Chua, Eun and Lai 2007). Under the corporate 
governance dimension, a firm can receive a score ranging between 0-5 depending 
on whether that firm has any of the five attributes indicative of effective 
governance. These five items represent core governance attributes specified in the 
2002 Chinese Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms (Rajagopalan and 
Zhang 2008). This provides an objective source for use of these governance 
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attributes. Additionally, these items are commonly used in the literature to measure 
the strength of corporate governance (Taylor, Tower and Neilson 2009; Chua, Eun 
and Lai 2007). The five items are the proportion of independent directors, the 
board of directors’ average age, the proportion of the board with outside 
directorship, board members’ meeting attendance and duality of CEO and 
chairmanship. Each governance item will be unweighted, consistent with the 
methodology applied in prior disclosure literature.  
In general, good corporate governance practices (such as board 
independence, the proportion of independent directors on the board, frequent board 
meeting, and separation of CEO and chairman roles are found to be positively 
associated with the extent of accounting disclosures (Barros, Boubaker and 
Hamrouni 2013; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Khan, Muttakin and Siddiqui 2012). 
Evidence also suggests that China has been adopting international corporate 
governance norms, such as implementation of the “Code of Corporate Governance 
for Listed Firms” (Rajagopalan and Zhang 2008). This code, adopted in 2002, 
provides evidence of radical governance reforms in China (Kakabadse, Yang and 
Sanders 2010). Theoretically, firms that seek institutional legitimacy and sound 
internal control may attempt to adopt an effective governance structure in order to 
comply with social norms and values (Meyer and Rowan 1977). One of the 
positive outcomes of good corporate governance is the increased degree of 
transparency (Ho and Wong 2001). Effective governance is expected to transform 
companies from the “inside out” so that external legitimacy can be achieved 
through continuing corporate communication. However, empirical results have not 
found consistent evidence. Liao, Lin, and Zhang (2016) found that having large 
boards, female directors and separate CEO and chairman positions is more likely 
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to result in firms engaging in CSR assurance, but they also found independent 
directors and directors with overseas directorship experience are not statistically 
significantly associated with CSR assurance.  
Furthermore, government ownership is also included as a control variable 
as there are a large number of state-owned enterprises (SOE) included in the 
sample. Management of SOEs may be more likely to disclose CSR information 
due to their allegiance with the controlling shareholder. Government ownership is 
measured as a dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if the firm is an SOE (the 
government controls more than 50% of the equity in the firm), or 0 otherwise. 
According to Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006a), firms with higher growth are more 
likely to establish tax haven operations to achieve t economies of scale. Similarly, 
Chen et al. (2010) find that firms with high growth or investment opportunities are 
likely to pursue a more complex operational and/or tax environment in order to 
efficiently control the flow of funds and reduce the cost of capital (Kim and Li 
2014). BVMV is measured as the book value of equity over market value of equity.  
Following the findings of Chen et al. (2010) that smaller firms in China are 
less likely to incorporate in tax havens, SIZE is also included as a control variable 
in the regression model. Similarly, Rego (2003) claims that larger firms are more 
capable of utilizing complex tax strategies including incorporating in tax havens 
to achieve economies of scale in order to reduce corporate taxes. Further, reflecting 
the potential non-tax incentives of tax haven utilization, larger firms are likely to 
achieve economies of scale in their ability to borrow or raise capital at lower costs 
and are better able to sustain earnings than smaller firms (Pittman and Fortin 2004). 
SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is included in the 
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regression model to control for operating performance and firm profitability. As 
most tax havens offer very low or zero tax, firms are attracted to the use of 
subsidiaries registered in these locations. This is because they can strategically 
manage their tax payments by moving profits from jurisdictions with high 
corporate tax rates to those with lower rates (Taylor and Richardson 2012). Kim 
and Li (2014) also find that more profitable firms can rely on their availability of 
resources to establish tax haven entities, particularly offshore financial centres. 
ROA is measured as pre-tax profit scaled by total assets. FORE is controlled for 
in the regression model because firms with foreign operations, especially those 
that have significant foreign income, would be more likely to strategically manage 
their financial position by utilising tax havens (Wilson 2009). Desai, Foley, and 
Hines (2006b) also find that firms with extensive foreign operations are more 
likely to establish foreign subsidiaries in tax havens. FORE is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total foreign revenue. The total net value of property, plant 
and equipment (TANG) is included as a control variable to control for capital 
intensity (Bradshaw, Liao and Ma 2012). TANG is measured as net property, plant 
and equipment over the total assets. 
Prior research has demonstrated that firms use intangibles and research and 
development to facilitate their tax avoidance practices (Clausing 2009; Sikka and 
Willmott 2010). Therefore, both intangible assets (TANG) and research and 
development (RD) are incorporated in the model as control variables. TANG is 
measured as total intangible assets scaled over total assets and RD is measured as 
total R&D expenditure scaled over total assets. Use of tax havens enhances firms’ 
financial secrecy (Kudrle 2009).  
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Finally, industry and year variables were included in the fixed effect model. 
IND dummy variables, defined by the two-digit Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) codes, are included as control variables in the regression model 
as tax haven use can fluctuate across different industry sectors (Rego 2003). Eight 
IND dummy variables are included in this study. They are consumer discretionary, 
consumer staples, energy, healthcare, industrials, materials, telecommunication 
services and utilities (with consumer discretionary being the omitted sector in the 
regression model). No sign predictions are made for the IND dummies. YEAR 
dummy variables are also included in the regression model to control for 
differences in CSR reporting activities that could possibly exist over the 2006–
2013 sample years (with the 2006 year being the omitted year in the regression 
model). No sign predictions are made for the YEAR dummies. 
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 (Panel A) provides the sample industry distribution based on 
GICS. The sample includes a greater proportion of firms in industrials (40 percent), 
materials (21 percent), and consumer discretionary (12 percent) sectors compared 
to the other industry categories. Moreover, Table 4.1 (Panel A) reports by industry 
classification (GICS), descriptive statistics for individual and aggregated 
categories of CSR items. Aggregated CSR disclosure is more prevalent in the 
utilities (28.24 percent), consumer staples (22.96 percent) and Healthcare (21.07 
percent) industry sectors as compared to the other industry sectors. The consumer 
discretionary sector is found to have the lowest response rate, even though it 
records the highest rate in terms of human rights disclosures (16.05 percent) among 
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the eight industry sectors. The energy and utilities sectors have the highest 
response rate on environmental disclosures, scoring 27.47 percent and 21.44 
percent respectively.   
Table 4.1 (Panel B) reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variable (CSR), independent variables (TH, WATCH, DON, AWARDS, and POL) 
and control variables (AF, BIG4, CG, GOV_D, BVMV, SIZE, ROA, FI, TANG, 
INTANG, and RD). To present useful results, total aggregated CSR scores are 
used, donations are recorded in millions of Chinese yuan (CNY), and the total 
number of awards is provided for in Panel B. The dependent variable (total 
aggregated CSR) has a mean of 12.933. The average number of GRI items 
disclosed by the sample firms is 12.933, which is 18.48 percent of the total 70 GRI 
items. The independent variables TH, WATCH, DON, AWARDS, and POL have 
means of 0.146, 0.398, 10.839, 5.32 and 0.326 respectively. Around 14.6 percent 
of firms sampled have at least one subsidiary incorporated in a tax haven. WATCH 
has a mean of 0.398, indicating that 39.8 percent of the firms studied were 
identified as significant polluters by MEP. DON reports a mean of 10.839, 
indicating that the average amount of donations made by firms sampled over the 
sample period is 10.839 million CNY. The standard deviation of DON is 46.785, 
which indicates a significant variability in the quantum of donations made. This 
suggests a relatively small number of firms contributed most of the donation. 
AWARDS reports a mean of 5.32, indicating that on average, firms report 5.32 
awards in their CSR reports. Similar to DON, the standard deviation of AWARDS 
is also high (9.087), indicating a large variance in the amount of awards firms 
publicise in their CSR reports. POL reports a mean of 0.326, suggesting that 32.6% 
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of board members are politically connected. The mean, median and range of the 
control variables are also reported in Table 4.1 (Panel B). 
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Panel B: Variable Summary  
          
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median 75th Percentile Maximum 
CSR 12.933 12.260 2.000 9.500 18.000 52.000 
TH 0.146 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.0000 
WATCH 0.398 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.0000 
DON 10.839 46.785 0.000 0.800 4.300 609.000 
AWARDS 5.320 9.087 0.000 3.000 8.000 125.000 
POL 0.236 0.221 0.000 0.200 0.333 0.9170 
AF 7.384 1.167 5.635 7.090 7.773 11.849 
BIG4 0.273 0.446 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.0000 
CORPG 0.651 0.203 0.000 0.600 0.800 1.0000 
GOV_D 0.776 0.418 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.0000 
BVMV 2.580 1.997 0.000 1.936 3.353 10.288 
SIZE 9.976 1.308 8.000 10.000 11.000 14.000 
ROA 0.068 0.063 -0.166 0.056 0.087 0.659 
FI 4.229 4.265 0.000 5.011 7.621 23.997 
TANG 0.402 0.259 0.017 0.374 0.636 0.8870 
INTANG 0.051 0.058 0.000 0.034 0.062 0.3130 
RD 0.007 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.0590 
Note: 
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 4.A.  
Table 4.1:  Summary Statistics    
Panel A: Sample distribution by industry sectors 
    
Industry sector 
Environment 
(30 items) 
Labour 
Practices 
(14 items) 
Human Rights (9 
items) 
Society 
(8 items) 
Product 
responsibility 
(9 items) 
Total 
CSR   
(70 
items) 
No.  
of 
Firm 
years Ranking 
Consumer 
Discretionary 12.83% 32.38% 1.38% 15.65% 16.14% 16.01% 96 6 
Consumer Staples 21.36% 42.57% 4.91% 24.29% 14.36% 22.96% 56 2 
Energy 27.47% 48.34% 14.27% 27.48% 14.19% 28.24% 64 1 
Healthcare 15.58% 36.20% 5.23% 17.00% 14.30% 18.43% 40 5 
Industrials 12.22% 33.53% 3.42% 17.19% 9.88% 15.65% 320 8 
Materials 14.73% 32.76% 2.36% 14.15% 7.86% 15.81% 168 7 
Tele- 
communication 
Service 8.75% 33.75% 16.50% 44.00% 16.50% 19.82% 8 4 
Utilities 21.44% 38.65% 8.58% 17.38% 8.25% 21.07% 48 3 
Total 15.37% 35.49% 4.46% 17.96% 11.05% 17.75% 800   
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4.5.2. Correlation results 
The Pearson correlation results are presented in Table 4.2 alongwith p-
values. Four independent variables (TH, WATCH, AWARDS and POL) are 
highly correlated to CSR, ranging from 0.091 to 0.776 (p < 0.01), which provides 
some preliminary (univariate) support for H1, H2, H3b and H4. Specifically, the 
correlation coefficients of WATCH and AWARDS are the most significant, 
ranging from 0.368 to 0.776 (p < 0.01), which is consistent with prior research (Du 
2015). The regression results also find that the CSR measure is significantly 
associated with the control variables (AF, BIG4, CORPG, GOV_D, BVMV, SIZE, 
ROA, FI, INTANG and RD). Table 4.2 also shows that collinearity among the 
explanatory variables is moderate (Hair et al. 2006).21 The highest correlation 
coefficient of –0.556 is between FSIZE and OCF (p < 0.01). Finally, the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) are tested for signs of multi-collinearity among the 
explanatory variables. The untabulated results suggest that all explanatory 
variables have VIFs well below 5; multi-collinearity is therefore not a problem in 
this study (Hair et al. 2006). 
 
                                                             
21 According to Hair et al. (2006), if a value of the correlation coefficient for a pair of 
explanatory variables lies between ± 0.25 to ± 0.75, then there is a moderate level of 
collinearity between the two variables. 
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Table 4.2:  Pearson Correlation  
 CSR TH WATCH DON AWARDS POL AF BIG4 CORPG GOV_D BVMV SIZE ROA FI TANG INTANG RD 
CSR 1                                 
TH 0.091***  1                               
  0.010                                 
WATCH 0.368*** -0.003 1                             
  0.000 0.934                               
DON 0.037 -0.093*** 0.032 1                           
  0.298 0.009 0.362                             
AWARDS 0.776***   0.082**       0.227***  0.005 1                         
  0.000 0.020 0.000 0.893                           
POL  0.141***   0.079** 0.029   -0.065*    0.057 1                       
  0.000 0.032 0.425 0.078 0.124                         
AF 0.438*** 0.164***     0.139***   -0.078**  0.265***   0.448***  1                     
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000                       
BIG4 0.187***  0.143***  0.066*    -0.117***    0.117***  0.287*** 0.637*** 1                   
  0.000 0.000 0.068 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000                     
CORPG -0.222*** 0.035     -0.209*** -0.029  -0.109***   -0.111***    -0.193***    -0.172***   1                 
  0.000 0.326 0.000 0.406 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000                   
GOV_D 0.104*** -0.014  0.064*       -0.191***  -0.004 0.293*** 0.148*** 0.224***  -0.203*** 1               
  0.003 0.697 0.070 0.000 0.908 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000                 
BVMV -0.133*** -0.080**  0.083**    0.121***   -0.150***  -0.107*** -0.136***    -0.088**  -0.038 -0.046 1             
  0.000 0.025 0.020 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.015 0.283 0.195               
SIZE   0.521***   0.238***   0.257***   -0.068*      0.369***   0.442***   0.756*** 0.449***  -0.194***   0.199***  -0.227***  1           
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000             
ROA -0.128***    -0.082** -0.032    0.157*** 0.142***  -0.002 -0.031 -0.022 0.050 0.049 0.317***   -0.089**    1         
  0.000 0.020 0.374 0.000 0.000 0.961 0.394 0.540 0.163 0.167 0.000 0.012           
FI   0.236***   0.286***  0.156***   -0.020 0.118***   0.052  0.287***   0.243***   0.010 0.077**  0.036  0.221***  -0.011 1       
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.584 0.002 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.791 0.038 0.341 0.000 0.774         
TANG 0.040 -0.046   0.173***   -0.017 -0.043 0.143*** 0.005 0.001 0.031  0.150***   -0.071**    0.146*** 0.044     -0.202*** 1     
  0.260 0.196 0.000 0.642 0.232 0.000 0.889 0.986 0.386 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.221 0.000       
INTANG  0.069*  -0.074**    0.096*** 0.043 0.099*** -0.008 0.031  0.133*** -0.011  0.137***  -0.065*   -0.049   0.131***  -0.112*** -0.072**    1   
  0.053 0.037 0.007 0.231 0.005 0.831 0.406 0.000 0.760 0.000 0.069 0.167 0.000 0.003 0.044     
RD  0.293*** 0.079**      0.091**   -0.005 0.262***  -0.084**  0.002 -0.034 0.001 -0.027 -0.030   0.081** -0.045      0.264***  -0.162***   0.076**    1 
  0.000 0.026 0.011 0.889 0.000 0.022 0.967 0.344 0.975 0.450 0.395 0.023 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.034   
Note: 
*, **, *** correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 4.A.
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4.5.3 Baseline Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results 
Table 4.3 reports results of the baseline OLS regression model that tests 
the association between the dependent and independent variables (with coefficient 
estimates and t-statistics provided in parentheses). 
The regression coefficient for CSR is shown by Table 4.3 to be 
significantly associated with the variables TH, WATCH, DON, AWARDS (p < 
0.05 or better). These results provide strong support for H1, H2, H3a and H3b, 
indicating that CSR disclosure behaviour is highly correlated with legitimacy and 
reputation management. However, the regression results do not find evidence to 
support suggestions that political connections are related to firms’ CSR disclosure 
practices. In terms of economic significance, on average, a one-standard deviation 
increase sampled firms’ TH results in a 0.092% (9 basis points) decrease in CSR. 
Additionally, on average, a one-standard deviation increase in sampled firms’ 
WATCH, DON and AWARDS results in CSR increasing by 0.067%, 385% and 
39.89% respectively. In addition, the regression coefficients suggest that the 
control variables, such as AF, CG, SIZE, FI, TANG and RD, are significantly 
associated (at p < 0.01) with CSR.  
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Table 4.3: Baseline OLS Regression Results 
  CSR  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
TH -0.2605***                   
  (-3.20)                   
WATCH   0.1371**                 
    (2.08)                 
POL     -0.1035 
      (-0.71)    
AF 0.1084** 0.1198*** 0.1186*** 
  (2.55) (2.80) (2.73) 
BIG4 -0.0803 -0.0914 -0.0854 
  (-1.01) (-1.15) (-1.07)    
CG -0.3796*** -0.3596*** -0.4044*** 
  (-2.78) (-2.59) (-2.94)    
GOV_D 0.054 0.0615 0.067 
  (0.77) (0.87) (0.93) 
BVMV 0.0234 0.0202 0.0234 
  (1.26) (1.08) (1.25) 
SIZE 0.2341*** 0.2099*** 0.2241*** 
  (6.33) (5.61) (6.03) 
ROA -0.8630* -0.7285 -0.7769*   
  (-1.87) (-1.57) (-1.68)    
FI 0.0244*** 0.0179** 0.0200*** 
  (3.18) (2.35) (2.63) 
TANG 0.3627*** 0.3630*** 0.3869*** 
  (2.94) (2.92) (3.11) 
INTANG 0.1876 0.106 0.2652 
  (0.40) (0.22) (0.56) 
RD 7.4902*** 7.5930*** 7.2669*** 
  (3.11) (3.13) (2.98) 
Intercept -1.9797*** -1.8957*** -2.0062*** 
  (-6.58) (-6.25) (-6.46)    
YEAR  YES YES YES 
IND  YES YES YES 
N 704 704 704 
Adjusted R-sq 0.6297 0.6265 0.6244 
Note: 
Coefficient estimates with t-statistics reported in parentheses. *, **, *** correspond to 
10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 4.A.
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4.5.4 Firm Fixed Effects 
Inferences about the association between CSR disclosure and the 
independent variables (TH, WATCH, and POL) are based on a pooled sample and 
time-series regression analysis, where multiple annual observations for the same 
firm are used. Although the standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity, 
within-firm clustering (e.g. Petersen 2009) in the main regression models helps to 
alleviate this concern. Further robustness is tested by estimating a firm fixed-
effects regression model version of Eq. (1), in which every firm and every year in 
the sample is assigned a dummy variable (e.g., Wooldridge 2010). The tabulated 
regression results in Table 4.4 indicate that the regression coefficients for CSR are 
statistically significant (p < 0.05 or better) for all independent variables except 
POL. This is consistent with the baseline OLS regression results. Thus, these sets 
of regression results show that the main results are not necessarily driven by any 
omitted time-invariant firm characteristics (Wooldridge 2010). 
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Table 4.4: Fixed Effect Regression Results  
  CSR  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
TH -0.2605***                   
  (-6.14)                   
WATCH   0.1371**                 
    (2.80)                 
POL     -0.1035 
      (-1.10)    
AF 0.1084 0.1198* 0.1186*   
  (1.89) (2.21) (1.96) 
BIG4 -0.0803 -0.0914 -0.0854 
  (-0.77) (-0.88) (-0.78)    
CG -0.3796* -0.3596* -0.4044*   
  (-2.34) (-2.07) (-2.35)    
GOV_D 0.054 0.0615 0.067 
  (0.79) (0.86) (0.99) 
BVMV 0.0234 0.0202 0.0234 
  (0.99) (0.88) (1.00) 
SIZE 0.2341*** 0.2099** 0.2241*** 
  (3.75) (3.39) (3.75) 
ROA -0.863 -0.7285 -0.7769 
  (-1.80) (-1.70) (-1.74)    
FI 0.0244*** 0.0179** 0.0200*** 
  (3.92) (2.97) (3.55) 
TANG 0.3627*** 0.3630** 0.3869*** 
  (3.76) (3.45) (3.84) 
INTANG 0.1876 0.106 0.2652 
  (0.82) (0.36) (1.01) 
RD 7.4902*** 7.5930*** 7.2669*** 
  (6.87) (6.70) (7.45) 
Intercept -1.0917 -1.0458 -1.1155 
  (-1.63) (-1.60) (-1.73)    
YEAR  YES YES YES 
IND  NO NO NO 
N 704 704 704 
Adjusted R-sq 0.3702 0.3895 0.3708 
Note: 
Coefficient estimates with t-statistics reported in parentheses. *, **, *** correspond to 
10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 4.A. 
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4.5.5 Interactions 
Regression results show that there is no significant relationship between 
political connections and firms’ level of CSR disclosure. The effect on firms’ CSR 
disclosure behaviour that can be attributed to the interaction between political 
connections of board members and the other independent variables is investigated. 
Results are presented in Table 4.5.  
The regression coefficient of the interaction term between politically connected 
boards and tax haven utilization (POL*TH) is positive and significant. Meanwhile, the 
regression coefficient of the interaction term between politically connected boards and 
firms being on an environmental watch-list (POL*WATCH) is negative and significant. 
These results show that politically connected boards enhance CSR disclosure levels, 
possibly because of the effect of political connections in driving CSR disclosure best 
practice and negating the effect that tax haven use may have in suppressing CSR 
disclosure. Firms with political connections that also use subsidiaries incorporated in 
tax havens are more likely to disclose greater amount of voluntary CSR information. 
This gives evidence to suggest that politically connected firms engaging in complex tax 
avoidance strategies may feel that it is necessary to manage their social reputation in 
order to direct the public’s attention to their positive societal contributions (Lindblom 
1994).  
In contrast, when big polluters have strong political connection, they tend to 
release less CSR information. According to Marquis, Zhang, and Zhou (2011), while 
China’s central government may have continued to address the environmental issues by 
setting up aggressive energy-saving plans and even empowering law enforcement to 
increase fines that apply to identified polluters, the implementation of the laws appears 
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to be inconsistent.22 This may give big polluters who are also heavily subsidised by the 
government an opportunity to sacrifice the environment in order to achieve high 
economic growth. In other words, the government’s prioritisation of economic success 
has undermined the country’s efforts in environmental protection efforts.23              
                                                             
22 The MEP is a central government agency. It was upgraded from vice ministry level to 
ministry level in 1998. In 2008, the central government upgraded the agency again to cabinet 
ministry level (Zhang 2012). 
23 The different segments within the Chinese government often have different goals and these 
sometimes contradict each other. This is well documented in Marquis, Zhang, and Zhou (2011). 
The fact that the MEP’s environmental protection programs and policies are frequently 
overridden by other ministries, such as bureaus of industry, commerce, and transportation, is 
the key reason for politically connected firms are not worrying about reputation management 
when they are being named and shamed. 
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Table 4.5: Interaction Effects  
CSR 
  Model 1 Model 2 
POL*TH 0.5533*   
  (1.69)   
POL*WATCH -0.4770* 
    (-1.92) 
TH -0.3875***   
  (-3.50)   
WATCH   0.2489*** 
    (2.84) 
POL (0.18) 0.0650 
  (-1.21) (0.38) 
AF 0.1150*** 0.1323*** 
  (2.66) (3.04) 
BIG4 (0.08) (0.09) 
  (-1.03) (-1.17) 
CG -0.3940*** -0.3597*** 
  (-2.88) (-2.59) 
GOV_D 0.0513 0.0684 
  (0.72) (0.96) 
BVMV 0.0238 0.0163 
  (1.28) (0.87) 
SIZE 0.2271*** 0.2063*** 
  (6.07) (5.49) 
ROA -0.8539* (0.72) 
  (-1.85) (-1.56) 
FI 0.0245*** 0.0184** 
  (3.18) (2.41) 
TANG 0.3995*** 0.3299*** 
  (3.19) (2.62) 
INTANG 0 0 
  (0.30) (0.19) 
RD 7.1098*** 7.4828*** 
  (2.94) (3.08) 
Intercept -1.9337*** -1.9428*** 
  (-6.18) (-6.26) 
YEAR FE YES YES 
IND FE YES YES 
N 704 704 
Adjusted R-sq 0.6305 0.6277 
Note: 
Coefficient estimates with t-statistics reported in brackets. *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 
5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 4.A. 
 
4.5.6 Blundell-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) regression analysis 
As another endogeneity check of the baseline regression results reported in 
Table 4.3, the Blundell-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) regression 
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analysis is employed to more accurately control for potential time-invariant 
correlated variables omitted from this study (Wintoki, Linck and Netter 2012; 
Kubick and Masli 2016; Pan and Tian 2016). The lagged dependent variable and 
the CSR are treated as endogenous variables in order to estimate the system GMM. 
Table 4.6 reports the Blundell-Bond GMM regression analysis results. 
The regression coefficients for dependent variables (including TH, 
WATCH, DON, AWARDS and POL) are shown by Table 4.6 to be significantly 
associated with CSR across all regression model specifications (p < 0.01). Hence, 
this particular set of results provides additional support for the hypotheses. The 
results indicate that some of the regression coefficients for the control variables 
(including AF, GOV_D, FI and RD) are significantly associated (at p < 0.10 or 
better) with CSR in at least three regression models. Several post-estimation tests 
were also performed. In particular, the Sargan test and Hansen test confirm the 
validity of the instruments used in the GMM model. 
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Table 4.6:  Blundell-Bond general methods of moments (GMM) Results 
CSR 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CSR 0.1114*** 0.1571*** 0.1992*** 
 (3.06) (3.16) (5.99)    
TH -0.2283**                 
 (-2.23)                  
WATCH  0.4673***                
  (3.00)                 
POL   0.5727**  
   (2.09)    
AF 0.1419*** 0.1711*** 0.0494    
 (3.00) (2.70) (1.14)    
BIG4 -0.0409 -0.0636 0.0056    
 (-0.35) (-0.55) (0.06)    
CG -0.0417 1.8698*** 0.4136    
 (-0.10) (4.62) (1.23)    
GOV_D 0.0874 0.2893*** 0.1667*   
 (0.76) (3.19) (1.72)    
BVMV 0.0215 0.0053 0.0170    
 (1.56) (0.28) (1.26)    
SIZE 0.0663 0.0222 0.1297*** 
 (1.19) (0.34) (3.71)    
ROA -0.2041 -0.4755 -0.3185    
 (-0.54) (-1.25) (-0.88)    
FI 0.0461*** 0.0261*** 0.0284*** 
 (3.93) (3.04) (3.39)    
TANG -0.0027 -0.2875 0.1210    
 (-0.02) (-1.43) (0.86)    
INTANG 0.2303 0.0644 0.6222    
 (0.54) (0.13) (1.55)    
RD 4.2329*** 5.7057*** 4.9171*** 
 (2.73) (3.51) (3.32)    
Intercept 0.0324 -1.3143*** -0.4078    
 (0.05) (-3.07) (-0.96)    
YEAR YES YES YES 
IND YES YES YES 
N 630 630 630 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions: 0.673   0.516  0.607 
Note: 
Coefficient estimates with t-statistics reported in parentheses. *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels of significance, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in appendix 4.A. 
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 4.6 Conclusions 
Based on a sample of 704 publicly-listed Chinese firm-years’ data, baseline 
regression results show that the extent of CSR disclosure is negatively related to 
firms’ use of tax haven jurisdictions. It is also positively related to the monitoring 
pressure applied by the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection by way of 
an environment watch-list registrar, the quantum of philanthropic donations made 
by a firm, receipt of environmental awards by a firm having politically connected 
members of the board of directors. The results are robust to additional analysis and 
endogeneity tests. This research is timely and important, given the rapid economic 
growth and industrialization of China and the increased importance placed by 
China’s government on firms’ reporting and accountability of CSR activities.  
This study contributes to the CSR literature in an economically significant 
and politically complex market. Unique empirical evidence is provided, assessing 
the association between CSR communication practices and elements of firms’ 
propensity to engage in social or environmental legitimacy by way of donations, 
awards. In particular, Chinese firms may make claims about being socially and 
environmentally responsible, but at the same time they may use tax havens to 
reduce the payment of corporate taxes. Firms that use tax havens may insulate 
themselves disclosing essential CSR information to stakeholders. Similarly, firms 
may face incentives to disclose more CSR information in order to revamp their 
reputation after being placed on an environmental watch-list by the government. 
Chinese firms may also legitimize operations through philanthropic activities, such 
as making donations, with the consequence that management discloses more 
extensive CSR information. Thus, legitimacy theory offers important insights into 
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the motivation of Chinese firms’ CSR disclosure practices. Future research in this 
area could examine the role of audit firms in facilitating compliance with CSR 
disclosure requirements, since the audit process in China is effectively governed 
and controlled by the Ministry of Finance. 
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Appendix 4.A: Variable Definitions and Measurement 
Dependent Variables:           
CSR = a continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of the total GRI 
3.0 (0-70) items observed from each company’s CSR report. 
 
Independent variables:            
TH = 1 if a firm utilise tax havens, or 0 otherwise. 
WATCH = 1 if a firm is identified on the watch list disclosed by MEP, or 0 otherwise  
POL = The total number of politically connected BOD members scaled by the 
total number of BOD members 
 
Control Variables:              
AF = a continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of the total audit 
fees 
BIG4 = a dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if the firm’s annual report was audited 
by one of the big 4 accounting firms, or 0 otherwise 
CG = A continuous variable, measured as a corporate governance score (0-5) 
scaled by 5. The corporate governance score consists of five dichotomous 
variables: 
 independent directors: coded as 1 if the percentage of independent 
directors exceeds the median (which is 0.3333), or 0 otherwise;  
 board of directors’ age: coded as 1 if the average age of the directors 
is lower than the median (which is 52), or 0 otherwise; 
 individuals on the board of directors (BOD) with outside directorship: 
coded as 1 if the percentage of directors holding outside directorship 
exceeded the median (which is 0.1538), or 0 otherwise;  
 board meeting attendance: coded as 1 if the percentage of directors 
attending all meetings exceeds the median (which is 0.8181), or 0 
otherwise; 
 duality of CEO and chairmanship: coded as 1 if the CEO of the 
company did not hold chairmanship, or 0 otherwise. 
GOV = A dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if firm is a state owned enterprise, or 
0 otherwise 
BVMV = A continuous variable, measured as the book value of equity over market 
value of equity (i.e. market capitalisation) 
SIZE = A continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets 
ROA = A continuous variable, measured as profit over total assets 
FI = A continuous variable, measured as the natural logarithm of total foreign 
revenue 
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Tang = A continuous variable, measured as total value of net property, plant and 
equipment over total assets 
INTG = A continuous variable, measured as total intangible assets over total assets 
RD = A continuous variable, measured as total R&D over total assets 
All continuous variables are winsorized (reset) at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines different aspects of corporations’ economic and societal 
behaviour. Specifically, this study investigates use of tax haven jurisdictions, incentives 
to hold cash and determinants of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The empirical 
evidence is examined in an emerging market (China) context. Data from some of the 
largest companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange covering 2006-2013 period are 
collected. The period selected witnessed the introduction of some major economic, tax 
and CSR policy reforms. A number of new laws and regulations were passed and took 
effect during this period. China implemented the new Corporate Income Tax law on 1 
Jan, 2008. The new law has a profound effect on companies’ choice of capital structure 
(An 2012). In regard to the promotion and regulation of CSR disclosure, the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (MEP) launched “Green IPO” policy with China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2008. The policy requires meeting 
environmental standards as one of the conditions for equity and debt financing by 
energy-intensive companies; the SSE also undertook several initiatives in order to 
encourage and regulate listed companies’ CSR disclosure ("Current Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National Governments and Stock Exchanges"  
2012).  
This period has also witnessed the rise of significant environmental and societal 
issues that could potentially hinder the sustainable development of the country. China’s 
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unprecedented economic development appears to have come with huge environmental 
and societal cost. Being the world’s largest energy and resource consumer and the 
largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, the Chinese government is under pressure to 
reduce the energy consumption and the intensity of GHG emissions (Liu et al. 2012). 
According to Liu et al. (2012), the Chinese government led a number of pollution 
combating initiatives since 2009. For instance, the government has since applied 
stringent assessments in opening new fossil fuel power plants. In the meantime, existing 
coal-burning power plants with inefficient capacity were required to be closed.  
The period examined by this thesis (2006-2013) is best described as one of 
transition – a transition that is evident in the social and economic aspects of Chinese 
government’s policies. It is also a transition period for Chinese business, as they change 
from a high energy consumption model to a low-carbon model. In light of the above 
changes in contemporary China’s market, this study provides a timely assessment of 
three attributes: Chinese firms’ tax havens utilization, cash holding policy and their 
disclosure practices relating to CSR issues.  
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5.2 Summary of Major Findings 
A summary of major findings of each essay are presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Summary of the findings 
Chapter  Hypotheses Findings  
Two  i. Chinese firms’ use of tax havens is negatively associated 
with the extent of CSR-driven activities; 
ii. The strength of corporate governance structure is 
associated with tax haven utilization. 
Strong 
Support 
Three i: Tax haven utilization is positively associated with a firm’s 
cash holdings; 
ii: Shareholder concentration is positively associated with a 
firm’s cash holdings; 
iii: The strength of corporate governance structure is 
positively associated with a firm’s cash holdings. 
Strong 
Support 
Four i: The extent of CSR disclosure is negatively associated 
with tax haven use of Chinese firms. 
ii: The extent of CSR disclosure is positively associated 
with firms being recorded in the MEP’s watch-list.      
iii: The extent of CSR disclosure is positively associated 
with the quantum of philanthropic donations made by 
Chinese firms.  
iv: The extent of CSR disclosure is positively associated 
with the number of awards firms received in relation to 
environmental matters.  
Strong 
Support 
 
The first essay presented as Chapter 2 examines the association between CSR 
and firms’ propensity to utilise tax havens. Overall, the level of tax haven utilisation by 
sampled firms is moderate. Approximately 14.6% of the firms sampled are identified 
as tax haven users. Supported by tenets of agency and legitimacy theory, regression 
results show that the extent of positive CSR activities reflected by way of the publicity 
of CSR achievements, increased CSR disclosure levels and existence of CSR related 
donations are negatively associated with tax haven utilization. The more extensively 
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firms engage in activities designed to enhance their connections with society, including 
the community, shareholders, and government, the less likely they will risk in 
employing tax havens as part of their business strategy. Tax haven jurisdictions provide 
avenues for Chinese multinational firms to engage in obscure and complex taxation or 
financial arrangements that may be reflected in lack of legitimacy by those firms. In 
addition, a statistically significant positive association between strength of governance 
structure and tax haven utilization demonstrates that efficiency in governance regimes 
assists firms in engaging in and utilizing complex arrangements via tax haven 
utilization.  
Chapter 2 contributes to the existing CSR and sparse tax avoidance literature in 
the Chinese context. It extends the CSR literature by taking a number of unique CSR-
driven activities into consideration. By doing so, the essay is able to present evidence 
that suggests Chinese firms achieve legitimacy by publicising their philanthropy 
donation, community recognition and other related CSR activities. Further, the 
empirical evidence is also able to demonstrate that firms which aim to achieve societal 
legitimacy are less likely to incorporate subsidiaries in tax haven jurisdictions. Finally, 
Chapter 2 also finds that stronger corporate governance structure of firms appears to 
drive the utilisation of tax havens. This provides importance evidence regarding the 
implication of corporate governance in strategic business decision making process.      
The second essay presented as Chapter 3 examines the determinants of Chinese 
firms’ corporate cash holdings. The empirical results suggest that large listed firms in 
China generally hold high levels of cash. On average, the cash to total assets ratio from 
the sample selected firms during the period studied is 15%. Among the eight industry 
sectors identified, the consumer staples and healthcare industry sectors hold the highest 
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level of cash, having cash to total non-cash assets ratio of 34.78% and 31.91% 
respectively. The empirical regression results show that tax haven utilization has a 
significant positive association with firms’ level of cash holdings. Further, a statistically 
significant positive association between the strength of governance structure and firms 
level of cash holdings is evident. This provides important evidence that suggest the 
purpose of using tax havens is not only simply to take advantage in the tradition sense, 
of tax avoidance, but also to facilitate their business transactions. In China, round 
tripping of foreign direct investment funds is evident particularly in the case of large, 
profit-making public SOEs. The potential benefits associated with use of tax havens 
appear to exceed potential costs, leading to the observed positive association between 
these variables. Chinese firms with large controlling shareholders and better governed 
firms are expected to have lower agency-principal costs potentially reducing market 
frictions taking hold such as adverse selection where firms may invest excess funds in 
poor projects or by engaging in rent extraction where funds are used for the benefit of 
directors or minority parties at the expense of shareholders.  
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on firms’ incentives to hold cash in a 
major relations based economy. Despite some research having been conducted in the 
area of management (e.g.Garcia-Herrero, Xia and Casanova 2015; Morck, Yeung and 
Zhao 2008; Kolstad and Wiig 2012), there is only sparse research examining the impact 
of tax haven use on firms’ cash flow policy in the accounting literature. This chapter 
highlights the important role tax haven utilization plays in assisting Chinese firms to 
reduce their business costs, taking advantage of regulatory arbitrage, and ultimately 
enabling firms to participate in an expanded set of capital markets.  
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The third essay presented as Chapter 4 examines the extent of CSR disclosures 
of Chinese listed firms. Overall, the average level of CSR disclosure made by listed 
Chinese firms is still relatively low. The mean level of reporting of GRI items is 12.933, 
which is 18.48 of the total 70 reporting items listed under GRI3.0. This suggests that 
the CSR disclosure practice is regulation-driven. However, CSR disclosure enables 
firms to achieve political legitimacy by complying with the stock exchange’s 
requirements.  
Firms that tend to disclose CSR activities possess a number of unique attributes: 
First, they participate in philanthropic activities. These firms record a mean of 10.839 
million CNY annual charitable donations over the studied period. Second, these firms 
actively publicise their CSR achievements, suggesting the Chinese firms consider 
receiving awards and trophies as symbolic evaluation of their CSR achievements. 
Finally, these firms are also big polluters. Some 39.8% of the firms studied are 
identified as big polluters and are under Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP)’s 
watch-list.  
The regression results show that extent of CSR disclosure is negatively related 
to firms’ use of tax haven jurisdictions, positively related to the monitoring pressure 
applied by MEP by way of an environment watch-list registrar, the quantum of 
philanthropic donations made by a firm, and receipt of environmental and social awards 
by a firm. Further, regression results also find that firms disclose more CSR information 
are if they are politically connected, and use tax havens. This result may signal that 
politically connected board members may have pressure to be transparent on other 
matters, such as CSR, when they associate themselves with tax haven dealings. Finally, 
the empirical evidence also suggests that politically connected firms choose to be less 
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CSR transparent when they are named on the MEP’s environmental watch-list. This 
result is consistent with extant evidence (e.g. Marquis, Zhang and Zhou 2011) that 
suggests MEP lacks power in implementing and penalising heavy polluters.   
This essay contributes to the CSR literature by incorporating modern CSR 
disclosure practices in an economically significant and political complex market. This 
research is timely and important given the rapid economic growth and industrialization 
of China and the increased importance placed on reporting and accountability of firms 
by the Chinese government. In addition, this chapter also contributes to CSR literature 
by examining specific CSR-driven activities Chinese firms adopt as part of their 
legitimation strategies and their association with the extent of CSR disclosure in CSR 
reports.    
5.3 Directions for future research  
The findings of the thesis add to our knowledge of the tax haven utilisation, 
corporate cash holdings behaviour and CSR disclosure practices of large listed Chinese 
firms. More research is needed to gain further knowledge of the association between 
the implications of the tax haven use and firms’ tax savings and related party 
transactions. Further work on Chinese firms’ cash holdings is also needed by examining 
the effect of related party transactions on cash holdings. In regard to future CSR studies, 
more knowledge is also needed to examine the role of audit firms in facilitating 
compliance with CSR disclosure requirements since the audit process is effectively 
governed and controlled by the Ministry of Finance in China. 
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